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					ABSTRACT	OF	THE	DISSERTATION		Responsibility,	Reasons-responsiveness,	and	History					 by					 Craig	Kushel	Agule			Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	Philosophy			University	of	California,	San	Diego,	2017			Professor	David	Brink,	Co-Chair	Professor	Dana	Kay	Nelkin,	Co-Chair				 I	 argue	 for	 an	 ahistorical	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility.	 An	 agent	 is	responsible	for	her	behavior,	and	is	thus	a	fitting	target	of	reactive	attitudes	such	as	praise	and	blame,	if	and	only	if	the	agent	acts	while	in	the	possession	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	to	recognize	reasons	and	to	act	in	accord	with	the	reasons	she	 recognizes.	 We	 need	 not	 augment	 this	 account	 with	 conditions	 tied	 to	 the	agent’s	 history,	 as	 the	 account	 can	 provide	 satisfying	 explanations	 for	 cases	 of	culpable	 incapacity	 (where	 the	 agent	 is	 incapacitated	 because	 of	 her	 prior	
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misbehavior)	 and	of	 bad	history	 (where	 the	 agent’s	wrongdoing	 is	 the	product	 of	having	 been	 neglected	 or	 mistreated).	 This	 ahistorical	 account	 of	 moral	responsibility	shows	us	that	responsibility	is	about	the	sort	of	agent	you	are	when	you	act,	not	about	what	happened	in	your	past.			
	1	
Introduction	
Imagine	 two	 killers.	 The	 first	 killer,	 delirious	 after	 drinking	 and	 taking	barbiturates	 for	 days,	 armed	 the	whole	 time,	 shoots	 and	 kills	 a	 close	 friend.	 This	killer	has	only	a	tenuous	grasp	upon	the	world	and	later	has	little	recollection	of	the	killing.	The	second	killer	had	a	horrendous	childhood.	He	was	abused	and	neglected	by	 both	 his	 parents	 and	 civil	 institutions.	 As	 an	 adult,	 he	 shoots	 and	 kills	 two	innocent	 teenagers	 in	 the	 course	 of	 a	 complex	 crime.	 This	 second	 killer	 is	 cold,	calculating,	 and	 malicious,	 and	 he	 later	 considers	 compounding	 the	 wrong	 by	taunting	the	victims’	families.		Blame	 might	 seem	 called	 for	 in	 both	 cases.	 Intentional	 murder	 is	 deeply	wrong,	and	these	murders	particularly	so.	In	both	cases,	blaming	these	killers	might	be	 an	 important	 way	 that	 we	 could	 experience	 our	 moral	 repugnance	 at	 their	behavior	 and	 recognize	 the	moral	 importance	 of	 their	 victims.	But	 it	 is	 important	not	to	blame	indiscriminately.	Doing	so	might	rob	blame	of	its	import,	and	blaming	those	who	 are	 not	 due	 blame	 seems	 intuitively	wrong.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 get	 our	blaming	right.	Part	 of	 the	 story	 of	 getting	 blame	 right	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 the	behavior	at	issue,	whether	the	behavior	was	wrongdoing	or	not.	Were	we	to	find	out	that	one	of	the	killings	was	somehow	justified,	perhaps	in	a	complicated	case	of	self-defense,	that	might	make	blame	inappropriate.	But	another	part	of	the	story	of	the	appropriate	reactions	has	to	do	with	the	agent’s	relationship	to	the	behavior.	This	is	the	 question	 of	 responsibility.	 One	 powerful	 explanation	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	
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appropriate	blame	identifies	responsibility	with	the	possession	of	certain	normative	capacities,	 in	particular	the	capacity	to	perceive	moral	reasons	and	the	capacity	to	act	in	accord	with	one’s	perceptions.	This	is	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	 responsibility.	 The	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacity	 can	 explain	 why	ordinary	 healthy	 adults	 are	 responsible	 but	 children	 and	 the	mentally	 ill	 are	 not.	The	adults	possess	the	normative	capacities,	but	the	capacities	are	still	developing	in	 children,	 and	 the	 capacities	 are	 compromised	 in	 at	 least	 some	 cases	 of	mental	illness.	On	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account,	 it	 might	 seem	 likely	 that	 the	 first	killer	 is	 going	 to	 be	 excused	but	 the	 second	killer	will	 be	 responsible	 and	 thus	 to	blame.	After	all,	at	the	time	of	their	killings,	the	first	killer	was	delirious,	while	the	second	killer	was	cold	and	calculating.	These	descriptions	might	lead	us	to	suspect	that	 the	 first	killer’s	normative	capacities	were	significantly	compromised,	but	 the	second	 killer’s	 were	 not.	 These	 apparent	 verdicts	 conflict	 with	 the	 reports	 many	give	 in	response	 to	 these	 two	cases,	especially	when	 the	cases	are	 fully	described.	Many	 think	 that	 the	 first	 killer	 is	 plainly	 to	blame	and	 the	 second	killer	 is	 at	 best	partially	to	blame.	This	is	because	many	think	that	any	satisfying	account	of	moral	responsibility	 must	 take	 into	 consideration	 an	 agent’s	 history	 in	 addition	 to	whatever	else	it	might	consider.	So	does	history	matter?	Of	course,	an	agent’s	history	might	explain	why	the	agent	is	or	is	not	reasons-responsive.	Supposing	that	the	first	killer	was	not	reasons-responsive,	it	stands	to	reason	that	his	normative	incapacity	was	the	causal	upshot	
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of	 his	history	of	 abusing	 alcohol	 and	drugs.	And	an	 agent’s	history	might	be	 good	evidence	of	the	agent’s	current	normative	capacities.	For	instance,	even	if	we	did	not	have	 the	 report	 that	 the	 first	 killer	was	 delirious,	 the	 history	 of	 alcohol	 and	 drug	abuse	might	lead	us	to	suspect	that	he	was	not	fully	reasons-responsive.		However,	the	core	reasons-responsiveness	account	does	not	give	history	any	direct	 role	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 moral	 responsibility,	 and	 so	 if	 the	 common	responses	 to	 these	 cases	 are	 correct,	 these	 cases	pose	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	responsibility.	Surely	the	first	killer	cannot	point	to	his	own	reckless	self-incapacitation	to	appeal	for	an	excuse	for	murdering	his	friend,	and	yet	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 seems	 ill-prepared	 to	 explain	why	he	could	not	make	that	appeal.	The	case	of	 the	 first	killer	 thus	suggests	 that	reasons-responsiveness	is	not	necessary	for	moral	responsibility,	because	it	seems	that	the	first	 killer	 is	morally	 responsible	 for	 his	 killing	 despite	 not	 having	 been	 reasons-responsive	at	the	time.	Then	consider	the	second	killer.	We	might	suppose	it	to	be	true	 that	 he	 was	 in	 control	 of	 his	 killings	 in	 the	 way	 articulated	 by	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	account.	But	we	might	consider	it	no	surprise	that	the	second	killer	became	a	killer	when	we	 think	of	his	childhood.	We	might	 think	 that	anyone	with	those	experiences	might	have	become	a	vicious	killer,	and	that	realization	seems	to	temper	 our	 blame	 toward	 the	 second	 killer.	 Thus,	 the	 case	 of	 the	 second	 killer	suggests	that	reasons-responsiveness	is	not	sufficient	for	moral	responsibility,	since	his	history	 tells	 against	his	moral	 responsibility	despite	his	being	 apparently	 fully	reasons-responsive.	
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Cases	 like	 these	 lead	many	 theorists	 to	 insist	 that	 any	 adequate	 theory	 of	moral	 responsibility	must	be	historical,	 that	 is,	 that	 any	adequate	 theory	of	moral	responsibility	 must	 give	 history	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 the	 fixing	 of	 moral	responsibility.	 Some	 historicists	 think	 that	 these	 cases	 mean	 that	 reasons-responsiveness	 should	 be	 abandoned	 for	 an	 alternative	 and	 historicist	 account	 of	moral	responsibility,	while	some	historicists	think	that	reasons-responsiveness	can	be	modified	to	add	a	limited	but	important	historicist	element.	I	reject	both	of	these	moves.	 Instead,	 I	 defend	 an	 ahistorical,	 reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 of	 moral	responsibility.	 An	 agent	 is	morally	 responsible	 for	 her	 behavior	 if	 and	 only	 if	 she	was	 reasons-responsive	 at	 the	 time.	 We	 do	 not	 have	 reason	 to	 give	 history	 any	fundamental	role	to	play.	My	 defense	 of	 this	 ahistorical	 view	 follows.	 In	 Part	 I	 of	 my	 dissertation,	 I	defend	 the	 core	 reasons-responsiveness	account.	 I	 first	outline	 the	 sense	of	moral	responsibility	 at	 issue:	 an	 agent	 is	morally	 responsible	 for	her	behavior	when	 the	agent	is	a	fitting	target	for	reactive	attitudes	like	resentment,	indignation,	and	guilt.	I	then	show	that	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	provides	a	good	explanation	of	when	these	attitudes	are	fitting:		it	provides	an	extensionally	satisfying	account	for	cases	 of	 widely	 accepted	 excuses	 like	 immaturity	 and	 insanity,	 and	 it	 provides	 a	satisfying	 sense	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 control	 usually	 thought	 to	 be	 central	 to	 moral	responsibility.	 In	 Part	 II,	 I	 turn	 to	 face	 the	 question	 of	 history.	 After	 outlining	 the	sort	of	history	at	 issue,	I	 look	at	the	two	sorts	of	cases	often	thought	to	mandate	a	historical	theory	of	moral	responsibility.	For	both	sorts	of	cases,	I	show	that	we	can	
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satisfyingly	 explain	 our	 reactions	 to	 the	 cases	 and	 the	 agents’	 histories	 with	 the	robust	resources	of	the	ahistorical	reasons-responsiveness	theory.	This	requires	us	to	be	careful	about	the	behavior	at	issue,	and	it	requires	us	to	attend	closely	to	the	sorts	 of	 reactions	 at	 stake.	 But	 this	 careful,	 close	 examination	 shows	 that	 the	reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 is	 itself	 satisfying,	without	 any	 historicist	 element,	even	for	these	cases.	Showing	 that	 the	 ahistorical,	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 can	 provide	satisfying	 explanations	 of	 the	 cases	 often	 thought	 to	 compel	 historicism	 does	 not	mean	 that	 historicism	 is	 false--some	 alternative	 defense	 of	 the	 fundamental	relevance	of	history	might	be	availing.	However,	 these	cases	are	often	 taken	 to	be	the	 strongest	 support	 for	 historicism,	 and	 so	 offering	 satisfying	 ahistoricist	explanations	of	 the	 cases	 shifts	 the	burden	of	 argument	 to	 the	historicist,	 thereby	giving	the	reasons-responsiveness	theorist	good	reason	to	maintain	ahistoricism.	
	6	
Chapter	1	 Reactive	attitudes	and	responsibility	
Praise	 and	blame	 lie	 at	 the	 center	of	my	 concerns	 about	 responsibility	 and	history.	 These	 are	 personally	 familiar	 attitudes	 to	 me.	 I	 have	 experienced	 being	resentful	towards	someone	for	how	they	had	behaved	toward	me,	feeling	the	heat	of	my	anger,	my	sense	of	the	wrong,	and	the	import	I	took	their	wrong	to	have	for	how	I	saw	them,	how	I	would	interact	with	them.	Although	moral	philosophers	have	long	taken	 these	 attitudes	 to	 have	 special	 importance,	 they	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 a	renewed	 focus	 since	 P.	 F.	 Strawson’s	 landmark	 1962	 essay	 “Freedom	 and	Resentment.”1	For	 Strawson	 and	 the	 many	 philosophers	 who	 follow	 him,	 these	attitudes	 are	 the	 attitudes	 we	 take	 by	 virtue	 of	 seeing	 each	 other’s	 behavior	 as	expressing	 value.	 As	 Strawson	 writes,	 these	 “participant	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	essentially	natural	human	reactions	to	the	good	or	ill	will	or	indifference	of	others	towards	us,	as	displayed	in	their	attitudes	and	actions”	(2008,	pp.	10–11).		Accordingly,	 I	begin	my	 investigation	by	offering	an	account	of	 the	reactive	attitudes	and	their	relationship	to	my	theory	of	moral	responsibility.	This	account	is	in	 significant	 part	 a	 synthesis	 of	 the	 extant	 accounts	 which	 populate	 the	 moral	responsibility	literature.	My	reliance	upon	the	account	is	supported	by	its	popularity	and	by	its	intuitive	fit	with	my	own	experiences	of	praise	and	blame	(and	hopefully	likewise	with	my	readers’	experiences	of	praise	and	blame).	This	account	is	for	the	most	part	stipulative,	though	hopefully	its	usefulness	in	addressing	the	issues	raised	through	the	course	of	this	dissertation	provides	it	further	support.																																																									1	I	cite	the	version	of	this	essay	reprinted	in	Strawson	(2008).	
7	
	
1.1	 The	elements	of	the	reactive	attitudes	In	this	section,	I	present	my	account	of	the	reactive	attitudes	(and	especially	of	praise	and	blame).	I	begin	with	three	widely	recognized	characteristic	elements	of	reactive	 attitudes:	 	 their	 propositional	 content,	 their	 phenomenology,	 and	 their	associated	 behavioral	 dispositions.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 elements,	 I	 follow	 several	recent	 scholars	 in	 recognizing	a	 fourth,	perceptual	element.	The	 reactive	attitudes	frame	our	perception	of	the	agents	to	whom	we	are	reacting.	In	developing	these	four	features	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	I	take	inspiration	from	the	recent	literature	seeing	the	reactive	attitudes	as	a	particular,	complex	type	of	emotion.	This	 literature--and	especially	 the	work	of	Lucy	Allais	(2008a,	2008b),	Elisa	Hurley	and	Colleen	Macnamara	(2010),	Macnamara’s	later	independent	work	(2015),	 and	 Leonhard	 Menges	 (2017)--has	 made	 clear	 the	 importance	 of	 the	distinctively	 emotional	 aspects	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes,	 and	 I	 follow	 those	philosophers	in	that	emphasis.2	
																																																								2	While	I	believe	that	it	is	true	that	the	reactive	attitudes	are	complex	emotions,	I	do	not	 take	 that	 to	 be	 a	 premise	 from	 which	 I	 might	 establish	 the	 elements	 of	 the	reactive	attitudes.	Rather,	my	claims	regarding	the	elements	of	the	reactive	attitudes	are	 largely	 taken	 from	 introspection	 and	 from	 support	 from	 within	 the	 moral-responsibility	 literature.	 The	 supposition	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 complex	emotions	 might	 buttress	 my	 conclusions	 regarding	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes,	but	it	does	not	provide	the	central	support.	Because	of	this,	and	because	a	significant	part	of	my	project	is	to	pick	out	the	concepts	at	issue	in	talk	of	praise	and	blame,	I	leave	for	later	the	work	of	checking	the	fit	between	philosophers’	work	on	the	 reactive	 attitudes	 and	psychologists’	work	 on	putatively	 similar	 phenomena.	 I	thank	Dana	Kay	Nelkin	for	pointing	me	to	the	importance	of	this	separate	project.	
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1.1.1	 Manifested	quality	of	will		The	reactive	attitudes	have	propositional	content:	 	they	are	sensitive	to	and	expressive	 of	 our	 perceptions	 and	 assessments.	As	 Strawson	 explains,	we	 can	 see	the	 propositional	 content	 in	 “the	 great	 extent	 to	which	 our	 personal	 feelings	 and	reactions	 depend	 upon,	 or	 involve,	 our	 beliefs	 about	 [agents’]	 attitudes	 and	
intentions”	 (2008,	 p.	 5,	 emphasis	 mine).	 That	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 content-sensitive	 is	 particularly	 clear	 from	 the	 way	 that	 our	 attitudes	 dissolve	 or	 change	when	 we	 correct	 our	 beliefs	 about	 others’	 attitudes	 and	 intentions.	 My	 blame	weakens	or	dissolves	when	I	learn	that	an	apparent	wrongdoer	bore	no	ill	will	but	rather	 had	 intended	 to	 do	 right.3	And	 my	 praise	 dissolves	 when	 I	 learn	 that	 an	apparent	rightdoer	was	acting	on	the	basis	of	self-serving	attitudes.	My	praise	and	blame	are	beholden	to	my	judgments	about	the	facts,	revealing	that	my	praise	and	blame	bear	content.	The	nature	of	the	content	at	issue	can	vary.	While	Strawson	takes	quality	of	will	to	be	the	content,	R.	Jay	Wallace	(1994)	explains	that	the	reactive	attitudes	are	our	 reactions	 to	 our	 assessment	 of	 how	 agents’	 behavior	 meets	 our	 normative	expectations.	 In	 general,	 however,	 contemporary	 Strawsonians	 hold	 that	 the	reactive	 attitudes	 regard	 quality	 of	 will,	 and	 so	 we	 can	 see	 praise	 and	 blame	 as	reactions	to	good	will,	ill	will,	or	indifference	displayed	in	actions	and	attitudes.	This	means	 that	 the	 Strawsonians	 should	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 quality	 of	will	 and	 an	account	of	manifestation.																																																									3	It	might	weaken	rather	than	dissolve	in	cases	where	I	think	that	the	agent’s	failure	to	live	up	to	his	good	attitude	was	due	to	some	other	insufficient	care	or	concern.	
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Though	 there	 are	 likely	 non-behavioral	 phenomena	 which	 can	 manifest	quality	 of	 will,	 quality	 of	 will	 is	 manifested	 most	 commonly	 in	 action.4	Eliding	significant	complications,	we	can	understand	many	of	our	actions	as	being	the	non-accidental	 upshots	 of	 our	 quality	 of	 will.	 For	 instance,	 an	 agent	 who	 is	 cowardly	might	 therefore	 be	 particularly	 disposed	 to	 notice	 risks	 and	 threats	 and	 likewise	particularly	 disposed	 to	 be	 motivated	 to	 avoid	 risks	 and	 threats.	 When	 these	dispositions	 result	 in	 the	 agent	 noticing	 and	 acting	 to	 avoid	 a	 particular	 risk	 or	threat,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 avoidance	 behavior	 manifests	 the	 agent’s	 cowardice.	 By	contrast,	consider	a	contrived	case	where	the	cowardice	plays	a	merely	causal	role	in	 the	 agent’s	 performing	 some	 role:	 	 the	 agent,	 in	 running	 from	 one	 risk,	 is	accidentally	 led	 to	 some	 important	 find.	 The	 find	 is	 the	 product	 of	 the	 agent’s	cowardice,	but	 it	does	not	seem	to	manifest	the	agent’s	cowardice,	not	 in	the	right	sort	 of	way.	The	Strawsonian	 account	of	 the	propositional	 content	 appeals	 to	 this	intuitive	 distinction	 between	 the	 running	 and	 the	 find,	where	 the	 latter	 is	merely	caused	by	quality	of	will,	while	the	former	manifests	quality	of	will.	
																																																								4 	Here,	 I	 elide	 the	 distinction	 between	 actions	 and	 omissions.	 For	 many	Strawsonians,	 including	myself,	 it	 seems	 true	 that	we	can	often	discern	an	agent’s	quality	of	will	in	both	her	actions	and	her	omissions,	and	this	makes	her	omissions	grist	 for	 the	reactive	attitudes.	 In	an	example	offered	by	Michael	McKenna,	Casper	cancels	his	weekend	business	plans	to	enjoy	time	with	his	friends,	but	he	does	not	consider	 whether	 he	 could	 use	 his	 free	 time	 to	 tend	 to	 his	 recently	 ill	 daughter	(2012,	p.	60).	McKenna	explains	 that,	while	desiring	 to	 spend	 time	with	 friends	 is	innocuous,	we	might	nonetheless	see	Casper’s	choices	as	manifesting	ill	will	because	they	 reveal	 insufficient	 regard	 for	 his	 daughter.	 I	 accept	 as	 intuitively	 plausible,	without	 hereby	 defending,	 that	 we	might	 treat	 inaction	 in	 this	 way	 as	 similar	 to	action.	
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That	an	action	manifests	the	agent’s	quality	of	will	is	one	way	to	understand	the	 attributability	 sense	 of	 responsibility	 identified	 by	 Gary	 Watson	 (1996).	Responding	to	Susan	Wolf	(1990),	Watson	distinguished	between	responsibility	as	attributability	 and	 responsibility	 as	 accountability.	 I’ll	 return	 to	 responsibility	 as	accountability	 later;	 for	 now,	 focus	 on	 responsibility	 as	 attributability.	 This	 is	 the	sort	of	responsibility	required	for	aretaic	judgments.	An	aretaic	judgment	about	an	agent	is	a	judgment	about	quality	of	an	agent’s	values	or	character.	For	example,	in	saying	 that	 an	 agent’s	 behavior	 shows	 her	 to	 be	 a	 coward,	 we	 hold	 the	 agent	responsible	for	the	behavior	in	the	attributability	sense.	But	for	this	to	be	the	case	requires	 more	 than	 that	 the	 behavior	 is	 the	 mere	 causal	 upshot	 of	 the	 agent’s	character	 or	 quality	 of	 will.	 As	 Watson	 writes,	 “The	 significant	 relation	 between	behavior	and	the	‘real	self’	is	not	(just)	causal	but	executive	and	expressive”	(1996,	p.	233,	 emphasis	 in	 original,	 footnote	 omitted).	 Watson	 then	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 this	executive	and	expressive	nature	of	human	(agential)	behavior	which	distinguishes	us	from	objects	and	from	other	creatures;	likewise,	I	claim	that	it	is	these	executive	and	 expressive	 features	 which	 distinguish	 our	 manifesting	 behavior	 from	 our	accidental	behavior.5	In	order	to	support	the	cognitive	assessment	required	for	the	first	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	we	must	take	the	agent	to	be	responsible	 in																																																									5 	In	 further	 developing	 the	 account	 of	 manifestation,	 we	 might	 appeal	 to	 the	concurrence	literature	in	the	criminal	law.	The	overwhelming	majority	of	crimes	are	defined	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 mental	 and	 behavioral	 elements.	 Merely	 satisfying	those	elements,	however,	is	not	sufficient.	The	behavioral	elements	must	be	related	in	 the	 right	 way	 to	 the	 mental	 elements,	 largely	 to	 avoid	 cases	 of	 accidental	causation.	 For	 a	 good	 overview	 of	 the	 concurrence	 requirement	 with	 a	 nice	argument	 for	 seeing	 the	 concurrence	 requirement	 in	 a	 normative	 fashion	 as	opposed	to	a	merely	counterfactual	fashion,	see	Alex	Sarch	(2015).	
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the	attributability	sense.	Seeing	the	agent	as	responsible	in	the	attributability	sense,	then,	is	necessary	for	the	reactive	attitudes.	The	Strawsonian	thus	owes	an	account	of	quality	of	will.	On	a	broad	read	of	quality	of	will,	quality	of	will	might	be	our	regard	for	anything	at	all	which	matters.	Michael	 McKenna	 (2012)	 offers	 a	 broad	 account	 along	 these	 lines.	 For	 him,	 the	quality	of	will	manifested	in	action	is	the	regard	manifested	in	the	behavior	for	other	agents,	 for	 the	 agent	 herself,	 and	 for	 other	 relevant	moral	 considerations.	On	 this	account,	we	might	blame	another	agent	for	his	faulty	regard	for	important	works	of	art	 or	 important	 features	 of	 the	 environment	 even	 if	 that	 faulty	 regard	 does	 not	adversely	affect	anyone	else	and	even	 if	 that	 faulty	 regard	does	not	extend	 to	any	faulty	regard	of	any	other	agent.	Alternatively,	we	might	take	on	the	 interpersonal	commitments	Strawson	focused	on	and	limit	quality	of	will	to	regard	for	agents.	As	Strawson	wrote,	we	 care	 about	whether	 “actions	…	 reflect	 attitudes	 towards	us	of	goodwill,	 affection,	 or	 esteem	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 or	 contempt,	 indifference,	 or	malevolence	on	 the	other”	 (2008,	pp.	 5–6,	 emphasis	 added).	And	we	 could	 seek	a	unifying	explanation.	For	 instance,	 even	 if	 regard	 for	agents	 is	 all	 that	matters	 for	the	quality	of	will	relevant	to	the	reactive	attitudes,	other	things,	such	as	artwork	or	the	 environment,	 can	matter	derivatively	where	 they	matter	 to	 some	agent.	Thus,	for	 here,	 I	 take	 on	 the	 Strawsonian,	 agent-focused	 account,	 leaving	 for	 later	 full	consideration	of	this	debate.	The	reactive-attitudes	theorist	should	also	have	something	to	say	about	the	nature	of	regard.	In	one	sense,	our	regard	for	things	(reading	things	broadly)	is	our	
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set	 of	 dispositions	 to	 act	 in	 appreciation	 or	 response	 to	 such	 things.	 As	 George	Vuoso	explains:	A	person’s	character	in	this	sense	may	be	described	as	the	collection	of	 many	 of	 his	 dispositions	 to	 act.	 It	 is	 a	 subpart,	 though	 a	 very	significant	 subpart,	 of	 one’s	 personality.	 It	 encompasses	 or	 involves	certain	 traits,	 such	 as	 honesty,	 loyalty,	 kindness,	 fairness,	ruthlessness,	 and	 greed,	 but	 not	 others,	 such	 as	 intelligence,	sophistication,	nervousness,	and	sense	of	humor.	For	the	purposes	of	moral	evaluation,	it	is	the	measure	of	a	person.	(Vuoso,	1987,	p.	1670)		We	 can	 see	 here	 the	 affinity	 with	 Watson’s	 attributability	 sense	 of	 moral	responsibility.	Thinking	of	quality	of	will	merely	in	terms	of	behavioral	dispositions	is	not	ultimately	satisfying,	however,	without	an	explanation	of	 those	dispositions.	Honesty	is	not	merely	a	statistical	disposition	to	tell	the	truth;	it	is	a	disposition	to	tell	the	truth	rooted	in	something	more	significant	about	the	agent.	Accordingly,	we	need	something	like	David	Shoemaker’s	(2015)	fuller	account	of	the	sorts	of	things	which	might	make	 up	 this	 regard.	 For	 Shoemaker,	 quality	 of	will	 is	 comprised	 of	three	different	classes	of	phenomena:	clusters	of	cares	and	commitments,	evaluative	judgments,	and	sensitivity	to	interpersonal	value.	The	honest	person	is	disposed	to	act	honestly	not	accidentally	but	rather	because	the	honest	person	cares	about	the	values	in	truth-telling,	finds	those	values	relevant	and	important,	and	is	sensitive	to	the	right	to	frankness	held	by	others.6	
																																																								6	Have	 the	 dispositions	 dropped	 out	 of	 the	 picture?	Why	 not	 take	 quality	 of	 will	simply	to	be	the	cares,	concerns,	and	the	like	picked	out	by	Shoemaker?	I	do	not	see	any	 reason	 to	 deny	 that	 identification,	 though	 it	 is	 worth	 remembering	 that	 the	resulting	behavioral	dispositions	might	be	an	 important	part	of	 the	explanation	of	why	a	Strawsonian	might	care	about	others’	cares,	concerns,	and	the	like.	
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There	are	two	related	puzzles	suggested	by	this	account	of	the	sort	of	quality	of	will	involved	in	reactive	attitudes	like	praise	or	blame.	We	ordinarily	focus	on	but	some	 aspect	 on	 an	 agent’s	 quality	 of	 will	 in	 blaming	 or	 praising	 them;	we	 rarely	praise	or	blame	an	agent	 for	being	a	good	or	bad	agent	overall.	 Instead,	we	praise	them	for	this	good	action	or	blame	them	for	this	bad	action.	So	in	that	sense,	we	do	not	praise	or	blame	the	agent	for	their	quality	of	will	in	its	totality.	Relatedly,	we	can	praise	 or	 blame	 agents	 for	 behavior	 which	 is	 out-of-character.	 We	 might,	 for	instance,	blame	an	otherwise-honest	agent	for	an	out-of-character	lie.	In	that	case,	it	might	 seem	 that	 we	 are	 blaming	 the	 agent	 despite,	 and	 not	 on	 account	 of,	 their	quality	of	will.	We	must	 keep	 two	 related	 features	 of	 the	 Strawsonian	 account	 in	mind	 to	address	 these	 concerns.	 First,	 we	 praise	 or	 blame	 agents	 for	 the	 quality	 of	 will	manifested	 in	 some	 particular	 action,	 and	 that	 quality	 of	 will	 need	 not	 be	 (and	indeed	rarely	will	be)	 the	entirety	of	 their	quality	of	will.	Second,	 the	Strawsonian	appeal	to	quality	of	will	does	not	require	a	commitment	to	a	unified	and	consistent	psychology.	The	will	of	any	real	agent	 is	almost	certainly	diverse	and	complicated,	inconsistent	 in	 important	 ways.	 That	 means	 that	 an	 agent’s	 broad	 quality	 of	 will	might	be	generally	honest,	but	 in	some	particular	case,	 that	general	honesty	 is	not	the	quality	manifested	 in	an	 instance	of	 lying.	These	two	features	can	explain	why	mostly	 good	 agents	 sometimes	 act	 poorly,	 even	 in	 the	matters	 which	most	mark	them	 as	 good	 agents,	 and	 why	 poor	 agents	 sometimes	 act	 well.	 Thus,	 when	 the	
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Strawsonian	talks	of	the	quality	of	will	at	issue	in	the	reactive	attitudes,	we	must	be	careful	to	pick	out	the	quality	of	will	at	issue	in	the	particular	action.	There	are	ordinarily	two	agents	involved	in	the	reactive	attitudes,	the	agent	who	 acts	 and	 the	 agent	 who	 reacts.7	The	 propositional	 content	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes	tracks	the	quality	of	will	of	the	agent	who	acts.	But	we	can	then	ask	about	the	 psychology	 of	 the	 agent	 who	 reacts.	 That	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 have	propositional	 content	 does	 not	 require	 that	 the	 agent	 experiencing	 the	 attitudes	have	 either	 conscious	 recognition	 or	 a	 full-throated	 judgment	 of	 that	 content.	 It	seems	 familiar	 that	we	 often	 blame	without	 reflection.	 It	 seems	 that	 I	 sometimes	even	blame	without	realizing	it--only	coming	to	see	that	I’ve	been	blaming	when	my	attention	 is	 brought	 to	 my	 own	 behavior	 after	 the	 fact.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	reactive	 attitudes	 do	 not	 require	 conscious,	 deliberated	 judgment.	 David	Zimmerman	 (2001)	 gives	 us	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 cognitive	 options	which	might	 suffice:	 	 explicit	 propositional	 beliefs,	 quasi-intentional	 states,	 vague	beliefs	with	 only	 roughly	 specified	 truth	 conditions,	 and	 patterns	 of	 intentional	 salience	(which	may	or	may	not	be	readily	formulable	as	beliefs).	In	all	of	these	cases,	there	is	 some	 phenomenon	 internal	 to	 the	 reacting	 agent	 that	 we	 might	 identify	 as	 a	reflection	or	recognition	of	the	target	agent’s	quality	of	will.	Allowing	 that	 phenomena	 less	 than	 fully	 fledged	 judgments	 can	 suffice	 for	the	propositional	 content	of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 allows	us	 to	 easily	 sidestep	 the	
																																																								7	We	can	praise	and	blame	ourselves.	 In	 that	 case,	 there	 is	one	agent,	who	 is	both	acting	 and	 reacting.	 Still,	we	 can	 separate	 our	 examinations	of	 that	 agent	 into	 the	two	roles.	
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wayward	reactions	problem.	Is	it	possible	for	me	to	blame	someone	if,	when	I	reflect	honestly,	 I	 judge	 that	 their	 behavior	 involves	 no	wrongdoing?	Wallace	 (1994,	 pp.	42–45)	asks	us	to	imagine	someone	who	was	raised	to	think	that	premarital	sex	is	improper	but	who	has	since	abandoned	that	belief.	When	the	agent	becomes	aware	of	 someone	 who	 has	 had	 premarital	 sex,	 they	 may	 experience	 something	 like	resentment.	However,	 if	 resentment,	as	a	 reactive	attitude,	 requires	 judgment	of	a	robust	nature,	and	if	we	trust	the	agent	with	respect	to	her	own	judgments,	then	this	cannot	be	 resentment.	 If	we	 trust	 the	 agent	 that	 she	 judges	 that	premarital	 sex	 is	morally	permissible,	and	if	we	accept	that	an	agent	cannot	be	marked	by	conflicting	judgments,	we	must	conclude	that	the	agent	cannot	also	judge	that	premarital	sex	is	morally	 impermissible,	 and	 this	 conclusion	 means	 that	 the	 reaction	 the	 agent	 is	experiencing	cannot	be	resentment,	lacking	the	necessary	propositional	content.		We	might	 allow	 that	 cases	 like	 this	 pick	 out	wayward	 resentment,	 and	we	might	 then	 conclude	 that	 resentment	 and	wayward	 resentment	 are	 two	 different	phenomena.	 In	 cases	 like	 this,	we’d	 have	wayward	 resentment,	which	 is	 like	 real	resentment,	 but	 propositionally	 defective.	 But	 what	 is	 to	 be	 gained	 from	 this	ontological	 expansion?	 Or	 perhaps	 we	 might	 abandon	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 reactive	attitudes’	 propositional	 content	 has	 a	 cognitive,	 occurrent	 element.	 If	 there	 is	 no	cognitive	element,	 then	wayward	resentment	and	ordinary	resentment	might	both	be	fully	resentment.	Shoemaker	(2015,	p.	89)	suggests	this,	focusing	on	anger	rather	than	resentment	 in	 large	part	because	of	 the	cognitive	 implications	of	resentment.	Wallace’s	 response	 to	 cases	 of	 wayward	 resentment	 is	 particularly	 creative:	 the	
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reactive	 attitudes	 are	 associated	 with	 normative	 expectations,	 and	 normative	expectations	do	not	 require	 judgments.	His	 solution,	however,	 leads	him	 to	define	normative	expectations	 in	 terms	of	 reactive	attitudes.	Although	 the	solution	 is	not	false	merely	because	it	 is	circular,	 the	tight	nature	of	the	circle	makes	the	solution	unilluminating.	The	better	solution	is	McKenna’s.8	Once	we	allow	that	the	cognitive	content	of	the	reactive	attitudes	need	not	be	the	sort	of	high-level	judgments	for	which	we	feel	 immediate	 pressure	 of	 consistency,	we	 can	 explain	 how	we	 could	 both	 judge	some	action	to	be	not	improper	and	at	the	same	time	resent	someone	for	the	action.	As	McKenna	writes,	 it	 isn’t	 that	 these	 cases	 of	wayward	 resentment	 are	 not	 true	resentment:	 “It’s	 rather	 that	 in	 such	 cases,	 they	 are	 linked	 to	 beliefs	 not	 fully	endorsed	 or	 in	 some	 way	 defeated	 by	 way	 of	 the	 agent’s	 wider	 class	 of	 beliefs,	including	her	evaluative	commitments”	(2012,	p.	67).	Understanding	the	wayward	resentment	 cases	 in	 this	 fashion	 reinforces	 the	 assessment	 that	 the	 propositional	content	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 can	 take	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 forms	 pointed	 to	 by	Zimmerman.9	
																																																								8	In	 email	 correspondence,	 David	 Brink	 has	 suggested	 a	 similar	 solution	 to	 this	problem,	 writing	 that	 we	 might	 understand	 conflicts	 between	 resentments	 and	contrary	 judgments	as	reflecting	“a	conflict	of	beliefs	 that	reflects	 the	operation	of	conscious	 processes	 and	 automatic	 processes,	 including	 bias.”	 Both	McKenna	 and	Brink	 solve	 the	 potential	 problem	 by	 rejecting	 the	 idea	 that	 an	 agent	 cannot	 be	marked	by	simultaneous,	conflicting	beliefs.	9	A	 similar	 problem-and-solution	 pair	 arises	 for	 the	 emotions	 more	 generally.	Consider	 fear.	We	might	 persist	 in	 our	 experience	 of	 fear	 even	 if	we	 are,	 in	 some	significant	 sense,	 assured	 of	 our	 safety.	 Think	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 fear	 during	 a	scary	movie	or	during	a	thrilling	theme	park	rollercoaster.	We	might	seem	to	face	an	unfortunate	 trilemma:	 	 is	 it	 that	 the	 agent	 in	 the	 theater	 judges	 herself	 to	 be	 in	
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To	sum	up:	 	the	reactive	attitudes	have	propositional	content,	the	quality	of	will	manifested	in	the	behavior	reacted	to.	This	quality	of	will	is	a	matter	of	regard	for	things	which	matter,	though	exactly	which	things	matter	is	for	later	exploration.	We	 should	 locate	 this	 propositional	 content	 inside	 the	 agent	 experiencing	 the	reactive	attitude,	 though	this	does	not	require	consciousness,	awareness,	or	global	consistency	with	other	beliefs	and	attitudes.	It	requires	something	cognitive,	but	not	particularly	much.	1.1.2	 The	characteristic	experiences		Much	 of	 the	 scholarly	 attention	 on	 reactive	 attitudes	 focuses	 on	 the	propositional	 content	 of	 the	 attitudes	 and	 its	 psychological	 instantiation.	 But,	 as	Manuel	Vargas	notes:	“If	we	focus	on	just	the	cognitive	aspect	of	blaming,	we	run	the	risk	 of	 presenting	 a	 pallid	 picture	 of	 responsibility,	 drained	 of	 its	 characteristic	affect”	 (2013,	 p.	 119).	 Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 content	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes,	 we	should	 recognize	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 also	 have	 characteristic	phenomenologies.	 The	 distinctive	 phenomenologies	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	particularly	 noticeable	 with	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes.	 Resentment,	 for	example,	 ordinarily	 feels	 agitated,	 tense,	 and	 metaphorically	 hot,	 and	 guilt	 feels	metaphorically	heavy.	And,	as	Menges	(2017)	notes,	these	first-person	experiences																																																																																																																																																																						significant	 danger	 (which	would	 require	 us	 to	 think	 that	 the	 agent	who	willingly	goes	to	the	movie	is	in	some	significant	way	irrational),	is	it	that	the	experience	that	results	is	wayward	fear,	or	is	it	that	fear	does	not	have	the	significant	connection	to	the	 perception	 of	 danger	we	might	 have	 expected?	 If	we	 allow	 that	 our	 cognitive	states	 can	 conflict,	 we	 might	 accept	 both	 that	 we	 have	 some	 experience	 of	 the	perception	of	danger	even	as	we	at	the	very	same	time	judge	ourselves	to	be	in	no	danger.	That	experience	of	the	perception	of	danger	can	explain	the	persistence	of	fear	as	an	emotion	in	the	absence	of	the	judgment	of	danger.	
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of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 track	 externally	measurable	 phenomena	 like	 increases	 in	heart	rate	and	skin	temperature.	While	 there	are	experiences	characteristic	of	 the	various	 reactive	attitudes,	we	need	not	 assume	either	 that	 there	 is	 some	 single	 characteristic	 experience	 for	any	particular	reactive	attitude	nor	that	every	instance	of	any	reactive	attitude	must	be	 associated	 with	 some	 distinctive	 experience.	 As	 Allais	 (2008a)	 explains,	 we	should	 think	 of	 each	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 as	 being	 associated	with	 a	 range	 of	feelings,	 the	particular	 feeling	elicited	at	 any	 time	being	a	 function	of	 the	 reactive	attitude	 at	 issue,	 the	 agent	 who	 is	 experiencing	 the	 reactive	 attitude,	 and	 the	attendant	circumstances.	Anger	might	sometimes	leave	us	agitated,	but	it	might	also	sometimes	leave	us	collected,	perhaps	depending	upon	whether	anger	is	combined	with	the	possibility	of	redress	and	improvement	or	not.		And	 no	 particular	 experience	 is	 required	 of	 any	 particular	 occasion	 of	 a	reactive	attitude.	For	instance,	we	might	be	resentful	without	any	noticeable	feeling.	In	 such	 a	 case,	 we	 judge	 the	 other	 has	 wronged,	 we	 are	 disposed	 to	 act	 on	 our	judgment,	and	we	see	 the	agent	 in	 light	of	 that	 judgment,	but	 there	 is	none	of	 the	distinctive	heat	commonly	associated	with	anger.	Of	course,	it	might	be	that	there	is	a	 feeling	 in	 these	cases,	but	 it	 is	a	subtle	one,	readily	overlooked.	Perhaps	there	 is	both	 heated	 and	 cool	 anger,	 and	 cases	 that	 had	 seemed	 to	 lack	 distinctive	phenomenologies	are	actually	cases	of	cool	anger.	 If	so,	we	might	persist	 in	seeing	the	characteristic	phenomenologies	as	necessary	elements	of	the	reactive	attitudes.	But	another	possibility	is	that	the	phenomenologies	are	ordinary	but	not	necessary.	
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The	 three	 other	 elements	 are	 sufficient	 to	 pick	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 out	 as	 a	distinctive	subject	of	interest.	1.1.3	 The	characteristic	behavioral	dispositions	The	 third	 commonly	 recognized	 element	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 is	 their	associated	 behaviors.	 There	 is	 a	 “distinctive	 syndrome”	 (Wallace,	 1994,	 p.	 24)	 of	practices	 characteristically	 associated	with	 each	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes.	When	 I	resent,	I	might	lash	out	at	the	target	of	my	resentment,	I	might	make	clear	to	them	how	 they	 have	 done	 wrong,	 I	 might	 seek	 to	 have	 them	 punished,	 or	 I	 might	withdraw	 from	 social	 interaction	 with	 them.	 These	 are	 all	 behaviors	 familiarly	associated	with	resentment.	Here,	as	with	 the	characteristic	phenomenologies,	 the	behaviors	are	characteristic	and	variable.	As	McKenna	notes,	while	there	are	these	characteristic	 practices,	 there	 is	 “no	 simple	 formula”	 (2012,	 p.	 67).	 The	behaviors	involved	in	any	particular	case	are	likely	to	be	highly	variable,	dependent	upon	the	wrongdoing,	 the	 attendant	 circumstances,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 parties	involved,	 and	 the	 like.	 Moreover,	 these	 are	 merely	 dispositions.	 Accordingly,	 no	particular	instance	of	resentment	need	involve	any	behavior	at	all.	You	can	resent	in	private,	and	you	can	resent	someone	you	do	not	and	will	not	interact	with.		1.1.4	 Seeing-as	These	three	elements--propositional	content,	characteristic	phenomenology,	and	 characteristic	 behavioral	 dispositions--are	 widely	 taken	 to	 mark	 the	 reactive	attitudes,	 though	 the	 exact	 details	 vary.	 I	 take	 on	 board	 this	 widely	 accepted	account.	However,	 these	 three	elements	alone	cannot	provide	a	sufficient	sense	of	
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the	sort	of	praise	and	blame	I	am	interested	in.	For	my	purposes,	 there	is	a	 fourth	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	one	that	seems	often	overlooked	but	also	critically	important:	the	reactive	attitudes	frame	our	perceptions,	especially	our	perceptions	relating	to	the	target	of	 the	attitudes.10	Because	of	 the	first	element	of	 the	reactive	attitudes,	 their	 propositional	 content,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 widely	 seen	 as	downstream	 from	our	perceptions;	 because	 of	 this	 fourth	 element,	we	 should	 see	that	the	reactive	attitudes	are	also	upstream	from	our	perceptions.	How	might	it	be	that	the	reactive	attitudes	affect	how	we	see	the	world?	The	reactive	 attitudes	 change	 what	 we	 take	 to	 be	 salient,	 and	 they	 change	 which	interpretations	 we	 find	 compelling.	 When	 I	 react	 to	 another’s	 wrongdoing	 (e.g.,	when	I	find	that	I	judge	that	someone	has	done	me	wrong	and	concomitantly	feel	the	characteristic	 heat	 of	 resentment),	 I	 am	 relatively	 more	 likely	 to	 notice	 other	instances	 of	 their	 wrongdoing	 and	 I	 am	 relatively	 less	 likely	 to	 take	 seriously	contrasting	evidence	of	the	other’s	good	will.	In	this	fashion,	our	reactive	attitudes	order	 the	 evidence	 we	 are	 presented	 about	 others’	 quality	 of	 will.	 As	 David	Zimmerman	explains:	Your	 reactive	 emotions--resentment,	 anger,	 the	 temptation	 to	forgiveness,	 the	 warmth	 of	 friendly	 nostalgia,	 and	 so	 on--play	 a	distinctively	cognitive	role	throughout	in	regulating	your	inquiry	into	the	question	of	whether	X	has	in	fact	been	perfidious.	How?	As	Rorty	and	de	Sousa	would	put	 it,	by	shifting	your	attention	from	one	set	of	facts	to	another,	and	then	back	over	the	same	set	of	facts,	with	more	care	 the	 second	 time	 around;	 by	 inducing	 you	 to	 see	 patterns	 of	
salience	 in	 the	 facts	 which	 you	 would	 otherwise	 have	 missed;	 by																																																									10	Allais	 (2008b),	 Hurley	 and	 Macnamara	 (2010),	 and	 David	 Zimmerman	 (2001)	offer	 particularly	 helpful	 explorations	 of	 the	 way	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitudes’	affective	nature	changes	how	we	see	the	world.	
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sometimes	 slowing	 you	 down	 and	 sometimes	 speeding	 you	 up,	 as	genuine	opportunities	for	inquiry	ebb	and	flow.	(2001,	p.	532)		As	 Allais	 explains:	 reactive	 attitudes	 involve	 “seeing	 [another]	 in	 a	 certain	 way,	being	 disposed	 to	 have	 characteristic	 patterns	 of	 attention,	 interpretation	 and	expectation	 with	 respect	 to	 her	 actions”	 (2008a,	 p.	 185).	 Thus	 I	 suspect	 that	 the	framing	effect	of	the	reactive	attitudes	is	in	fact	very	broad.	When	I	resent	someone,	I	 am	 therefore	 increasingly	 likely	 to	notice	 flaws	of	 all	 kinds	and	 increasingly	 less	likely	to	notice	virtues	of	all	kinds.	For	example,	 I	am	more	 likely	to	notice	and	be	bothered	by	someone’s	grating	voice	when	I	resent	them	for	some	wrongdoing,	and	I	am	less	likely	to	notice	and	be	impressed	by	their	sharp	attire.	Taking	seriously	the	framing	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes	can	explain	a	number	of	features	which	seem	to	mark	the	attitudes.	First,	this	element	can	help	to	explain	the	impenetrability	of	the	reactive	attitudes.	So	long	as	we	are	in	the	throes	of	 the	 reactive	attitudes,	we	are	disinclined	 to	notice	 competing	evidence,	 and	we	are	 inclined	 to	 interpret	 the	 features	 we	 do	 notice	 in	 ways	 consistent	 with	 our	reactions.	This	cannot	completely	explain	why	we	can	resent	someone	at	the	same	time	 that	 we	 acknowledge	 that	 they’ve	 done	 no	 wrong,	 as	 in	 such	 a	 case	 we	 do	notice	the	competing	evidence	and	we	do	take	it	to	have	normative	significance.	But	it	can	explain	why	the	reactive	attitudes	are	relatively	resilient	and	self-reinforcing.	Second,	the	seeing-as	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes	explains	why	it	is	that	we	resent	wrongdoers	for	their	wrongdoing,	rather	than	merely	resenting	them	or	merely	 resenting	 the	 wrongdoing.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 we	 do	 not	 sometimes	
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assess	either	the	agent	herself	or	the	action	itself.	We	certainly	assess	those	things.11	And	when	we	are	assessing	the	agent,	we	might	look	to	her	behavior	as	evidence	of	her	 quality	 of	 will.	 For	 instance,	 we	 might	 use	 an	 agent’s	 acting	 rudely	 once	 as	evidence	that	the	agent	 is	herself	rude.	Likewise,	we	might	use	our	 impressions	of	the	 agent	 as	 evidence	 regarding	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 particular	 bit	 of	 behavior.	 For	instance,	 we	 might	 use	 our	 judgment	 that	 an	 agent	 is	 generally	 rude	 to	 help	 us	decide	that	a	particular,	ambiguous	act	was	a	rude	act.	However,	there	is	a	natural	sense	of	 resentment	and	many	of	 the	other	reactive	attitudes	which	 involves	both	the	agent	and	 their	behavior	essentially,	neither	as	merely	evidence	 for	 the	other.	That	 there	 are	 essential	 roles	 for	 both	 the	 agent	 and	 the	 action	 can	 explain	 why	resentment	displays	ordering	effects.	If,	for	instance,	we	reacted	to	others’	quality	of	will	and	their	behavior	was	merely	evidence	of	that	underlying	phenomenon,	then	it	is	not	clear	that	we	should	experience	reactive	attitudes	so	attuned	to	the	particular	behavior	at	issue,	and	it	is	not	clear	that	the	order	of	behaviors	should	make	such	a	difference	to	the	reaction	to	the	ultimate	bit	of	behavior.12	
																																																								11	As	 David	 Brink	 has	 suggested	 in	 correspondence,	 we	 might	 have	 good	 reason	sometimes	 to	 separate	 these	 assessments.	 In	 parenting,	 for	 instance,	 it	 might	 be	fitting	to	assess	a	behavior	but	to	refrain	from	deep	assessments	of	quality	of	will	or	agent.	12	Consider	a	puzzle	raised	by	David	Hume	(2000	bk.	2,	pt.	2,	sec.	2):		how	can	it	be	right	 to	 justify	 blaming	 an	 agent	 now	 for	 some	 action	 in	 the	 distant	 past?	 Hume	thinks	 that	we	are	 justified	 in	 this	 connection	because	 (and	presumably	 therefore	when)	the	action	stems	from	some	persisting	character	 trait,	a	 trait	 that	 the	agent	had	both	then	and	now.	But	I’m	no	more	satisfied	with	this	explanation	than	Wallace	(1994,	 pp.	 122–23)	 is.	 We	 often	 blame	 people	 even	 if	 they’ve	 changed	 in	 the	meantime,	 and	 we	 often	 blame	 people	 when	 their	 actions	 were	 out	 of	 character.	Moreover,	Hume’s	answer	comes	too	close	to	seeing	the	behavior	as	mere	evidence	of	the	untoward	character	trait.	
23	
	
The	seeing-as	element	readily	explains	this	feature	of	the	reactive	attitudes.	When	we	react	to	others	on	account	of	some	bit	of	behavior,	we	see	them	in	light	of	that	bit	of	behavior.	We	are	not	seeing	 them	 in	 their	entirety,	 judging	 them	 in	 the	light	of	all	of	the	evidence	(indeed,	that	is	plausibly	something	we	never	could	do).	Return	 to	 the	 ordering	 problem.	 Consider	 two	 otherwise	 identical	 agents,	 one	 of	whom	does	some	good	behavior	first	and	then	some	bad	behavior	second,	and	the	other	of	whom	does	 the	 same	behaviors,	 but	 in	 the	opposite	order.	The	 seeing-as	element	 can	 explain	 why	 can	 we	 have	 such	 strikingly	 different	 reactions	 to	 the	agents	 after	 their	 second	 behaviors.	 We	 see	 the	 first	 agent	 in	 light	 of	 their	 bad	behavior,	causing	us	to	overlook	their	prior	good	behavior,	and	so	we	might	strongly	resent	 them,	 whereas	 we	 see	 the	 second	 agent	 in	 light	 of	 their	 good	 behavior,	causing	us	to	overlook	their	prior	bad	behavior,	and	so	our	resentment	of	them	for	that	 prior	 behavior	 might	 be	 mitigated	 or	 even	 absent.	 Thus,	 understanding	 the	reactive	 attitudes	 as	 involving	 this	 seeing-as	 element	 seems	 to	 explain	 a	 common	phenomenon	of	our	reacting	practice.13	
																																																								13	Dana	Nelkin	has	pointed	out	an	 interesting	puzzle	 raised	by	 the	 combination	of	recognizing	potential	ordering	effects	and	recognizing	the	seeing-as	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes.	If	the	seeing-as	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes	means	that	our	perceptions	 of	 the	 later	 behavior	 are	 framed	 by	 our	 reactions	 to	 the	 earlier	behavior,	 we	 might	 expect	 a	 different	 ordering	 effect.	 Consider	 the	 agent	 who	behaves	first	poorly	and	then	properly.	Why	not	think	that	the	resentment	sparked	by	the	poor	behavior	will	lead	us	to	underappreciate	the	later	proper	behavior?	This	is	an	interesting	question.	I	find	it	plausible	that	resentment	might	sometimes	work	this	 way	 and	 sometimes	 work	 the	 way	 that	 I	 described	 in	 the	 body	 text	 here.	Perhaps	 the	 particular	 ordering	 phenomenon	 witnessed	 depends	 upon	 which	behavior	 is	presented	to	us	first,	rather	than	which	behavior	occurs	first.	That	 is	a	different	sort	of	ordering	effect,	though	there	too	the	seeing-as	element	can	play	an	
24	
	
Seeing	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 as	 framing	 mechanisms	 is	also	confirmed	by	the	recognition	that	 the	reactive	attitudes	are	broader	than	 just	the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes.	 The	 philosophical	 discussion	 has	 focused	 on	 the	negative	 reactive	 attitudes.14	Philosophers	 are	 fascinated	 by	 blame.	 We	 see	 in	Wallace	a	substantive	argument	claiming	there	is	a	set	of	negative	reactive	attitudes	worthy	of	distinctive	attention.	His	account	of	the	reactive	attitudes	is	closely	tied	to	the	Strawsonian	moral	demand	(and	the	concomitant	obligation)	that	others	regard	us	(and	therefore	treat	us)	with	due	good	will,	and	so	he	limits	the	reactive	attitudes	to	 those	 connected	 with	 the	 belief	 that	 a	 moral	 obligation	 has	 been	 violated.	 He	allows	that	we	might	react	to	the	ways	that	others	exceed	those	obligations,	but	“the	reactive	attitudes	are	explained	exclusively	by	beliefs	about	 the	violation	of	moral	obligations”	 (1994,	 p.	 38).	 Wallace-style	 skepticism	 about	 the	 positive	 reactive	attitudes	 is	 buttressed	 by	 the	 relatively	 thin	 phenomenologies	 and	 behavioral	upshots	of	the	putative	positive	reactive	attitudes	in	many	cases.	But	 this	 is	 too	 narrow.	 While	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 might	 as	 a	matter	of	 contingent	 fact	 be	particularly	 salient,	 “‘positive’	 attitudes	 like	 gratitude	can	also	be	understood	as	responses	to	the	way	in	which	an	agent	demonstrates	the	character	of	her	will	 in	her	actions”	 (Allais,	2008a,	p.	184).	Consider	a	case	where	
																																																																																																																																																																					explanatory	 role.	 I	 will	 have	 to	 think	 further	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	seeing-as	element	and	potential	ordering	effects.	14	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 philosophers	 do	 not	 address	 praise	 significantly.	 Some	philosophers,	 e.g.,	Wallace,	 limit	 their	 accounts	 to	 blame	 and	 resentment.	 Others,	like	Fischer	and	Ravizza,	make	broader	arguments	despite	a	strong	focus	on	cases	of	blame.	But	some,	e.g.,	Nelkin	(2011),	do	devote	significant	attention	to	praise	and	to	the	comparative	relationships	between	praise,	blame,	and	moral	responsibility.	
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someone	has	 gone	well	 beyond	 your	 expectations,	 perhaps	 a	 friend	has	 put	 in	 an	extraordinary	 effort	 to	 help	 you	 through	 a	 difficult	 spot,	 even	 at	 great	 cost	 to	themselves.	Their	behavior	expresses	their	tremendous	regard	and	concern	for	you.	Perhaps	 this	 leads	 you	 to	 feel	 a	 certain	 warmth	 and	 softness	 and	 to	 express	gratitude	and	thanks	to	them.	But	even	if	not,	or	even	if	 these	reactions	are	subtle	and	difficult	to	notice,	your	reaction	to	their	aid	should	color	the	way	you	see	them.	That	is	certainly	my	experience.	While	the	aid	is	but	one	act	out	of	an	entire	lifetime,	if	I	attend	to	the	act,	I	am	inclined	to	notice	other,	consistent	acts	of	good	will,	and	I	am	inclined	to	interpret	other	behaviors	in	a	sympathetic	light.	On	my	account	of	the	reactive	 attitudes,	 if	 you	 do	 not	 experience	 these	 framing	 effects,	 you	 are	 not	praising,	at	 least	not	 in	the	sense	picked	out	by	the	reactive	attitudes.	But	because	we	can	make	sense	of	 the	epistemic	 framing,	we	can	make	sense	of	 the	 intuitively	plausible	 positive	 reactive	 attitudes,	 despite	 their	 often	 behavioral	 and	phenomenological	thinness.	1.1.5	 Episodes	versus	stances	Many	 of	 our	 ordinary	 experiences	 with	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 can	 be	explained	by	way	of	this	account,	but	not	all	of	them.	Some	of	our	reactive	attitudes	are	 brief,	 especially	when	we	 react	 to	 strangers	 for	 insignificant	 interactions.	 But	many	 of	 our	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 long-lasting.	 We	 might,	 for	 instance,	 resent	someone	close	to	us	for	a	significant	wrongdoing	for	quite	some	time.	However,	that	does	not	mean	that	we	need	have	their	wrongdoing	on	our	minds	throughout	or	that	our	epistemic	contact	with	 the	world	 is	 constantly	mediated	by	 their	wrongdoing.	
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Instead,	 we	 should	 distinguish	 reactive-attitude	 episodes	 and	 reactive-attitude	stances.15	An	episode	is	the	immediate	experience	of	an	attitude,	whereas	a	stance	is	the	durable	disposition	to	episodes	of	the	attitude.	Thus,	 for	 instance,	 consider	 Adam	 who	 resents	 Beverly.	 While	 thinking	 of	Beverly,	Adam	finds	himself	in	a	resentful	episode.	He	is	thinking	of	Beverly	and	her	wrongdoing,	he	feels	heated,	he	is	disposed	to	punish	Beverly	or	to	lash	out	at	her,	and	 he	 sees	 the	world	 colored	 by	 her	wrongdoing.	 But	 on	 other	 occasions,	when	Adam	is	not	thinking	of	Beverly,	he	does	not	feel	heated,	he	does	not	experience	any	urge	to	punish	Beverly	or	to	lash	out	at	her,	and,	importantly,	his	understanding	of	the	world	is	not	informed	by	thoughts	of	Beverly	or	her	wrongdoing.	This	does	not	mean	 that	he	does	not	 resent	her.	Rather,	 it	means	 that	he	 is	not	 in	an	episode	of	resentment.	He	is,	rather,	in	a	resentment	stance	toward	Beverly.	The	 exact	 relationship	 between	 episodes	 and	 stances	 is	 grist	 for	 more	inquiry.	 For	 instance,	 might	 a	 reactive	 attitude	 stance	 involve	 more	 than	 a	 thin	disposition	to	the	corresponding	episodes?	Or:	 	could	an	agent	be	said	to	be	in	the	reactive	 attitude	 stance	 even	 if	 they	 never	 experience	 an	 episode?	 I	 set	 those	questions	 aside.	 For	my	 purposes,	 it	 is	 important	 only	 to	 recognize	 this	 intuitive	distinction	between	two	common	ways	to	experience	the	reactive	attitudes.	
1.2	 An	important	sort	of	blame	Although	Strawson	does	not	seem	to	have	been	particularly	concerned	with	blame,	 the	negative	 reactive	 attitudes	pick	 out	 a	 distinctive	 and	 important	 sort	 of	
																																																								15	Here	I	borrow	terminology	from	Menges	(2017).	
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interpersonal	 blame.	 They	 have	 both	 the	 right	 backward-looking	 focus	 on	wrongdoing	and	a	sufficiently	unwanted	sting.	That	the	negative	reactive	attitudes	can	be	seen	as	an	important	sort	of	blame	is	part	of	the	case	for	making	the	reactive	attitudes	central	to	the	study	of	moral	responsibility.	I	 do	 not	mean	 here	 to	 take	 a	 particular	 stand	 on	 the	 essence	 of	 blame,	 on	whether	there	is	a	single	unified	sense	of	blame,	or	on	whether	the	negative	reactive	attitudes	mark	the	most	important	sense	of	blame.	There	are	many	sorts	of	blame.	There	are	behaviors	which	seem	to	be	sorts	of	non-moralized	blame.	We	blame	the	thunderstorm	 for	 the	 canceled	 picnic.	 While	 that	 indicates	 some	 sense	 that	 the	thunderstorm	 has	 played	 a	 causal	 role	 in	 things	 being	 worse	 than	 they	 might	otherwise	be,	we	do	not	think	that	the	thunderstorm	has	done	anything	wrong.		And	there	are	several	sorts	of	moralized	blame	which	are	not	equivalent	to	the	negative	reactive	attitudes.	Strawson	contrasted	two	ways	of	seeing	others:	akin	to	patients,	whom	we	might	diagnose	and	treat,	and	as	morally	responsible	agents,	whom	we	might	praise	and	blame.	When	we	see	others	as	lacking	the	right	sort	of	role	in	their	own	behavior,	or	when	we	see	their	character	as	the	product	of	external	and	often	malignant	 factors,	we	do	not	treat	 them	as	morally	responsible	 for	their	behavior.	 Still,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	we	might	be	 thought	 to	blame	agents	we	consider	in	an	objective	sense	in	cases	where	we	judge	them	to	do	wrong,	so	long	as	we	 point	 to	 them	 and	 to	 their	 character	 in	 our	 explanations	 of	 their	wrongdoing.	And	 punishment	 might	 be	 another	 sort	 of	 moralized	 blame.	 While	 punishment	might	be	 thought	 to	be	 inclusive	or	derivative	of	 the	reactive	attitudes,	 it	 involves	
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the	further	necessary	element	of	the	intended	attempt	to	impose	harm,	an	element	not	needed	in	ordinary	instances	of	interpersonal	blame.16		The	negative	reactive	attitudes	are	a	distinctive	sort	of	blame.	Like	the	other	sorts	of	blame,	the	negative	reactive	attitudes	involve	an	explanatory	assessment	of	some	 sort	 of	 negative	 phenomenon;	 here,	 it	 is	 the	 attribution	 of	 some	 bit	 of	wrongdoing	 to	 poor	 quality	 of	 character. 17 	And	 this	 is	 a	 backwards-looking	assessment--indeed,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 reactive.	 The	 negative	 reactive	attitudes	 fit	 nicely	 in	 between	 merely	 cognitive	 blaming	 that	 involves	 only	judgments	and	behavioral	blaming	such	as	requires	punishment	or	change	in	social	relationships.	 And	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 seem	 widespread	 and	 familiar.	Accordingly,	 we	 should	 see	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 as	 constituting	 a	distinctive	and	important	sort	of	blame.18	Because	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 do	 not	 necessarily	 involve	 any	withdrawal	 of	 social	 interaction,	 punishment,	 or	 the	 like,	 it	might	 be	 thought	 that																																																									16	Importantly,	 an	 advocate	 of	 a	 reactive-attitudes	 account	 of	 blame	 need	 not	thereby	also	be	a	retributivist,	thinking	there	is	an	immediate	good	in	the	imposition	of	 some	 harm	 on	 a	 wrongdoer	 or	 the	 experience	 of	 some	 suffering	 by	 the	wrongdoer.	These	views	are	consistent,	but	neither	entails	 the	other.	For	more	on	the	 relationship	 between	 a	 theory	 of	 responsibility	 and	 a	 theory	 of	 desert,	 see	especially	McKenna	(2012)	and	Nelkin	(2014).	17	The	 relationship	 to	 the	 prior	 wrongdoing	 is	 an	 important	 sense	 in	 which	 the	negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 properly	 backward-looking,	 by	 contrast	 with	 the	results-oriented	concerns	of	consequentialist	theories	of	appropriate	blame	like	that	offered	most	famously	by	J.J.C.	Smart	(1961)	or	the	results-oriented	concerns	which	motivate	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 quasi-blame	 like	 those	 offered	 by	 Derk	Pereboom	(2001,	2014)	and	Vargas	(2005a,	2006,	2013).	18	Skeptics	not	convinced	by	the	argument	which	immediately	follows	can	treat	the	bulk	 of	 this	 essay	 as	 an	 essay	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 being	appropriate	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 essay	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 a	 certain	 sort	 of	 blame	being	appropriate.	
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they	 lack	 the	 characteristic	 “sting”	 of	 blame.19	This	 objection	 has	 been	 described	forcefully	by	Pamela	Hieronymi:	it	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 affective	 accompaniment	 of	 a	 judgment	 could,	itself,	 carry	 the	 characteristic	 force	 of	 blame.	 An	 affective	accompaniment	 of	 a	 judgment	 would	 be	 a	 certain	 unpleasant	emotional	disturbance,	occasioned	by	the	 judgment.	But,	 the	force	of	blame	seems	deeper,	more	serious	or	weighty	than	simply	being	the	object	of	 certain	unpleasant	emotional	disturbance.	The	affect,	 itself,	seems	insufficiently	robust.	(2004,	p.	121)20		Consider	punishment.	Punishment’s	propositional	content	resembles	resentment’s,	but	 punishment	 combines	 that	 content	 with	 the	 intentional	 infliction	 of	 pain	 or	deprivation.	That	 infliction	 seems	sufficient	 for	 the	 characteristic	 sting	of	blame.21	Likewise,	we	can	see	informal,	social	alienation	as	being	marked	by	a	sting--the	sting	of	exclusion,	degraded	relationships,	public	excoriation,	and	 the	 like.	 It	 is	 intuitive	that	 blame	 “stings,”	 and	 it	 might	 not	 be	 immediately	 clear	 how	 the	 reactive	attitudes--especially	given	 that	 they	might	be	entirely	private--sting.	This	 can	give	us	reason	to	doubt	that	the	reactive	attitudes	constitute	blame	at	all.	One	 way	 to	 locate	 a	 sting	 in	 the	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 is	 to	 see	 the	reactive	attitudes	as	important	for	our	relationships	of	mutual	regard.	This	is	similar		to	 Hieronymi’s	 strategy;	 she	 locates	 the	 characteristic	 sting	 of	 the	 judgments	 of																																																									19	Because	I	think	that	the	reactive	attitudes	do	sting,	I	do	not	challenge	Hieronymi’s	claim	that	blame	 is	 the	sort	of	 thing	which	stings.	But	some	sorts	of	blame	do	not	sting:		the	earthquake	feels	nothing	when	we	blame	it	for	the	damage	to	buildings.		20	Watson	 raises	 the	 same	 concern:	 	 “But	 how	 far	will	 this	 [that	we	 dislike	when	others	resent	us]	take	us?	It	is	disagreeable	only	when	the	disagreement	is	felt.	And	some	may	be	indifferent	to	others’	disapproval	altogether”	(1996,	p.	238).	21	A	dedicated	skeptic	could	re-raise	the	Hieronymi	and	Watson	critiques	here.	Even	in	 the	case	of	 intentionally	 inflicted	punishment,	 “It	 is	disagreeable	only	when	 the	disagreement	 is	 felt.	And	some	may	be	 indifferent	 to	 [the	punishment]	altogether”	(quoting	Watson,	1996,	p.	238,	replacing	“disapproval”	with	“punishment”).	
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blaming	in	the	importance	they	carry	for	our	interpersonal	relations,	for	our	mutual	standing.	But	Hieronymi’s	argument	is	too	strong.	She	argues	that	“the	content	of	a	judgment	of	ill	will	can	carry	a	certain	amount	of	force—despite	being	descriptive.	If	it	 [the	 judgment	of	 ill	will]	 is	 true,	 then	you	no	 longer	stand	in	such	a	relationship	[i.e.,	one	of	mutual	regard]”	(2004,	p.	124).	But	I	have	blamed	those	close	to	me,	and	in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 cases,	 those	 instances	 of	 blaming	 did	 not	 disrupt	 the	relationships.	I	can	even	recall	instances	of	blame	which	went	unaddressed--and	yet	the	 friendships	 continued.	 (And	 I’m	 sure	 I	 have	 been	 the	 target	 of	 such	blamings,	hopefully	infrequently.)	Minor	blamings	need	not	vitiate,	or	even	significantly	affect,	standings	 of	 mutual	 regard.	 Friendships,	 after	 all,	 can	 tolerate	 occasional	wrongdoings.22	Nonetheless,	 these	 instances	of	blaming	do	seem	 to	have	carried	a	sting.	 I	 would	 regret	 being	 blamed	 in	 such	 a	 case,	 even	 if	 it	 did	 not	 threaten	my	relationship.	 The	 negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 need	 not	 erode	 or	 even	 threaten	 to	erode	a	standing	of	mutual	regard.		That	said,	Hieronymi	 is	correct	 to	 focus	on	our	standings	of	mutual	 regard.	The	reactive	attitudes	arise	because	we	expect	to	be	treated	as	moral	peers	in	light	of	 those	standings.	But	we	do	not	need	to	appeal	to	the	apparent	 fragility	of	 those	standings	to	locate	the	sting	of	blame.	We	do	not	need	to	appeal	to	the	potential	for	a	significant	if	not	wholly	vitiating	impact	on	our	standings	of	mutual	regard	to	locate	the	sting	of	blame.	Rather,	the	sting	of	blame	arises	because,	as	Strawson	noted,	we	
																																																								22	Repeated	and	persistent	negative	reactive	attitudes	might	lead	to	the	erosion	of	a	relationship	of	mutual	 regard.	But	 this	 is	 an	 exceptional	 case,	 not	 the	normal	 and	characteristic	operation	of	the	reactive	attitudes.	
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are	sociable	creatures	and	so,	 in	general,	we	care	about	how	others	regard	us,	and	not	 just	 how	 others	 treat	 us.	 We	 ordinarily	 care	 how	 others	 see	 us,	 and	 this	 is	independent	of	the	further	impact	that	they	might	have	on	our	lives.	Thus	we	care	even	about	 the	opinions	of	 strangers	and	of	 those	 living	 in	 the	 future,	 though	 this	need	not	entail	that	we	care	about	those	opinions	just	as	much	as	we	care	about	the	opinions	of	those	more	proximate.	Accordingly,	 the	 sting	 of	 the	 reactive-attitude	 sort	 of	 blame	 falls	 out	 of	 its	seeing-as	element.23	It	is	true	that	all	sorts	of	blame	involve	some	judgment.	But	the	seeing-as	 element	 heightens	 the	 epistemic	 import.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 resentment	 in	particular,	it	isn’t	just	that	we	are	judged	to	have	done	wrong,	though	that	is	often	a	significant	 sting.	 It	 is	 that	 we	 are	 seen	 in	 light	 of--in	 the	 focusing	 light	 of--our	wrongdoing.	We	care	about	how	we	are	seen,	and	we	want	others	to	 focus	on	our	strengths.	Thus	the	negative	reactive	attitudes	have	a	distinctive	sting.	In	this	sense,	the	blaming	reactive	attitudes	mark	a	central	way	(and	perhaps	the	 central	way)	 that	we	hold	each	other	accountable.	Earlier	 I	 spoke	of	Watson’s	attributability	 sense	 of	 responsibility.	 An	 agent	 is	 responsible	 for	 an	 action	 in	 the	attributability	 sense	 when	 the	 action	 can	 properly	 be	 taken	 to	 reveal	 something	about	 the	 agent’s	 character.	 This	 is	 an	 aretaic	 sort	 of	 responsibility.	 Watson	distinguishes	the	attributability	sense	of	responsibility	from	an	accountability	sense	of	 responsibility:	 	 an	 agent	 is	 responsible	 in	 the	 accountability	 sense	 when	 it	 is	appropriate	 to	 respond	 to	 the	agent	with	adverse	 treatment	or	negative	attitudes,																																																									23	This	 is	not	to	say	that	the	behavior	characteristic	of	resentment	might	not	sting.	There	can	be	more	than	one	sting!	
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and	not	merely	with	 a	 judgment.	 For	Watson,	 the	 two	 sorts	 of	 blame	 are	 related:		“accountability	 blame	 is	 a	 response	 to	 the	 faults	 identified	 in	 the	 aretaic	 sense”	(1996,	 p.	 238).	 But	 accountability	 requires	 more	 than	 attributability,	 for	accountability	 involves	 a	 distinctive	 sting. 24 	Returning	 to	 Hieronymi,	 we	 can	distinguish	the	sting	of	 judgments	(which	she	accepts)	from	the	sting	of	the	affect-laden	attitudes	(which	she	rejects).	The	sting	of	a	 judgment	cannot	be	unfair	if	the	judgment	 is	 accurate,	 she	 insists.	 Even	 if	 that	 is	 so,	 there	 might	 be	 distinctive	questions	having	 to	do	with	 the	 fairness	of	accountability	 in	 light	of	 its	distinctive	sting.	 Taking	stock,	I’ve	laid	out	the	core	of	the	concept	of	the	reactive	attitudes	I’m	concerned	with,	 one	 taken	 largely	 from	Strawson’s	work.	These	 reactive	 attitudes	are	our	affective	reactions	to	the	quality	of	will	manifested	in	agent’s	behaviors--in	our	 own	 behaviors	 and	 others’	 behaviors.	 As	 is	 commonly	 accepted,	 I	 see	 the	reactive	attitudes	as	having	as	central	components	a	propositional	element	tracking	the	 manifested	 quality	 of	 will,	 a	 characteristic	 felt	 phenomenology,	 and	 a	characteristic	set	of	behavioral	dispositions.	In	addition	to	these	three	components,	I	follow	 important	 recent	 work	 from	 Allais,	 Hurley,	 Macnamara,	 Menges,	 and	Zimmerman	 in	 stressing	 a	 further	 component,	 one	 informed	 by	 work	 on	 the	emotions:		the	reactive	attitudes	influence	how	we	see	the	agents	who	act,	directing	our	attentions	and	interpretations.	This	four-element	model	of	the	reactive	attitudes																																																									24 	The	 relationship	 between	 the	 attributability	 and	 accountability	 is	 not	straightforward.	 As	 Nelkin	 (2015)	 explains,	 one	 significant	 dispute	 is	 whether	attributability	 might	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	 accountability,	 even	 if	 the	 two	 sorts	 of	responsibility	are	conceptually	distinct.	
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allows	us	a	moderately	wide-scoped	account	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	incorporating	the	negative	 reactive	 attitudes	 like	 resentment	but	 also	positive	 reactive	 attitudes	like	gratitude,	and	it	provides	us	an	attractive	explanation	of	why	we	should	see	the	negative	reactive	attitudes	as	an	important	and	distinctive	sort	of	blame.	Now	I	turn	to	 consider	 when	 an	 agent	 is	 an	 appropriate	 target	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes,	 i.e.,	when	an	agent	is	responsible.	
1.3	 Responsibility	and	the	reactive	attitudes	1.3.1	 The	Strawsonian	biconditional	For	 Strawson,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 concept	 of	responsibility.	 Although	 there	 is	 a	 cottage	 industry	 of	 Strawson	 interpretations,	many	Strawsonians	accept	the	Strawsonian	biconditional,	which	I	put	as	follows:			an	agent	is	responsible	(for	a	bit	of	behavior)	just	in	case	the	agent	is	an	appropriate	target	of	the	reactive	attitudes	(on	the	basis	of	that	bit	of	behavior).		This	biconditional	 claims	 that	 there	 is	a	 central,	normative	connection	between	(a	certain	sort	of)	responsibility	and	practices	like	blame	and	praise.	That	connection	is	widely	accepted.	We	see	something	like	it	from	incompatibilists	like	Derk	Pereboom	(2014),	revisionists	like	Vargas	(2013),	and	compatibilists	like	John	Martin	Fischer	and	 Mark	 Ravizza	 (1998),	 and	 we	 see	 something	 like	 this	 from	 response-dependence	 theorists	 like	Wallace	 (1994)	 and	 from	 realists	 like	 David	 Brink	 and	Dana	Kay	Nelkin	 (2013).25	And	 this	biconditional	 can	 also	be	 seen	as	marking	 the	
																																																								25 	Fischer	 sometimes	 suggests	 that	 responsibility	 for	 wrongdoing	 and	blameworthiness	are	not	tied	in	this	fashion,	as	in	his	(2014)	review	of	Pereboom’s	book.	 But	 in	 those	 cases,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 it	 is	 responsibility	 that	 is	 being	
34	
	
relationship	 between	 blame	 and	 responsibility	 picked	 out	 by	 Watson’s	accountability	sense	of	responsibility,	the	sort	of	responsibility	required	for	us	to	be	disposed	to	react	to	others	on	the	basis	of	how	they	meet,	exceed,	or	fall	short	of	our	moral	expectations.26	But	“appropriate”	is	a	normative	notion,	so	we	need	to	get	clear	on	the	right	normative	sense.	As	Wallace	remarks,	 “appropriate”	 is	a	 “bland	and	noncommittal	term[]	 of	 generalized	 appraisal”	 (1994,	 p.	 92).	 I	 identify	 the	 sense	 of	appropriateness	at	issue	as	fittingness:	an	agent	is	responsible	(for	bit	of	behavior)	just	in	case	the	agent	is	a	fitting	target	of	the	reactive	attitudes	(on	the	basis	of	that	bit	 of	 behavior).	 And	 I	 understand	 the	 sense	 of	 fittingness	 here	 to	 be	 the	 sense	discussed	 by	 Justin	 D’Arms	 and	 Daniel	 Jacobson	 in	 their	 work	 on	 the	appropriateness	 of	 the	 emotions,	 especially	 their	 essay	 “The	 Moralistic	 Fallacy”	(2000).27	As	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	explain,	emotions	mark	the	elements	of	the	world	as	having	certain	features.	Fear,	for	example,	marks	its	object	as	being	threatening.	
																																																																																																																																																																					considered	rather	than	reasons-responsiveness.	That	is,	it	seems	there	that	Fischer	is	 saying	 that	 reasons-responsiveness	 and	 wrongdoing	 are	 not	 sufficient	 for	blameworthiness.	 Fischer	 elsewhere	 advocates	 a	 view	 of	 responsibility	 where	reasons-responsiveness	is	one	subpart	of	a	complex	account.	26	Sometimes	Watson	writes	as	if	the	readiness	to	treat	harshly	is	central	to	the	sort	of	 blame	 at	 issue	 in	 accountability.	 For	 example,	 he	 writes	 that	 the	 “blaming	attitudes	 involve	 a	 readiness	 to	 adverse	 treatment”	 (1996,	 p.	 239).	 If	 this	 is	 to	suggest	that	one	is	not	blaming	if	one	is	not	ready	to	treat	adversely,	then	I	reject	the	suggestion.	 I	 see	 the	 readiness	 to	 treat	 adversely	 as	 a	 common	 element	 of	 the	blaming	reactive	attitudes,	not	a	necessary	feature	of	them.		27	While	D’Arms	and	 Jacobson’s	work	 is	duly	popular	 and	 is	often	 cited	 to	explain	the	sense	of	fittingness	involved	in	the	Strawsonian	biconditional	(see,	e.g.,	D.	Justin	Coates	 and	 Neal	 Tognazzini	 (2016)),	 the	 idea	 that	 we	 can	 make	 sense	 of	 the	appropriateness	of	our	 responses	and	 reactions	 in	 fittingness	 terms	 is	not	new	 to	them.	We	see	it,	for	instance,	in	the	work	of	Adam	Smith	(2010).	
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We	can	then	make	sense	of	the	fittingness	of	the	emotions	by	asking	whether	their	targets	in	fact	have	the	corresponding	features.	At	least	in	ordinary	cases,	it	is	fitting	to	fear	a	threatening	storm,	but	it	is	not	fitting	to	fear	a	balmy	afternoon.	The	storm	might	cause	you	harm,	but	the	balmy	afternoon	almost	certainly	will	not.	In	the	case	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	we	can	point	to	the	content	of	the	attitudes.	Resentment	is	a	 fitting	reactive	attitude,	 i.e.,	an	agent	 is	blameworthy,	when	the	agent’s	behavior	manifests	 ill	 will,	 and	 gratitude	 is	 a	 fitting	 reactive	 attitude,	 i.e.,	 an	 agent	 is	praiseworthy,	when	the	agent’s	behavior	manifests	good	will.28	Fittingness	 is	 not	 all	 there	 is	 to	 appropriateness,	 especially	 to	 all-things-considered	 appropriateness.	 A	 reaction	 can	 be	 fitting	 though	 there	 is	 reason	 to	resist,	suppress,	or	avoid	the	reaction;	and	there	can	be	reason	to	induce	a	reaction	even	though	it	is	not	fitting.	It	might	be	useful	sometimes	to	experience	a	reaction	in	order	 to	 fit	 in	 or	 to	 share	 a	 social	 experience.	 It	might	 be	 useful,	 for	 instance,	 to	induce	a	 feeling	of	 fright	during	a	horror	 film,	even	 if	 there	 is	nothing	 threatening	about	 the	 film.	 Nonetheless,	 fittingness	 does	 have	 practical	 import.	 Centrally,	 the	fittingness	of	a	reactive	attitude	provides	a	pro	tanto	basis	for	the	reactive	attitude	being	 practically	 appropriate.	 Something	 like	 this	 is	 widely	 assumed	 in	 the	responsibility	literature.	McKenna,	for	instance,	thinks	that	we	must	understand	the	sense	of	appropriateness	in	the	Strawsonian	biconditional	as	“offer[ing]	a	pro	tanto	
																																																								28	That	 the	 fittingness	 sense	of	 appropriateness	makes	 reference	 to	quality	 of	will	does	not	resolve	the	debate	between	quality	of	will	and	fair	opportunity	theories	of	responsibility,	for	much	hangs	on	the	conditions	of	manifestation.	
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reason”	(2012,	p.	36,	emphasis	in	original).29	We	can	see	this	relationship	between	fittingness	and	practical	appropriateness	 in	our	explanations	of	why	we	engage	 in	any	particular	instance	of	blame,	by	appealing	to	fittingness.	That	there	is	this	connection	between	the	fittingness	sense	of	“appropriate”	and	 the	 practical	 sense	 of	 “appropriate”	 is	 a	 substantive	 and	 potentially	controversial	position,	and	defending	it	would	be	an	important	part	of	a	full	defense	of	a	Strawsonian	compatibilist	account.	Although	that	question	 is	 far	broader	than	my	 current	 project,	 I	 can	 gesture	 at	 some	 of	 the	 elements	 that	might	 ground	 the	connection	between	 fittingness	and	practical	 reasons	by	pointing	 to	 the	ways	 that	the	reactive	attitudes	might	be	thought	to	mark	an	important	part	of	healthy	human	life.30	If	the	reactive	attitudes	are	an	important	part	of	healthy	human	life,	then	that	we	 have	 good	 reason	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 practice	 might	 be	 seen	 as	 providing	 an	explanation	for	why	we	have	reason	in	particular	cases	to	engage	in	the	reactions.31	As	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 write,	 life	 without	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 would	 be	“cold	 and	 alienating--and	 highly	 unattractive”	 (1998,	 p.	 4).	 A	 susceptibility	 to	 the	reactive	attitudes	might	be	thought	necessary	or	at	least	important	for	certain	sorts	
																																																								29	McKenna’s	point	is	primarily	that	the	reason	be	seen	as	a	pro	tanto	reason	rather	than	 an	 all-things-considered	 reason.	 But	 that	 the	 relevant	 distinction	 is	 between	pro	tanto	and	all-things-considered	reasons,	not	between	offering	a	practical	reason	and	serving	some	other	role,	shows	how	palatable	it	is	to	assume	that	responsibility	for	wrongdoing	supplies	a	pro	tanto	reason	to	blame.	30	For	similar	arguments,	see	Macalaster	Bell	(2013).	31	That	 is,	 an	 external	 justification	 for	 the	 practice	 might	 explain	 why	 fittingness	gives	rise	to	a	pro	tanto	practical	reason,	an	internal	justification.	Consider	the	sort	of	 argument	 John	 Rawls	 gives	 for	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 justification	 in	 his	 “Two	Concepts	of	Rules”	(1955).	I	thank	David	Brink	for	pushing	me	to	make	clearer	the	relationship	between	the	different	levels	of	justification.	
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of	valuable	human	relationships.32	It	is	via	the	reactive	attitudes	that	we	experience	ourselves	and	others	as	 agents	 and	not	 as	 ‘mere’	 causes	or	 sites	of	behavior.	This	experience	 of	 someone	 as	 an	 agent	 is	 the	 stuff	 of	 significant	 interpersonal	relationships.	Because	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 the	way	we	experience	ourselves	and	others	as	agents,	the	reactive	attitudes	are	an	important	part	of	how	we	engage	in	significant	interpersonal	relationships.	And	the	reactive	attitudes	provide	important	behavioral	incentives.33	We	like	being	 the	objects	of	praise,	and	we	dislike	being	 the	objects	of	blame.	Because	we	are	motivated	 to	 avoid	 blame,	 the	 possibility	 of	 blame	 can	 help	 us	 avoid	 running	afoul	of	our	own	and	others’	moral	demands.	These	are,	of	 course,	only	 imperfect	mechanisms.	 Because	 interpersonal	 blame	 depends	 upon	 the	 interpersonal	perception	of	wrongdoing,	and	because	perception	 is	a	matter	of	appearances,	 the	behavioral	incentives	are	most	directly	sensitive	to	the	appearance	of	wrongdoing.	This	can	yield	a	motivation	to	cover	up	wrongdoing,	and	this	can	yield	a	motivation	to	 act	 immorally	 where	 others	 have	 errant	 moral	 beliefs.	 Moreover,	 our	 concern	with	others’	resentments	is	highly	variable.	But	because	we	are	generally	motivated	
																																																								32	Most	Strawsonians	offer	some	version	of	this	claim.	We	see	the	stronger,	necessity	claim	 in	 Strawson,	 and	 we	 see	 a	 somewhat	 weaker	 version	 in	 Wallace.	 But	 not	everyone	accepts	the	connection	between	the	susceptibility	to	the	reactive	attitudes	and	 centrally	 important	 human	 relationships.	 Importantly,	 skeptics	 about	 the	applicability	of	the	reactive	attitudes	such	as	Pereboom	and	Per	Milam	(2014,	2016)	claim	 that	 we	 might	 maintain	 our	 ordinary	 relationships	 or	 at	 least	 comparably	valuable	replacements	even	if	we	abandoned	the	reactive	attitudes.	33	Not	surprisingly,	finding	forward-looking	import	in	the	reactive	attitudes	is	more	common	in	revisionists	such	as	Vargas	(2013).	
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by	 our	 concerns	 for	 how	 others	 see	 us,	 we	 should	 see	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 as	having	a	moral-coordination	effect.	The	reactive	attitudes	also	play	important	expressive	roles.	They	allow	us	to	express	 praise	 and	 censure.34	Each	 of	 the	 various	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 closely	associated	with	characteristic	forms	of	expression--verbal,	facial,	and	otherwise.	We	can	wince	or	frown,	for	instance,	upon	the	appreciation	of	some	bit	of	wrongdoing.	Thus	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	provide	a	mechanism	 for	us	 to	 express	our	 judgments	about	the	ways	that	agents’	actions	reflect	upon	them.	But	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	reactive	 attitudes	 are	 merely	 a	 neutral	 medium	 for	 the	 conveyance	 of	 the	proposition	 that	 the	 target	 agent	 has	 missed,	 met,	 or	 exceeded	 some	 moral	expectation.	The	affective	component	of	the	reactive	attitudes	adds	a	particular	kind	of	force	to	the	message.	As	Miranda	Fricker	(2016)	insists,	the	reactive	attitudes	are	emotionally	laden	expressions,	and	that	emotion	is	significant	for	us.	That	emotion	marks	the	reactive	attitudes	as	a	distinctive	medium	for	communication.	Moreover,	plausibly,	 the	 seeing-as	 element	 helps	 enable	 our	 expressive	 behavior.	 By	simplifying	our	assessments	of	each	other,	the	reactive	attitudes	enable	us	to	offer	expressions	 which	 are	 more	 communicatively	 forceful	 because	 less	 qualified	 and	therefore	 less	 milquetoast.	 Even	 if	 the	 milquetoast	 or	 the	 qualified	 assessment	would	 be	 our	 all-things-considered	 assessment,	 that	 expression	 might	 lack	
																																																								34	Almost	everyone	writing	about	the	reactive	attitudes	explicitly	acknowledges	that	the	 reactive	attitudes	can	express	 censure,	 and	many	also	accept	 that	 the	 reactive	attitudes	 can	express	praise.	For	many,	 this	 expressive	 role	 is	 the	most	 important	role	that	the	reactive	attitudes	play.	
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communicative	power,	and	so	the	focusing	provided	by	the	reactive	attitudes	helps	us	to	express	something	more	meaningful.	Finally,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 valuable	 for	 us	 because	we	 have	 limited	attention	but	live	in	a	complex	world.	As	David	Zimmerman	explains,	the	emotions	help	 us	manage	 our	 attentions.	 He	writes	 that	 “logical	 considerations	 alone,	 even	when	 supplemented	 by	 any	 of	 the	 well-recognized	 epistemic	 and	methodological	principles,	 do	 not	 determine	 salience,	what	 to	 attend	 to,	what	 to	 inquire	 about	 in	contexts	 in	 which	 this	 kind	 of	 focal	 efficiency	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 advancement	 and	protection	 of	 basic	 interests”	 (2001,	 pp.	 534–535,	 punctuation	 and	 citations	omitted).	 These	 points	 extend	 to	 the	 reactive	 attitudes.	We	 need	 to	 attend	 to	 our	own	and	to	others’	quality	of	will,	but	we	cannot	organize	those	attentions	on	purely	principled	 grounds.35	Instead,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 provide	 us	 a	 way	 to	 react	 to	others’	 manifested	 quality	 of	 will	 in	 the	 face	 of	 our	 necessarily	 incomplete	circumstances.	They	are	highly	important	heuristics	for	our	attention.	All	 of	 these	 are	 contingent,	 empirical	 claims,	 and	 all	 of	 them	 might	 be	contested.	Moreover,	even	if	the	reactive	attitudes	are	generally	beneficial,	that	does	not	mean	that	any	of	us	have	reason	to	experience	them	in	any	particular	instance.	We	should	want	a	fuller	explanation	of	the	connection	between	the	practice	and	the	instance.	But	 these	contingent,	empirical	claims	make	plausible	that	we	have	good	reason	 to	be	 the	sorts	of	creatures	who	are	susceptible	 to	 the	reactive	attitudes.36	
																																																								35	Although	I	take	this	denial	to	be	true,	I	do	not	defend	it	here.		36	One	 potentially	 promising	 defense	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 might	 point	 to	 a	virtue-theoretic	defense	of	the	role	of	the	reactive	attitudes	in	the	good	human	life,	
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And	 that	 claim	 makes	 plausible	 that	 there	 is	 a	 connection	 between	 matters	 of	fittingness	and	practical	matters.	Even	 supposing	 that	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 grounds	 the	practical	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes,	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes	 is	not	sufficient	 for	the	all-things-considered	practical	appropriateness	of	my	 particular	 experience	 of	 some	 reactive	 attitude.37	Fischer	 and	 Ravizza,	 for	instance,	distinguish	between	blameworthiness	and	it	being	justified	or	appropriate,	all	things	considered,	to	actually	have	any	reactive	attitude	toward	an	agent	(1998,	p.	 7).	 As	 Fischer	 later	 explains,	 “an	 agent	 can	 be	 morally	 responsible,	 but	circumstances	 may	 be	 such	 as	 to	 render	 praise	 or	 blame	 unjustifiable”	 (2004,	 p.	158).	And	McKenna	explains	that,	while	blameworthiness	can	make	for	a	pro	tanto	reason	 to	 blame,	 it	 does	 not	 by	 itself	 provide	 an	 all-things-considered	 reason	 to	blame	(2012,	p.	36).	We	 can	 see	 this	 distinction	 between	 fittingness	 and	 all-things-considered	appropriateness	 by	 looking	 at	 cases	 where	 facts	 about	 the	 agent	 who	 might	
																																																																																																																																																																					one	consistent	perhaps	with	a	contemporary	virtue	theory	of	the	sort	that	Philippa	Foot	 (2001)	 has	 offered,	 and	 one	 evocative	 of	 Vargas’s	 (2013,	 p.	 172)	 two-level	justification.	Those	sympathetic	to	virtue	theories	of	this	sort	will	hopefully	find	this	suggestion	illuminating.	In	any	case,	it	is	a	placeholder	for	a	future	exploration.	37 	Is	 fittingness	 necessary?	 It’s	 unclear	 whether	 responsibility	 for	 wrongdoing	provides	 the	 only	 pro	 tanto	 reason	 to	 blame.	 Imagine,	 for	 instance,	 the	 sorts	 of	reasons	 a	 utilitarian	 might	 offer	 to	 blame.	 If	 those	 reasons	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	blame,	 then	 blameworthiness	 marks	 merely	 one	 of	 several	 pro	 tanto	 reasons	 to	blame	 (even	 if	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 privileged	 reason).	 It’s	 also	 unclear	whether	 such	non-blameworthiness	 reasons	give	us	 reasons	 to	blame	or	merely	 reasons	 to	 faux	blame.	 I	 read	 the	 disagreement	 between	 the	 incompatibilism	 urged	 by	 Pereboom	(2014)	and	the	revisionism	urged	by	Vargas	(2013)	as	in	large	part	a	disagreement	about	this	matter.	
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experience	the	reactive	attitudes	seem	to	make	the	reactive	attitudes	inappropriate	all-things-considered.	 For	 instance,	 there	 is	 something	 intuitively	 amiss	 in	 cases	where	 one	wrongdoer	 blames	 another	wrongdoer	 for	 a	wrong	 in	which	 they	 are	both	implicated,	especially	if	there	is	not	at	the	same	time	any	self-directed	blame.38	As	McKenna	explains,	“If	Joe	is	an	adulterer,	then	even	if	Josephine	is	blameworthy	for	her	act	of	adultery,	Joe	might	not	have	moral	standing	to	hold	Josephine	morally	responsible	for	her	transgressions”	(2012,	p.	28).	And	we	might	think	that	this	lack	of	 standing	 is	what	makes	 it	 inappropriate	 for	 Joe	 to	blame	 Josephine	despite	her	being	blameworthy.	There	are	a	number	of	plausible	explanations	for	why	unclean	hands	 might	 defeat	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 blame.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 that	 you	 cannot	appropriately	blame	someone	 for	 failing	to	measure	up	to	some	expectation	when	your	own	behavior	reveals	that	you	yourself	reject	that	expectation,	or	perhaps	it	is	that	you	cannot	appropriately	blame	someone	when	you	have	played	a	role	in	their	wrongdoing.39	Whatever	the	best	explanation,	the	unclean-hands	cases	are	one	sort	of	case	where	it	is	not	appropriate	for	some	agent	to	blame	a	wrongdoer	despite	the	wrongdoer	being	responsible	for	their	wrongdoing	and	therefore	blameworthy.	There	 are	 other	 cases	 where	 it	 might	 seem	 intuitive	 that	 blaming	 is	 all-things-considered	inappropriate	despite	the	agent	being	blameworthy.	For	instance,	in	 particular	 cases,	 blaming	 could	 cause	 harm	 sufficient	 to	 outweigh																																																									38	Wallace	(2011)	offers	a	Strawsonian	explanation	of	why	it	might	be	inappropriate	to	blame	a	blameworthy	agent	if	you’re	also	blameworthy:		doing	so	might	seem	to	suggest	that	you	don’t	treat	all	people	equally.	See	also	Matt	King	(2015)	for	a	nice,	recent	treatment	of	unclean-hands	and	the	issue	of	the	standing	to	blame.	39	For	an	alternative	explanation	of	the	hypocrisy	cases	which	appeals	to	the	seeing-as	element	of	blame,	see	my	“Paying	Attention	to	Standing”	(n.d.).	
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blameworthiness.40	As	McKenna	 explains,	 the	 pro	 tanto	reason	 to	 blame	provided	by	blameworthiness	“could	be	defeated	by	other	weighty	reasons”	(2012,	p.	36).41	McKenna	gives	an	example	where	blaming	someone	would	cause	the	destruction	of	the	 planet.	 That	 consequence	 is	 so	 grave	 that	we	would	 have	 good	 reason	 not	 to	blame	even	if	the	agent	were	blameworthy.	There	are	perhaps	more	ordinary	cases	of	 outweighing.	 Consider	 a	 case	 where	 blaming	 a	 responsible	 wrongdoer	 would	cause	tremendous	harm	to	the	wrongdoer’s	innocent	family	members.	This	could	be	emotional	harm,	such	as	the	harm	caused	to	the	parent	as	the	child	is	blamed,	or	it	could	be	more	ordinary	harm,	such	as	the	harm	a	child	might	suffer	if	blaming	the	parent	disrupts	the	parent’s	caretaking	of	the	child.	These	harms	are	contingent	side	effects	of	blaming,	neither	conceptually	necessary	to	blaming	nor	(presumably)	the	ordinary	 role	or	purpose	of	blaming.	But	blaming	 could	 result	 in	 such	harms,	 and	there	 could	 be	 cases	 where	 the	 scale	 of	 such	 harms	 renders	 it	 inappropriate	 to	blame	the	agent.	In	such	cases,	the	reasons	to	blame	given	by	blameworthiness	are	outweighed	 by	 the	 reasons	 to	 refrain	 from	 blaming	 arising	 from	 the	 costs	 of	
																																																								40	We	 should	 be	 careful	 to	 distinguish	 the	 consequences	 of	 blaming	 from	 the	consequences	of	the	expression	of	blame.	That	said,	the	expression	of	blame	is	often	one	ordinary	consequence	of	blaming.	41	The	 term	 “weighty”	 might	 suggest	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 aggregation	 of	 reasons,	perhaps	even	consequentialism	about	the	reasons	involved.	I	mean	here	to	be	more	general	 than	 that.	 For	 now,	 I	 only	 need	 that	 the	 reasons	 involved	 can	 combine	 in	some	way	where	it	is	possible	that	there	could	be	a	reason	to	blame	of	some	sort	but	that,	at	the	same	time,	there	is	not	all-things-considered	reason	to	fully	blame.	This	could	 involve	 consequentialist	 aggregation,	 but	 it	 could	 also	 involve	 exclusion,	estoppel,	or	any	number	of	other	sorts	of	relations	between	practical	reasons.	
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blaming.42	Whether	the	harms	of	blaming	outweigh	the	reasons	of	blameworthiness	in	any	particular	case	will	depend	both	upon	the	harms	of	blaming	in	that	case	and	upon	the	force	of	the	reasons	provided	by	blameworthiness	in	that	case.	But	in	the	cases	 where	 the	 harms	 do	 outweigh	 blameworthiness,	 even	 though	 the	 agent	 is	blameworthy,	it	is	not	appropriate	to	blame	the	agent.	It	is	important	to	keep	these	wide-ranging	defeaters	of	fittingness	in	mind	in	order	to	avoid	the	moralistic	fallacy	identified	by	D’Arms	and	Jacobson.	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	offer	the	example	of	a	nasty	joke.	We	might	judge	that	it	would	be	wrong,	all-things-considered,	to	laugh	at	the	joke,	and	this	judgment	could	lead	us	to	infer	that	the	joke	is	not	funny.	However,	as	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	explain:	to	 commit	 the	 moralistic	 fallacy	 is	 to	 infer,	 from	 the	 claim	 that	 it	would	 be	 wrong	 or	 vicious	 to	 feel	 an	 emotion,	 that	 it	 is	 therefore	unfitting.	We	 shall	 contend,	 to	 the	 contrary,	 that	 an	 emotion	 can	 be	fitting	 despite	 being	 wrong	 (or	 inexpedient)	 to	 feel.	 In	 fact,	 the	wrongness	of	feeling	an	emotion	never,	 in	itself,	constitutes	a	reason	that	the	emotion	fails	to	be	fitting.	(2000,	p.	69)		We	must	be	careful	distinguish	the	reasons	which	tell	against	an	emotion	from	the	reasons	which	make	the	emotion	unfitting.	And	this	lesson	about	the	emotions	can	shed	 light	 on	 how	we	 should	 think	 about	 the	 reactive	 attitudes.	 The	 phenomena	which	 can	 bear	 on	 the	 all-things-considered	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes	 are	 wider	 than	 the	 phenomena	 which	 bear	 on	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	reactive	 attitudes.	 Failing	 to	 keep	 this	 in	mind	 can	 lead	 us	 to	misunderstand	 the																																																									42	These	harms	need	not	be	harms	 imposed	upon	a	 third	party.	As	 the	 forgiveness	literature	 makes	 clear,	 blaming	 can	 be	 bad	 for	 the	 agent	 who	 blames.	 It	 can	 be	upsetting	 and	 disruptive,	 and	 it	 can	 distract	 the	 blaming	 agent	 from	 focusing	 on	more	productive	matters.	These	costs	might	give	an	agent	good	reason	to	forego	a	fitting	blame	response	in	order	to	protect	his	own	interests.	
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nature	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	for	we	might	infer	from	the	fact	that	it	is	wrong	or	vicious	to	feel	a	reactive	attitude	that	the	reactive	attitude	is	unfitting,	and	we	might	then	 infer	 either	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitude	 does	 not	 correctly	 present	 the	world’s	evaluative	 features	 to	 us	 or	 that	 fittingness	 has	 to	 do	with	 things	 beyond	 correct	presentation;	neither	inference	would	be	warranted	on	such	grounds.	Accordingly,	while	 my	 primary	 subject	 is	 responsibility	 and	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes,	 it	 will	 be	 important	 to	 return	 regularly	 to	 the	 defeaters	 of	 fittingness.	Being	 aware	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 defeaters	 will	 help	 preclude	 committing	 the	moralistic	 fallacy,	 and	 the	 defeaters	 are	 important	 in	 their	 own	 right	 for	understanding	the	norms	of	blaming.	1.3.2	 Realism	or	response-dependence?	Much	 of	 Strawson’s	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 is	 widely	 accepted--in	particular	 the	 revival	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 and	 the	 connection	between	 blameworthiness	 and	 responsibility.	 However,	 some	 balk	 at	 Strawson’s	apparent	further	commitment	to	the	idea	that	moral	responsibility	is,	in	its	essence,	about	 our	 responding	 practices,	 such	 that	 the	 contours	 of	 moral	 responsibility	depend	upon	the	contours	of	our	responses	or	our	responding	practices.	In	contrast	to	 such	apparently	 response-dependent	views,	 some	of	 these	critics	 favor	 realism,	claiming	 an	 independent	 status	 for	moral	 responsibility.	 This	 distinction	 between	realism	 and	 response-dependence	 about	 responsibility	 is	 often	 taken	 to	 be	 a	foundational	 question.	My	 focus	 on	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	might	 suggest	 that	 I	 am	committed	to	a	response-dependent	view.	However,	while	we	can	learn	much	from	
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the	 response-dependence/realism	 debate,	 rejecting	 what	 I	 will	 call	 performed	response-dependence	 and	 accepting	 what	 I	 will	 call	 methodological	 response-dependence,	I	prescind	from	taking	any	stand	on	the	ultimate	question,	suggesting	that	the	stakes	are	smaller	than	many	have	thought.	When	 thinking	 of	moral	 responsibility,	 there	 are	 different	 views	which	we	might	call	response-dependent	views.43	One	of	those	views	ties	moral	responsibility	to	 the	ways	 that	 we	 in	 fact	 do	 respond	 to	 each	 other,	 the	 performed	 patterns	 of	behavior.	I	call	these	views	performed	response-dependent	views.	One	example	of	a	performed	response-dependent	view	might	be	this	view:	an	agent	 is	responsible	(for	bit	of	behavior)	 just	 in	case	holding	that	agent	morally	 responsible	 (e.g.,	 praising	or	blaming)	 fits	 the	 general	patterns	 of	 praise,	 blame,	 and	 other	 reactive	 responses	which	mark	the	relevant	society.		Imagine	a	society	where	it	is	normal	to	blame	even	the	youngest	children	when	they	do	wrong	 but	where	 those	who	 suffer	 from	 certain	mental	 illnesses	 are	 not	 held	responsible.	In	that	society,	a	young	child	would	in	fact	be	responsible,	because	that	fits	the	general	pattern	of	praise	and	blame.	However,	not	everyone	is	responsible	in	that	society:		those	suffering	from	certain	mental	illnesses	would	not	be	responsible.	This	 view	 provides	 a	 way	 to	make	 sense	 of	 certain	 sociological	 behaviors.	However,	it	does	not	provide	a	way	for	evaluating	whether	a	widespread	practice	is	in	error	(in	 fact,	 it	denies	that	possibility),	nor	does	 it	provide	a	way	to	determine	
																																																								43	Here	 I	 look	 at	 views	 which	 might	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 “pure	 response-dependent	views.”	But	those	are	not	the	only	views	which	we	might	imagine.	On	one	reading,	McKenna	 (2012)	offers	a	blended	view,	with	both	 realist	and	response-dependent	elements.		
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whether	a	society’s	 reactionary	practices	have	become	better	or	worse.	So	while	 I	allow	that	there	might	be	reason	to	be	interested	in	a	more	sophisticated	version	of	the	performed	response-dependent	view,	it	is	not	the	view	I’m	interested	in,	and	so	I	set	it	aside.44	Then	 there	 is	 methodological	 response-dependence.	 On	 this	 view,	 we	 can	appeal	to	our	judgments	about	instances	of	appropriate	response	as	evidence	in	our	inquiry	 about	 responsibility.	 Our	 judgments	 about	 responsibility	 are	 dependent	upon	 the	 evidence	we	 gather	 from	 our	 actual	 responses,	 our	 intuitions	 regarding	cases,	and	the	like.	So	long	as	we	accept	the	Strawsonian	biconditional,	and	so	long	as	we	take	our	judgments	and	intuitions	about	particular	cases	as	generally	reliable,	we	can	use	our	intuitions	about	responses	to	pick	out	the	contours	of	responsibility.	Methodological	 response-dependence	 does	 not	 entail	 that	 our	 responses	 or	 the	appropriateness	 of	 the	 responses	 are	 explanatorily	 or	metaphysically	 prior	 to	 the	facts	 about	 responsibility,	 though	 of	 course	 it	 is	 consistent	 with	 these	 priorities.	Rather,	methodological	 response-dependence	only	 requires	 that	we	might	 at	 least	sometimes	 have	 readier	 access	 to	 our	 intuitions	 about	 the	 appropriateness	 of	certain	 responses	 than	 to	 the	 facts	 about	 moral	 responsibility.	 While	 this	 is	 a	comparably	 innocuous	 claim,	 it	 reflects	 a	 shallow	 response-dependence,	 perhaps	
																																																								44	For	 similar	 reasons,	 I	 set	 aside	 any	 view	 which	 grounds	 responsibility	 in	 the	reactions	which	we	are	inclined	or	disposed	to	have.	
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not	 even	 deserving	 of	 the	 name.	 Realists	 can	 and	 do	 accept	 what	 I’m	 calling	methodological	response-dependence	without	abandoning	their	realism.45	Accordingly,	 I	 set	 aside	 performed	 response-dependence,	 and	 I	 accept	methodological	 response-dependence.	 But	 this	 still	 leaves	 open	what	 seems	 to	 be	the	core	of	the	dispute	between	realists	and	response-dependence	theorists.	Begin	by	 attending	 to	 the	 Strawsonian	 biconditional.	 Recall	 that	 the	 Strawsonian	biconditional	claims	that	an	agent	is	responsible	for	some	bit	of	behavior	if	and	only	if	the	agent	is	a	fitting	(i.e.,	appropriate,	in	the	relevant	sense)	target	for	the	reactive	attitudes	with	 respect	 to	 that	 behavior.	 But	we	might	 then	 ask	which	 side	 of	 the	biconditional	has	explanatory	priority.	Is	it	that	the	agent	is	responsible	because	the	agent	is	a	fitting	target	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	which	is	the	response-dependence	theorist’s	 claim?	 Or	 is	 it	 that	 the	 agent	 is	 a	 fitting	 target	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	because	the	agent	is	responsible,	which	is	the	realist’s	claim?	Brink	and	Nelkin	(2013)	argue	that	even	this	sort	of	response-dependence	is	unable	to	ground	criticism	of	our	extant	practices.	It’s	not	clear	why	this	should	be	so.	As	Wallace	makes	clear,	this	sort	of	response-dependent	view	can	make	sense	of	the	 truth	 conditions	of	 the	 appropriateness	of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes.	On	Wallace’s	response-dependent	 view,	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 resent	 a	 wrongdoer	(thus	 making	 the	 wrongdoer	 responsible)	 if,	 only	 if,	 and	 because	 the	 agent	
																																																								45	If	 this	 is	 the	 sort	 of	 position	 response-dependence	 theorists	 are	 claiming,	 then	they	 are	 in	 essence	 denying	 any	 significant	 difference	 between	 realism	 and	response-dependence.	 Moreover,	 if	 this	 is	 the	 only	 sense	 in	 which	 a	 theory	 is	response-dependent,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	we	should	not	call	such	a	theory	a	realist	theory.	
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possessed	the	two	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	at	the	time	of	the	wrongdoing.	If	we	hold	responsible	those	who	lack	the	two	capacities,	we	are	in	error,	even	if	it	is	our	society’s	practice	to	do	so	or	we	are	inclined	to	do	so.	That	Wallace	claims	that	his	view	can	support	criticism	of	our	extant	practices	might	suggest	that,	contrary	to	his	self-description	and	usual	reception	as	a	response-dependence	theorist,	Wallace	is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	 realist.	 But	 Wallace	 seems	 committed	 to	 his	 response-dependence:		“I	cannot	see	how	to	make	sense	of	the	idea	of	a	prior	and	independent	realm	of	moral	responsibility	facts.	…	it	seems	incredible	to	suppose	that	there	is	a	prior	and	 independent	 realm	of	 facts	about	 responsibility	 to	which	such	emotions	and	actions	should	have	to	answer”	(1994,	p.	88).	Here	is	one	way	to	make	sense	of	how	Wallace	could	maintain	his	response-dependence	line	and	yet	offer	a	theory	which	can	support	criticism	of	our	practices.	Notice	 that	 Brink,	 Nelkin,	 and	 Wallace	 might	 all	 accept	 both	 of	 the	 following	propositions:	(1) an	 agent	 is	 responsible	 if	 and	 only	 if	 the	 agent	 is	 reasons-responsive;	and	(2) an	agent	is	responsible	if	and	only	if	the	agent	is	a	fitting	target	of	the	reactive	attitudes.		For	the	response-dependence	theorist,	(1)	is	a	synthetic	claim,	and	(2)	is	an	analytic	claim,	 and	 (2)	 must	 be	 appealed	 to	 in	 explaining	 (1).	 As	 Neal	 Tognazzini	understands	the	position	of	the	Strawsonian	response-dependence	theorist:	the	question	will	always	remain:		what	is	it	about	those	capacities	that	‘calls	for’	or	justifies	blame?	Add	as	much	to	the	list	as	you	like,	but	as	Strawson	 says,	 ‘there	 still	 seems	 to	 remain	 a	 gap	 between	 its	applicability	 in	 particular	 cases	 and	 its	 supposed	 moral	consequences.’	(2013,	p.	1302,	quoting	Strawson)	
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	By	contrast,	realists	would	claim	that	(2)	is	a	synthetic	claim,	even	if	different	sorts	of	 realists	 might	 accept	 different	 characterizations	 of	 (1).	 To	 characterize	 those	different	ways	of	thinking	about	(2):		for	the	realist,	that	responsibility	grounds	the	fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 is	 a	 property	 (perhaps	 a	 morally	 necessary	property)	 of	 responsibility,	 whereas	 for	 the	 response-dependence	 theorist,	 that	responsibility	 grounds	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 is	 the	 essence	 of	responsibility.46	But	 that	 the	 debate	 between	 realists	 and	 response-dependence	 theorists	might	 turn	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 essences	 and	 properties	 shows	 just	 how	incredibly	close	realists	like	Brink	and	Nelkin	are	to	response-dependence	theorists	like	Wallace.47	Indeed,	on	this	construal,	some	self-described	realists	might	be	best	seen	 as	 response-dependence	 theorists.	 If	 the	 best	 understanding	 of	 their	 view	makes	fairness	essential	to	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility,	 then	the	thing	that	must	 be	 fair	 is	 likewise	 intimately	 part	 of	 the	 concept--but	 that	 thing	 is	 the	response!	This	might	be	the	sort	of	thought	which	leads,	Fischer,	ostensibly	a	realist,	to	write	that	“there	does	not	seem	to	be	any	interesting	difference,	with	respect	to	the	 issue	 of	 irreducible	 normativity!”	 (2012,	 p.	 141).	 We	 should	 not	 so	 quickly	concede	 the	matter.	For	example,	 realists	need	 to	 identify	 the	sort	of	 realism	 they	
																																																								46	Although	 the	 distinction	 between	 essences	 and	 properties	 is	 ancient,	 found	 for	instance	in	Aristotle,	for	a	recent	treatment	of	the	distinction	between	essences	and	properties,	see	Kit	Fine	(1994).	47	See	Patrick	Todd’s	(2016)	argument	about	how	difficult	it	is	to	determine	exactly	what	the	various	participants	in	the	debate	between	the	realists	and	the	response-dependence	theorists	are	taking	themselves	to	claim.	
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are	staking	out.	A	realist	who	identifies	moral	responsibility	with	the	manifestation	of	quality	of	will	and	a	realist	who	identifies	moral	responsibility	with	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	disagree	about	the	concept	at	issue.	Their	disagreement	is	largely	 a	 disagreement	 about	 vocabulary;	 they	 are	 simply	 talking	 about	 two	different	 notions	 of	 responsibility.	 The	 substantive	 questions	 are	 downstream--which	sorts	of	responsibility	play	which	roles.	By	contrast,	a	response-dependence	theorist	will	see	the	choice	between	manifestation	theories	and	capacity	theories	as	a	substantive	choice	about	responsibility.	Still,	while	there	are	surely	stakes	to	this	debate,	I	sidestep	the	question.	As	Vargas	concludes,	“Rather	than	trying	to	answer	the	 ‘is	 it	 realism?’	 question,	 we	 are	 better	 off	 focusing	 on	 more	 fine-grained	questions	about	successful	reference,	truth-functionality	of	a	given	bit	of	discourse,	licensed	inferences,	and	the	status	of	imputed	properties”	(2013,	p.	123).	
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Chapter	2	 The	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	
moral	responsibility	
	
	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 offer	 a	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	 moral	responsibility.	I	claim	that	an	agent	is	morally	responsible	in	the	sense	that	renders	the	agent	a	fitting	target	of	reactive	attitudes	like	praise	and	blame	if	and	only	if	the	agent	was	reasons-responsive	at	the	time	of	the	behavior	at	 issue.	And	an	agent	 is	reasons-responsive	 if	 and	 only	 if	 the	 agent	 possesses	 the	 capacity	 to	 respond	 to	reasons.	This	is	a	capacity	compromised	of	many	component	agential	capacities.	As	H.	 L.	 A.	 Hart	 explained,	 “[t]he	 capacities	 in	 question	 are	 those	 of	 understanding,	reasoning,	and	control	of	conduct:	the	ability	to	understand	what	conduct	legal	rules	or	 morality	 require,	 to	 deliberate	 and	 reach	 decisions	 concerning	 these	requirements,	 and	 to	 conform	 to	 decisions	 when	 made”	 (1968,	 p.	 227).	 This	reasons-responsiveness	account	provides	a	satisfying	explanation	of	the	patterns	of	our	reactive	attitudes,	and	it	provides	a	satisfying	sense	of	control.	 It	also	helps	us	understand	 the	 relevance	of	other	matters	 for	 responsibility,	matters	 like	 the	 role	for	empathy	or	the	presence	of	especially	strong	urges.	To	see	all	this,	and	to	have	the	materials	needed	to	assess	the	role	of	history,	I	offer	a	fuller	development	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	responsibility	here.	
2.1	 Explaining	our	paradigmatic	patterns	I	expect	that	we	are	pretty	good	at	ascribing	responsibility.	Because	of	that,	we	can	pick	out	a	plausible	candidate	account	of	moral	responsibility	by	looking	at	the	 patterns	 of	 our	 ascriptions	 of	 responsibility.	 By	 referencing	 considered	
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judgments	 about	 cases	 both	 real	 and	 hypothetical,	 we	 can	 contrast	 paradigmatic	cases	 of	 responsibility	 with	 paradigmatic	 cases	 of	 irresponsibility	 and	 with	paradigmatic	 cases	 of	 compromised	 responsibility.	 Those	 comparative	 patterns	provide	 good	 if	 defeasible	 evidence	 of	 an	 underlying	 account	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	moral	responsibility.48		The	 paradigmatic	 responsible	 agent	 is	 an	 informed,	 mature,	 deliberative	adult	 who	 reflects	 upon	 her	 options,	 makes	 a	 decision	 under	 no	 particular	pressures,	 and	 then	 acts	 on	 that	 decision.	 When	 such	 an	 adult	 acts	 wrongly,	 we	usually	 blame	 her.	 By	 contrast,	we	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 blame	 young	 children	 or	 the	sufferers	of	 certain	 sorts	of	mental	 illness.	When	a	 child	acts	wrongly,	we	correct,	remonstrate,	and	teach,	but	we	do	not	ordinarily	blame.	We	might	come	to	believe	that	 a	 child’s	 behavior	 manifests	 ill	 will,	 but	 we	 are	 unlikely	 to	 experience	 the	phenomenological	 responses	 characteristic	 of	 resentment,	 we	 are	 unlikely	 to	respond	 with	 the	 characteristic	 behaviors,	 and	 we	 are	 unlikely	 to	 frame	 our	perceptions	 of	 the	 child	 in	 light	 of	 the	 wrongdoing.	 Likewise,	 when	 someone	
																																																								48	A	full	defense	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	responsibility	using	this	method	should	involve	significant	social	science.	Here	I	rely	primarily	upon	my	own	intuitive	judgments	about	cases	and	my	own	intuitive	sense	of	the	patterns	of	social	responses,	all	very	much	defeasible	evidence.	 I	 take	my	own	reactions	to	be	prima	facie	evidence	of	the	social	phenomena	(recognizing	the	hubris	that	requires).	I	 do	 not	 take	 my	 own	 reactive	 attitudes	 to	 be	 particularly	 idiosyncratic.	Alternatively,	I	take	this	work	to	be	an	investigation	of	what	I	in	particular	mean	by	moral	responsibility.	On	that	latter	read,	when	I	make	claims	about	what	we	do	or	are	 inclined	 to	 do,	 those	 are	 best	 understood	 as	 claims	 about	 what	 I	 do	 or	 am	inclined	to	do	conjoined	with	claims	about	my	rough	sense	of	what	we	(that	group	itself	understood	but	gesturally)	do	or	are	inclined	to	do.	
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suffering	 from	 certain	 forms	 of	 mental	 illness	 commits	 a	 wrongdoing,	 we	quarantine,	treat,	and	sympathize.	There,	too,	we	do	not	ordinarily	blame.		The	 rivals	 to	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 theories	 include	 characterological	theories	 and	 libertarian	 theories.	 The	 characterological	 theories	 claim	 (roughly)	that	an	agent	is	responsible	for	those	behaviors	which	reflect	their	character.49	A	full	assessment	of	a	characterological	theory	would	require	full	expositions	of	the	ideas	of	character	and	of	reflection.	However,	supposing	that	ordinary	virtues	and	vices	at	least	partly	constitute	character,	we	might	then	think	that	an	agent	is	blameworthy	if	 her	wrongdoing	 reflects	 vice	 and	 that	 an	 agent	 is	 praiseworthy	 if	 her	 behavior	reflects	virtue.	But	 such	 characterological	 theories	 do	 not	 seem	well-suited	 to	 explain	 our	intuitive	judgments.	We	might	be	confident	assessing	that	an	informed,	deliberative	adult	who	regularly	does	wrong	and	takes	unconflicted	pleasure	in	her	wrongdoing	is	 a	 paradigmatically	 vicious	 agent.	 The	 theory	might	 then	 rightly	 hold	 this	 adult	agent	 blameworthy.	 But	we	 should	 not	 assume	 that	 children	 and	 the	mentally	 ill	cannot	 likewise	 be	marked	 by	 deeply	 vicious	 characters.	 Children	 can	 be	 greedy,	vengeful,	and	malicious.	Even	if	character	requires	a	certain	sophistication,	such	that	it	makes	 little	sense	to	think	of	very	young	children	as	having	any	character	at	all,	and	 even	 if	 young	 children’s	 characters	 are	 fluid	 and	 developing,	 I	 can	 imagine	 a	child	young	enough	to	make	the	reactive	attitudes	intuitively	inappropriate	but	old	
																																																								49	Although	Vargas	 is	not	a	 characterological	 theorist,	his	 recent	discussion	 (2013,	pp.	 133–157)	 lays	 out	 the	 theory	 (and	 several	 variants)	 clearly	 and	 offers	 fair	treatments	of	the	theory’s	strengths	and	weaknesses.	
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enough	 to	 have	 and	 act	 upon	 distinctive	 character	 traits.	 The	 characterological	theory	would	seem	to	inappropriately	hold	this	child	responsible.	Likewise,	there’s	little	reason	to	 think	that	 the	mentally	 ill	universally	 lack	character.	Mental	 illness	might	 sometimes	 occlude	 character,	 and	 it	 might	 sometimes	 mold	 and	 affect	character;	but	mental	 illness	does	not	always	obliterate	character.	 In	 fact,	 in	some	cases,	 we	 might	 think	 that	 certain	 sorts	 of	 mental	 illness	 affect	 or	 even	 create	character	 traits.	 If	 so,	 we	 might	 expect	 that	 some	 mentally	 ill	 agents	 intuitively	entitled	 to	 excuse	 nonetheless	 act	 upon	 character	 traits.	 While	 these	 claims	 are	tentative,	it	is	intuitively	plausible	that	all	these	sorts	of	agents--adults,	at	least	some	children,	and	at	least	some	of	the	mentally	ill--can	possess	and	act	upon	character,	and	so	character	does	not	seem	to	be	what	distinguishes	the	intuitively	responsible	from	the	intuitively	not	responsible.	There	is	a	second	class	of	cases	which	seem	to	trouble	the	characterological	theories:	 	 cases	 of	 agents	 who	 are	 intuitively	 responsible	 despite	 acting	 out	 of	character.	 That	 an	 agent	 is	 honest	 does	 tell	 us	 something	 about	 the	 agent’s	propensity	to	lie,	but	even	an	honest	agent	might	nonetheless	sometimes	lie.	Indeed,	I	think	(perhaps	optimistically)	that	much	of	the	wrongdoing	for	which	we	hold	each	other	 responsible	 is	 just	 this	 sort	 of	 out-of-character	 behavior.	 But	 the	characterological	 theory	would	 seem	 to	 require	us	 to	 either	 revise	our	 judgments	regarding	 character	 attributions	 significantly	 or	 to	 let	 all	 of	 these	 intuitively	responsible	agents	off	the	hook.		
55	
	
The	libertarian	fares	no	better	in	explaining	the	patterns	in	our	judgments	of	paradigm	 cases.	 A	 central	 libertarian	 thought	 is	 (roughly)	 that	 an	 agent	 is	responsible	 for	 a	 bit	 of	 behavior	 only	 if	 the	 agent	 acted	 while	 at	 liberty	 to	 do	otherwise.50	The	libertarian	theories	do	not	seem	to	offer	any	promising	distinction	between	the	paradigmatic	cases.	Often	the	thought	is	that	an	agent	is	not	at	liberty	if	the	agent’s	behavior	is	constrained	by	the	past	and	the	laws	of	nature.	However,	the	laws	of	nature	do	not	distinguish	between	 the	paradigmatically	 responsible	 adult,	the	young	child,	or	the	sufferer	of	mental	illness.	In	all	three	cases,	it	seems	that	the	person’s	choices	are	the	products	of	their	past,	so	in	all	three	cases	it	seems	that	the	libertarian	would	be	led	to	deny	responsibility.	The	 libertarian	 cannot	 remedy	 this	 by	 appeal	 to	 the	 lay	 sense	 of	 the	possibility	of	doing	otherwise.	It	is	ordinary	to	imagine	an	adult	wrongdoer	having	done	otherwise.	We	commonly	imagine	someone	having	chosen	otherwise,	and	we	commonly	imagine	what	might	have	resulted	from	alternative	choices.	Even	if	those	thoughts	turn	out	to	be	misleading	or	merely	epistemic,	this	is	a	normal,	lay	sense	of	the	 possibility	 of	 doing	 otherwise.	 But	 this	 sense	 won’t	 distinguish	 our	 cases,	because	 we	 can	 imagine	 a	 child	 wrongdoer	 having	 done	 otherwise,	 and	 we	 can	imagine	 an	 agent	 beset	 by	 mental	 illness	 having	 done	 otherwise	 (though	 our	
																																																								50	For	 thoughtful	 defenses	 of	 the	 libertarian	 position,	 see	 Alvin	 Plantinga	 (1974),	Randolph	 Clarke	 (1993),	 and	 Robert	 Kane	 (1996).	 Some	 libertarians	 are	 global	incompatibilists,	 thinking	 that	 determinism	 robs	 all	 of	 us	 of	 responsibility.	 That	argument	is	usually	grounded	in	the	attractiveness	of	principles	about	control	and	the	like,	not	in	the	ability	to	explain	the	appropriateness	of	the	general	patterns	of	our	behavior.		
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imaginations	 here	 will	 be	 informed	 and	 limited	 by	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	particular	mental	illness).	Neither	 characterological	 theories	 nor	 libertarian	 theories	 can	 readily	explain	both	why	adults	are	ordinarily	blameworthy	and	children	and	the	mentally	ill	 ordinarily	 are	 not.51	Instead,	 we	 can	 make	 that	 distinction	 by	 considering	 the	various	actors’	normative	capacities.	The	adult’s	normative	psychology	is	such	that	it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 expect	 that,	 as	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza	 explain,	 “There	would	 be	 a	tight	 fit	 between	 the	 reasons	 there	 are	 and	 the	 reasons	 the	 agent	has,	 the	 agent’s	reasons	 and	 his	 choice,	 and	 his	 choice	 and	 his	 action”	 (1998,	 p.	 42).	 The	 adult	agent’s	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	ground	this	expectation.	By	contrast,	the	young	child	has	still-developing	capacities	for	responding	to	reasons.	This	explains	why	 the	 child	 often	makes	practical	 and	moral	mistakes.	We	might	 also	 expect	 at	least	 some	 mentally	 ill	 agents	 to	 have	 compromised	 or	 occluded	 capacities	 for	responding	 to	 reasons,	 and	 this	 could	 explain	 why	 those	 agents	 might	 make	practical	and	moral	mistakes.	Accordingly,	it	is	the	capacity	to	respond	to	reasons--
																																																								51	Of	course,	defenders	of	these	theories	might	either	seek	revision	of	our	intuitions	or	 offer	 more	 complex	 defenses	 of	 their	 theories.	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 offer	 a	 final	refutation	 of	 either	 sort	 of	 theory	 here.	 However,	 I	 suspect	 that	 if	 either	 theory	remedied	 these	problems,	 it	would	most	 likely	result	 in	severely	reducing	 the	gap	between	 that	 theory	 and	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 theory.	 For	 instance,	 the	characterological	 theory	 might	 claim	 that	 only	 certain	 expressions	 of	 character	count--perhaps	 just	 those	 which	 arise	 in	 the	 right	 agential	 way.	 But	 that	 comes	awfully	 close	 to	 requiring	 the	 possession	 of	 the	 agential	 capacities,	 even	 if	 the	starting	point	differs.	 In	any	case,	 I	 leave	the	final	addressing	of	 these	competitors	for	later.	
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and	not	just	the	general	capacity	to	do	otherwise--which	best	explains	our	patterns	of	assessing	moral	responsibility.52		Because	 the	 normative	 capacities	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	theory	of	moral	responsibility,	the	theory	should	offer	an	analysis	of	capacity.	Here,	I	appeal	to	an	inchoate	but	intuitive	notion	of	an	agential	capacity.	It	seems	 intuitive	 that	 I	 now	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 read.	 That	 provides	 part	 of	 the	explanation	of	how	I	read	on	any	particular	occasion.	I	have	this	capacity	even	when	I’m	not	exercising	it,	and	I	have	the	capacity	even	when	it	seems	I	could	not	exercise	it	 (e.g.,	while	 I’m	sleeping	or	while	 I’m	sitting	 in	 the	dark).	The	capacity	 to	read	 is	something	 that	 I	might	 sometimes	exercise	 intentionally,	deciding	 to	 read	a	paper	and	then	doing	so,	for	instance,	but	it	is	also	something	that	I	might	exercise	without	any	 intention	to	do	so,	 reading	 the	name	of	a	store	 from	a	sign	 I	happen	to	notice	when	I	glance	outside.	This,	roughly,	is	the	sort	of	agential	capacity	at	issue	(though	the	capacity	to	read	is	a	relatively	high-level	capacity,	and	it	does	not	capture	all	of	the	 features	 which	 appear	 in	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 agential	 capacities).	 We	 could	scarcely	 understand	 agency	 without	 employing	 the	 notion	 of	 such	 agential	capacities.	The	 possession	 and	 exercise	 of	 such	 intuitive	 capacities	 is	 consistent	 with	physical	determinism.	My	history	and	the	laws	of	nature	might	combine	to	make	it	so	 that	 I	 lack	 the	opportunity	 to	exercise	 some	capacity,	 or	 they	might	make	 it	 so	
																																																								52	Many	 philosophers	 have	 espoused	 reasons-responsiveness	 accounts	 of	 moral	responsibility.	 Wolf	 (1990),	 Wallace	 (1994),	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 (1998),	 Nelkin	(2011),	and	Brink	and	Nelkin	(2013)	have	been	particularly	influential.	
58	
	
that	I	decline	to	exercise	some	capacity.	But	it	would	be	significantly	revisionary	to	say	that	determinism	makes	it	so	that	I	lack	capacities	altogether.	Plausibly,	that	we	do	 something	 implies	 that	 we	 can	 do	 that	 thing,	 and	 that	 we	 can	 do	 something	implies	that	we	have	the	capacity	to	do	it.	Thus,	if	we	rejected	capacities	in	accepting	determinism,	it	would	not	be	clear	how	we	could	explain	that	I	do	what	I	do,	or	at	least	the	explanations	would	look	quite	alien	to	the	explanations	we	ordinarily	offer,	and	 so	 determinism	would	 be	 incompatible	with	 the	 ordinary	 explanation	 of	 our	actual	behavior,	not	merely	with	moral	responsibility.	This	is	too	revisionary,	and	so	we	 should	 be	 able	 to	 accept	 both	 physical	 determinism	 (though	 we	 need	 not	 be	committed	to	 it)	and	the	presence	of	the	capacities	for	action.	This	 latter	gives	the	compatibilist	an	important	argument	for	her	compatibilism.	I	 sidestep	 important	 questions	 about	 what	 grounds	 those	 capacities.	Plausibly,	 the	 capacities	 are	 grounded	 in	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	 psychology,	 and,	plausibly,	those	features	plausibly	bear	important	relationships	to	structures	within	the	 brain. 53 	Fully	 developing	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 will	 require	identifying	the	nature	of	that	grounding	and	those	contours	of	those	relationships.	That	development	would	be	an	important	part	of	identifying	the	diagnostic	tools	to	look	for	the	capacities	in	particular	agents.	But	I	leave	those	questions	for	later.		
																																																								53	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 we	 should	 expect	 the	 capacities	 to	 be	 identified	 with	particular	 brain	 structures.	 The	 capacities	 might	 well	 involve	 psychological	phenomena	 not	 reducible	 to	 brain	 structures,	 and	 they	 might	 well	 involve	 social	phenomena.	
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2.2	 The	component	capacities		We	can	be	more	precise	about	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	which	ground	moral	responsibility	by	looking	at	the	component	capacities	which	comprise	reasons-responsiveness.	We	 expect	 the	 adult	 to	 conform	her	 behavior	 to	 relevant	reasons.	 But	 in	 order	 to	 comport	 her	 behavior	 to	 the	 relevant	 reasons,	 the	 adult	needs	 to	 be	 able	 to	 assess	 the	 relevant	 reasons,	 and	 the	 adult	 needs	 to	 be	 able	comport	her	behavior	 to	her	normative	assessments.	Accordingly,	 like	virtually	all	reasons-responsiveness	theorists,	I	 identify	two	general	component	capacities,	one	cognitive,	one	volitional.	The	cognitive	component	capacity	 is	 the	capacity	 to	recognize	 the	presence	and	practical	relevance	of	moral	reasons.	One	significant	reason	we	excuse	children	from	responsibility	is	their	inability	to	understand	the	significance	of	their	behavior.	And	when	we	excuse	the	insane,	it	is	often	because	their	illness	compromises	their	ability	 to	 make	 good	 sense	 of	 their	 circumstances.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	paradigmatically	responsible	adult,	by	contrast,	we	expect	the	agent	to	understand	both	the	options	they	face	and	the	significance	of	those	options.	Some	distinguish	this	cognitive	capacity	from	a	separate	epistemic	constraint	on	responsibility.	For	 instance,	 following	Aristotle,	Fischer	and	Ravizza	distinguish	the	excusing	force	of	ignorance	from	the	excusing	force	of	the	lack	of	control,	where	the	cognitive	capacity	plays	a	 role	 in	 the	agent’s	having	control	over	her	behavior	(1998,	 p.	 13).	 For	 Aristotle,	 Fischer,	 Ravizza,	 and	 many	 others,	 innocently	 not	knowing	that	you	are	about	to	miss	a	good	friend’s	birthday	party	and	knowing	that	
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you	 are	 about	 to	 miss	 the	 party	 but	 not	 being	 able	 to	 see	 that	 as	 a	 significant	omission	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 different	 grounds	 for	 excuse.	 In	 the	 one	 case,	 you	 are	innocently	 ignorant	 of	 some	 descriptive	 fact,	 and	 in	 the	 other	 case	 you	 are	innocently	 ignorant	 of	 some	normative	 fact.	 I	 refrain	 here	 from	deciding	whether	these	 are	 two	 different	 sorts	 of	 excuses	 or	 two	 variants	 of	 the	 same	 cognitive	excuse.54	On	my	understanding,	what	matters	is	whether	the	agent	has	the	capacity	to	 discern	 the	 normatively	 relevant	 options.	 That	 involves	 both	 discerning	 the	options	and	seeing	their	significance.	The	cognitive	capacity	requires	that	the	agent	be	capable	of	discerning	moral	reasons	 in	 particular.	 An	 agent	 who	 could	 respond	 to	 pragmatic	 but	 not	 moral	reasons	 would	 not	 be	 a	 responsible	 agent. 55 	On	 a	 lay	 understanding,	 some	psychopaths	are	like	this.56	Plausibly,	very	young	children	are	sometimes	like	this	as	well,	being	far	more	sensitive	to	their	own	interests	than	to	interests	of	others.	This	contrast	 in	 sensitivity	 might	 suggest	 that	 very	 young	 children	 are	 sensitive	 to	
																																																								54	The	account	could	also	be	complicated	to	distinguish	between	excuses	grounded	in	 cognitive	 incapacity	 and	 excuses	 grounded	 in	 ignorance,	 given	 that	 an	 agent	might	both	possess	the	cognitive	capacity	and	nonetheless	be	ignorant.	I	am	inclined	toward	a	unitary	account	focused	on	the	capacities,	though	this	raises	issues	about	culpable	ignorance;	in	any	case,	this	is	an	issue	worth	further	reflection,	and	I	thank	David	Brink	for	pushing	me	to	think	more	about	this.	55	Perhaps	that	agent	would	perhaps	be	pragmatically	responsible	but	not	morally	responsible.	That	 is,	 there	could	be	pragmatic	reactive	attitudes,	 in	addition	to	the	more	 familiar	 moral	 reactive	 attitudes,	 and	 pragmatic	 competence	 might	 the	condition	of	the	pragmatic	responsibility	required	for	the	appropriate	application	of	those	attitudes.	56 	For	 thoughtful	 discussions	 of	 the	 moral	 responsibility	 of	 psychopaths,	 see	Cordelia	Fine	and	Jeanette	Kennett	(2004),	Neil	Levy	(2007a,	2007b),	Brink	(2013),	and	David	Shoemaker	(2015).		
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pragmatic	 reasons	 but	 that	 they	 have	 not	 yet	 developed	 due	 sensitivity	 to	moral	reasons.	And	 the	cognitive	capacity	 requires	more	 than	simply	 “the	ability	 to	parrot	the	 moral	 principle	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 it	 has	 some	 relevance,”	 as	 Wallace	explains	 (1994,	 p.	 157).	 This	 can	 explain	 why	 children	 have	 reduced	 or	 no	responsibility--they	 often	 cannot	 grasp	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 import	 of	 the	 moral	reasons	they	can	recite.	“Just	because”	is	good	enough	to	insist	upon	compliance,	but	it	 is	 not	 good	 enough	 for	 moral	 responsibility.	 The	 agent	 must	 have	 access	 to	 a	genuine	 understanding	 of	 the	 relevant	 moral	 reasons.	 A	 genuine	 understanding	entails	 the	ability	 to	apply	 the	principle	 to	wide	range	of	 relevant	 situations.57	We	might	 require	 more.	 We	 might	 require	 that	 the	 agent	 have	 access	 to	 a	 robust	understanding	of	the	reason	at	issue,	one	including	a	sense	of	the	grounding	of	the	principle.	 But	 we	 must	 be	 careful	 not	 to	 be	 too	 demanding.	 Few,	 if	 any	 of	 us,	routinely	 act	 upon	moral	 principles	which	we	 grasp	 down	 to	 basic	 fundamentals,	and	 likely	 few	 of	 us	 have	 the	 capacities	 to	 routinely	 act	 with	 such	 deep	understandings.	 Such	understandings	are	 far	 too	 rare	 to	explain	our	 judgments	 in	the	paradigmatic	cases.	In	identifying	the	Goldilocks	middle	ground,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that,	 just	 like	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacity	 itself,	 the	cognitive	capacity	 involves	 further	 component	 capacities.58	The	 capacity	 to	 understand	 the	
																																																								57	In	 fact,	what	matters	 is	 access	 to	 a	 genuine	understanding	of	 how	 the	principle	applies	 to	 the	 particular	 situation.	 However,	 at	 least	 in	 ordinary	 cases,	 a	 genuine	understanding	will	yield	wide	usefulness.	58	Wallace	(157-158)	is	particularly	clear	that	the	cognitive	capacity	is	comprised	of	a	number	of	further	capacities.	
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relevant	moral	reasons	requires	being	able	 to	attend	to	 the	relevant	 factors,	being	able	 to	distinguish	between	 related	 features	of	 the	world,	 and	being	able	 to	make	needed	moral	judgments.	And	these	subcomponents	may	themselves	further	ramify.	The	second	capacity,	the	volitional	capacity,	is	the	capacity	to	comport	one’s	behavior	 to	 one’s	 normative	 assessments.	 Another	 significant	 reason	 we	 excuse	children	is	their	impulsivity.	Sometimes	children	act	poorly	even	when	they	know	or	should	 know	better.	 They	 act	 on	 an	 immediate	want	 or	 urge,	without	 letting	 that	urge	be	mediated	by	what	they	know,	in	some	sense,	to	be	a	better,	contrary	choice.	Likewise,	 addiction	 can	 interfere	 with	 an	 agent’s	 volitional	 capacity.	 The	 addict	might	 be	 excused	 if	 his	 normative	 control	 is	 such	 that	 he	 would	 find	 himself	indulging	the	addiction	even	in	the	face	of	an	earnest	judgment	otherwise.	And	even	depression	might	be	understood	as	at	least	sometimes	compromising	our	volitional	capacity	so	much	as	to	excuse,	at	least	where	it	robs	us	of	motivation.	Philosophers	 have	 made	 less	 progress	 exploring	 the	 volitional	 component	than	 they	 have	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 cognitive	 component.	 That	 can	 explain	 why	Fischer	and	Ravizza	think	that	reactivity,	their	term	for	the	volitional	capacity,	is	“all	of	a	piece”	(1998,	p.	73).	Fischer	and	Ravizza	claim	that	the	volitional	capacity	is	not	indexed	 to	 particular	 reasons	 to	 act.	 If	 an	 agent’s	 mechanism	 can	 react	 to	 one	reason,	 then	 that	mechanism	 can	 react	 to	 any	 reason.59	The	 lack	 of	 exploration	of	
																																																								59	Fischer	and	Ravizza	predicate	reasons-responsiveness	of	mechanisms,	not	agents.	For	 them,	 an	 agent	 is	 responsible	 for	 their	 behavior	 in	 an	 ordinary	 case	 if	 their	action	 is	 the	 product	 of	 a	 reasons-responsive	mechanism.	 The	mechanism	 is	 “the	process	that	leads	to	the	relevant	action…	the	‘way	the	action	comes	about’”	(1998,	p.	 38).	 An	 example	 of	 a	 mechanism	 is	 ordinary	 deliberation.	 Although	 I	 do	 not	
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the	volitional	capacity	can	also	explain	why	there	has	been	great	reticence	to	include	a	volitional	basis	for	excuse	in	the	criminal	law’s	insanity	defense.60	But	I	have	little	reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 volitional	 capacity	 is	 any	 less	 complex	 than	 the	 cognitive	capacity.	I	leave	it	here	open	whether	the	agent	must	have	the	capacity	to	act	upon	distinctively	moral	reasons	and	whether,	in	doing	so,	not	just	any	causal	interaction	will	suffice.		Seeing	 that	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 made	 up	 of	 a	 range	 of	 further,	increasingly	 more	 basic	 capacities	 has	 a	 number	 of	 benefits.	 It	 can	 help	 us	distinguish	 different	 reasons	 warranting	 excuse.	 Even	 within	 one	 diagnostic	category,	like	childhood,	we	can	distinguish	different	ways	that	the	excuse	functions,	sometimes	 cognitive,	 sometimes	 volitional.	 Making	 those	 distinctions	 can	 help	 us	get	our	excuses	right,	both	as	to	identifying	which	agents	are	entitled	to	excuse	and	as	 to	 identifying	 which	 conditions	 properly	 ground	 excuse.	 Then,	 seeing	 that	reasons-responsiveness	is	made	up	of	these	more	basic	capacities	can	also	show	us	that	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 the	 right	 condition	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 in	 part	
																																																																																																																																																																					generally	adopt	the	convention	of	talking	of	mechanisms	rather	than	agents,	I	follow	it	here	to	avoid	attributing	to	Fischer	and	Ravizza	the	claim	that	an	agent’s	volitional	capacity	is	“all	of	a	piece.”	60	Stephen	 Morse	 (2002)	 is	 a	 particularly	 forceful	 critic	 of	 including	 a	 volitional-capacity	 excuse.	 Morse	 argues	 that	 excusing	 for	 loss	 of	 volitional	 control	 gains	credibility	because	we	are	not	 careful	 to	distinguish	 that	 loss	 of	 volitional	 control	from	the	sorts	of	mechanical	forcings	which	result	in	movements	but	not	actions	(a	strong	wind,	for	instance)	or	from	the	sorts	of	hard	choices	which	might	change	the	relative	import	of	the	choices	faced.	Both	of	these	offer	grounds	for	refraining	from	blame,	 the	 former	 because	 the	 ostensible	 wrongdoing	 was	 not	 an	 act,	 the	 latter	because	the	act	was	not	a	wrongdoing.	Morse	then	argues	that	there	is	nothing	left	for	a	volitional	control	element	to	do.	Morse	argues	that	we	get	all	the	true	excuse	which	we	might	need	from	the	cognitive	element.	
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because	 it	 is	 tied	 to	 the	proper	 functioning	 of	 agents.	 These	 capacities	 are	 among	those	capacities	which	make	up	agency	generally.	It	is	not	just	that	an	agent	has	the	propensity	 to	 act	 differently	 in	 response	 to	 different	 reasons,	 because	 we	 might	conceive	 of	 an	 automaton	which	 can,	 in	 some	perhaps	minimal	 sense,	 respond	 to	reasons.	Rather,	a	well-functioning	agent	can	respond	to	reasons	because	the	well-functioning	agent	has	these	further	component	capacities.	An	actor	who	lacked	the	capacities	could	not	be	acting	as	an	agent,	and	that	can	explain	why	such	an	actor	would	not	be	responsible	as	an	agent.		
2.3	 Matters	of	degree	I	do	not	here	offer	a	 full	 account	of	 agential	 capacity;	 an	 intuitive	notion	 is	enough	 for	 my	 purposes.	 However,	 whatever	 the	 underlying	 metaphysics	 of	 the	agential	 capacities,	 they	 should	 be	 scalar	 in	 nature.	 Reasons-responsiveness--like	many	 capacities--is	 a	matter	 of	 degree.	 Some	 agents	 are	 barely	 responsive,	 some	agents	are	ordinarily	responsive,	and	some	agents	are	highly	responsive.61	This	can	explain	some	of	the	patterns	of	our	responses,	and	being	attuned	to	this	feature	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	will	make	it	easier	to	account	for	the	effects	history	can	have	on	our	intuitions.	
																																																								61	There	are	two	different	senses	in	which	an	agent	might	be	more	or	less	reasons-responsive.	 First,	 an	agent	might	be	 reasons-responsive	 to	more	or	 fewer	 sorts	of	reasons.	Thus	an	agent	who	is	widely	reasons-responsive	is	thereby	more	reasons-responsive	 than	 an	 agent	who	 is	 insensitive	 to	many	 sorts	 of	 reasons.	 Second,	 an	agent	 might	 be	 more	 responsive	 to	 some	 particular	 reason	 than	 another.	 Thus,	reasons-responsiveness	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 degree	 both	 with	 respect	 to	 scope	 and	strength.	 I	 elide	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	 senses	 here,	 although	 there	 are	interesting	questions	about	both	senses.	I	thank	David	Brink	for	pushing	me	to	think	more	about	this.	
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While	 the	 exact	 metaphysics	 of	 capacities	 might	 be	 up	 for	 debate	 and	variable,	it	is	intuitive	that	capacities	can	be	a	matter	of	degree.62	We	readily	speak,	for	 instance,	 of	 the	 capacities	 of	 ordinary	 objects	 in	 degree	 terms.	 “This	 tent	 can	protect	you	from	rain,”	we	might	say,	and	that	shielding	feature	is	a	capacity	of	the	tent.	But	some	tents	are	sturdier	 than	others,	and	so	we	understand	that	different	tents	have	rain-shielding	capacities	of	differing	degrees.	A	flimsy	tent	has	a	minimal	capacity	 to	protect	 from	the	rain,	and	a	 technical,	mountaineering	tent	has	a	great	capacity	to	protect	from	the	rain.	We	can	also	make	sense	of	capacities	of	differing	degrees	with	 respect	 to	 our	 capacities	 for	 different	 actions.	 Some	 people	 lack	 the	capacity	 to	 run	 a	 six-minute	mile.	 Paula	Radcliffe,	 by	 contrast,	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	run	a	 six-minute	mile,	 and	hers	 is	a	 ready	capacity.	She	can	run	a	 six-minute	mile	regularly,	with	 little	preparation,	and	with	 little	commitment	and	effort.	 I’m	 in	 the	middle.	I	am	a	regular	runner,	not	a	spectacular	runner.	I	have	the	capacity	to	run	a	six-minute	mile,	but	I	could	do	so	only	with	tremendous	commitment	and	effort,	and	I	could	do	so	only	irregularly.	I	have	a	moderate	capacity	to	run	a	six-minute	mile.	These	 examples	 show	 several	 ways	 that	 we	 might	 discern	 different	 degrees	 in	capacities:		one	capacity	might	be	exercised	more	readily	than	another,	one	capacity	might	 be	 easier	 to	 exercise	 than	 another,	 one	 capacity	 might	 succeed	 in	 broader	contexts	than	another,	etc.	
																																																								62	For	a	pithy	argument	suggesting	that	the	degree	of	responsibility	is	related	to	but	does	not	exactly	track	the	degree	of	capacity,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	relevance	of	external	circumstances,	see	Jesper	Ryberg	(2014).	
66	
	
We	should	see	the	component	capacities	comprising	reasons-responsiveness	as	admitting	of	degrees.63	Think	of	the	cognitive	capacity,	the	capacity	to	recognize	the	 presence	 and	 relevance	 of	 moral	 reasons.	 One	 agent	 might	 recognize	 the	presence	and	relevance	of	moral	reasons	only	rarely,	only	with	effort,	and	only	for	the	 most	 striking	 moral	 reasons.	 That	 pattern	 of	 sporadic	 performance	 gives	 us	reason	to	think	that	the	agent	has	but	a	slight	cognitive	capacity.	Another	agent,	by	contrast,	might	 be	 readily	 and	widely	 aware	 of	 the	moral	 reasons	 bearing	 on	 her	choices.	 That	 constant	 performance	 gives	 us	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	 agent	 has	 a	genuine	and	strong	cognitive	capacity.	This	is	likewise	so	for	the	volitional	capacity,	the	 capacity	 to	 comport	 one’s	 behavior	 to	 one’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 circumstances.	Here	we	have	readier	vocabulary,	 the	 talk	of	willpower.	Akratic	agents	have	weak	volitional	capacities,	and	they	are	only	barely	(and	thus	usually	only	rarely)	able	to	convert	 their	 assessments	 of	 their	 normative	 circumstances	 into	 corresponding	behaviors.	 Strong-willed	 agents,	 by	 contrast,	 have	 great	 volitional	 capacities,	 and	they	 readily	 (and	 thus	 often)	 convert	 their	 normative	 assessments	 into	corresponding	behaviors.	As	agents	can	possess	the	component	capacities	to	greater	or	lesser	degrees,	we	 should	 likewise	 see	 reasons-responsiveness	 itself	 as	 a	matter	 of	 degree.	 Some	agents,	barely	 responsible,	have	but	a	 slight	 capacity	 to	 respond	 to	 reasons.	 Some	
																																																								63	Although	 reasons-responsiveness	 philosophers	 have	 consistently	 acknowledged	that	 the	 capacities	 at	 issue	might	well	 be	 a	matter	of	degree,	 there	has	been	 little	sustained	 attention	 to	 this	 issue.	 That	 said,	 recent	 papers	 from	 Coates	 and	 Philip	Swenson	 (2013)	 and	 Nelkin	 (2016)	 offer	 promising	 investigations	 of	 the	 scalar	nature	of	these	capacities.	
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agents,	highly	responsible,	have	a	great	capacity	to	respond	to	reasons.	Because	the	degree	 of	 an	 agent’s	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 degrees	 of	 his	component	capacities,	we	should	expect	that	there	could	be	multiple	combinations	which	might	make	 for	 roughly	 similar	 overall	 degrees	 of	 reasons-responsiveness.	For	 instance,	 if	one	agent	possesses	only	a	slight	cognitive	capacity	but	matches	 it	with	 a	 strong	 volitional	 capacity	 and	 another	 agent	 possesses	 a	 strong	 cognitive	capacity	and	a	slight	volitional	capacity,	it	might	nonetheless	be	that	these	different	agents	 possess	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 of	 roughly	 the	 same	 overall	degree.	And	the	further	we	ramify	the	component	capacities,	the	greater	variety	of	instantiations	we	should	expect	to	see	of	the	particular	degrees.	Because	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	come	in	degrees,	and	because	responsibility	is	a	matter	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities,	we	might	expect	responsibility	too	to	come	in	degrees.64	An	agent	might	be	more	or	less	responsible	for	 some	 particular	 action.	 This	 means	 that	 an	 agent	 might	 be	 more	 or	 less	blameworthy	 for	 the	 same	 bit	 of	 wrongdoing.	 That	 responsibility	 might	 come	 in	degrees	 in	 just	 this	 sense	 fits	 with	 ordinary	 experience.	 We	 familiarly	 think	 that	older	children	are	more	responsible	than	younger	children.65	As	children	age,	their	reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 develop	 into	 mature	 capacities,	 and	 along	 this	
																																																								64	Seeing	 responsibility	 as	 a	matter	 of	 degree	 is	 not	 the	only	option.	Among	other	possibilities,	the	scalar	capacities	might	result	in	binary	responsibility	verdicts	if	we	have	a	threshold	account	of	responsibility.	65	See,	e.g.,	Brink	(2004),	with	respect	to	the	culpability	of	children.	In	this	section,	I	am	also	borrowing	from	Brink’s	current	thinking	about	how	the	criminal	law	might	account	for	partial	responsibility.	
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path,	 children	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 increasingly	 responsible.	 That	 they	 are	 increasingly	responsible	is	reflected	in	the	increasing	severity	of	the	sanctions	they	face.		The	 importance	of	 the	different	degrees	 is	sensitive	to	the	context	 in	which	we	 agents	 find	 ourselves.	 As	 Brink	 and	 Nelkin	 (2013)	 point	 out,	 reasons-responsiveness	 interacts	 with	 situational	 features. 66 	For	 example,	 duress	 can	compromise	 blameworthiness	 just	 as	mental	 illness	 can.	 Both	 duress	 and	mental	illness	 can	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 respond	 to	 moral	 reasons,	 and	 so	 both	 can	reduce	an	agent’s	blameworthiness	when	he	fails	to	so	respond.	Duress	is	one	sort	of	 excusing	 situational	 element,	 but	 there	 are	 many	 others	 besides.	 Chaos,	 for	instance,	is	an	often-overlooked	situational	factor	that	might	reasonably	be	thought	to	 ground	 at	 least	 a	 partial	 excuse.	 Two	 otherwise	 similar	 agents,	 with	 similar	capacities,	 who	 fail	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 same	 reason	 to	 do	 otherwise	 might	 be	responsible	 to	 different	 degrees	 if	 the	 first	 agent	 failed	 to	 respond	 in	 sedate	conditions,	with	 little	 else	 demanding	 her	 attention	 and	 little	 interfering	with	 her	
																																																								66	For	them,	the	overarching	responsibility	concept	is	the	fair	opportunity	to	avoid	wrongdoing.	 Reasons-responsiveness	 is	 one	 component	 of	 the	 fair	 opportunity	 to	avoid	 wrongdoing,	 and	 situational	 factors	 are	 the	 other	 component.	 Brink	 and	Nelkin’s	observation	about	the	relevance	of	situational	 factors	to	blameworthiness	might	seem	to	threaten	the	equating	of	responsibility	and	reasons-responsiveness.	If	 blameworthiness	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 responsibility	 and	 wrongdoing,	 and	 if	 the	situational	 factors	do	not	make	 the	wrongdoing	more	or	 less	wrong,	 then	 it	might	seem	 that	 the	 situational	 factors	 can	 affect	 blameworthiness	 only	 by	 affecting	responsibility.	 If	 that’s	 so,	 then	 it	 seems	 that	 responsibility	 must	 be	 more	 than	reasons-responsiveness,	at	least	if	we	accept	the	plausible	claim	that	the	situational	factors	are	external	to	reasons-responsiveness.	It’s	not	clear	that	this	is	the	only	way	to	incorporate	Brink	and	Nelkin’s	observation,	and,	in	any	case,	accepting	a	modified	understanding	of	responsibility	along	those	lines	would	require	notational	changes	to	my	argument	throughout,	but	not	substantive	changes.	
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deliberations,	while	 the	second	agent	 failed	 to	 respond	 in	chaotic	 conditions,	with	his	attention	thinly	stretched	and	his	deliberations	constantly	interrupted.	Although	 we	 could	 see	 responsibility	 as	 being	 fundamentally	 a	 matter	 of	degree,	our	everyday	responsibility	talk	often	seems	binary.	We	can	account	for	this	feature	of	our	ordinary	practice	by	thinking	of	our	responses	as	reflecting	practical	thresholds.	 A	 person	 is	 or	 is	 not	 responsible,	 in	 ordinary	 cases,	 and	 while	 big	differences	 in	 psychology	 or	 big	 differences	 in	 outside	 conditions	 can	 change	responsibility	verdicts,	slight	differences	do	not.67	A	mild	temptation	has	little	effect	on	 our	 responsibility	 assessments,	 for	 instance.	 Our	 everyday	 responsibility	 talk	reflects	 chunky,	 discrete	 assessments	 of	 our	 responsibility.	 This	 should	 not	 be	surprising.	We	are	limited	assessors	of	each	others’	responsibility,	with	limited	time,	limited	evidence,	and	the	like,	and	so	practical	constraints	lead	us	to	make	simpler	assessments	 than	 the	 fully	 scalar,	 continuous	 assessments	 the	 underlying	metaphysics	 might	 admit	 of.	 As	 with	 many	 normative	 thresholds,	 the	 particular,	appropriate	 level	 is	 a	 function	 of	 a	 number	 of	 practical	 concerns,	 but	 we	 should	expect	that	the	relevant	threshold	is	a	moderate	threshold.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	offer	 the	most	 famous	moderate	 threshold.68	But	while	they	 are	 right	 to	 look	 for	 moderate	 reasons-responsiveness	 as	 the	 relevant	threshold,	their	particular	account	will	not	do.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	distinguish	three	levels	 of	 reasons-responsiveness:	 	 weak,	 moderate,	 and	 strong.	 These	 levels	 are	
																																																								67	I	thank	David	Brink	for	conversation	on	this.	68	For	 the	 core	 of	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 argument	 for	 their	 moderate	 account	 of	reasons-responsiveness,	see	(1998,	pp.	62–76).	
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picked	out	by	patterns	of	actual	and	counterfactual	response.	A	weakly	responsive	agent69	is	one	who	successfully	responds	 to	relevant	moral	reasons	 in	at	 least	one	actual	 or	 counterfactual	 situation,	 and	 a	 strongly	 responsive	 agent	 is	 one	 who	successfully	 responds	 to	 relevant	 moral	 reasons	 in	 all	 situations,	 actual	 and	counterfactual.	 A	 moderately	 responsive	 agent	 is	 somewhere	 in	 between.	 The	moderately	 responsive	 agent	 has	 a	 weak	 volitional	 capacity:	 	 the	 moderately	responsive	 agent	 successfully	 comports	 her	 behavior	 to	 her	 assessment	 of	 the	circumstances	 in	 at	 least	 one	 case,	 actual	 or	 counterfactual.	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza,	however,	 are	more	 demanding	with	 respect	 to	 the	 cognitive	 capacity.	 There,	 they	require	 that	 two	 conditions	 be	met.	 First,	 the	 agent	must	 successfully	 respond	 to	relevant	moral	reasons	in	at	least	one	actual	or	counterfactual	situation.	Second,	the	agent’s	responses	must	yield	an	understandable	pattern.	For	example,	if	a	reason	is	important	 enough	 to	 engender	 response	 in	 one	 case,	 it	 should	 likewise	 engender	responses	in	most	similar	cases.	Of	course,	an	understandable	pattern	might	be	an	imperfect	 pattern,	 so	 the	 moderate	 cognitive	 responsiveness	 is	 still	 weaker	 than	strong	cognitive	responsiveness.	For	Fischer	and	Ravizza,	 then,	moderate	reasons-responsiveness	 is	 weak	 reasons-responsiveness	 combined	 with	 an	understandability	constraint	on	the	cognitive	capacity.	This	asymmetry	presents	a	puzzle.	If	both	component	capacities	are	a	matter	of	degree,	why	be	more	demanding	of	one	than	of	the	other?	The	best	interpretation	of	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	moderateness	is	as	evidentiary.	What	they	ultimately	care																																																									69 	Again,	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 predicate	 reasons-responsiveness	 of	 agential	mechanisms,	not	agents,	a	distinction	I	elide.	
71	
	
about	 is	whether	 the	 agent	 can	 respond	 to	 the	particular	 reason	 in	 the	particular	case.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	contend	that	an	agent	can	respond	to	a	reason	if	the	agent	can	both	recognize	that	reason	and	comport	her	behavior	to	her	recognition	of	that	reason.	The	moderate	responsiveness	conditions	are	evidence	of	 those	component	capacities.	Because	Fischer	and	Ravizza	believe	 that	 reactivity	 is	 “of	 a	piece,”	 they	believe	that	weak	reactivity	 is	sufficient	 to	show	the	relevant	component	capacity.	After	all,	if	the	agent	does	react	in	some	case,	the	agent	can	react	in	that	case,	and	if	reactivity	is	of	a	piece,	then	if	the	agent	can	react	in	that	case,	the	agent	can	react	in	this	 case.	 By	 contrast,	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 receptivity	 is	 of	 a	piece,	 and	 so	 the	 inference	 permitted	 in	 the	 case	 of	 reactivity	 is	 not	 licensed	 for	receptivity.	 Accordingly,	 they	 offer	 the	 understandable-pattern	 test,	 which	 they	claim	is	sufficient	to	license	the	inference	of	the	relevant	capacity	particular	to	the	situation.	If	the	agent	does	not	display	an	understandable	pattern	to	his	responses,	then	 even	 if	 the	 agent	 does	 respond	 to	 reasons	 in	 some	 cases,	 we	 cannot	 be	confident	 that	 he	 is	 doing	 so	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 appropriately	 functioning	capacities	that	would	license	us	to	infer	that	he	could	respond	in	the	particular	case	under	consideration.	I	 am	skeptical	both	 that	 reactivity	 is	of	 a	piece	and	 that	an	understandable	pattern	in	other	cases	is	sufficient	to	show	the	relevant	ability	in	any	particular	case.	However,	 I	set	 those	matters	aside	here.	The	moderateness	we	should	seek	 in	our	threshold	 is	 not	 merely	 evidentiary.	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	requisite	capacities	is	also	a	matter	of	degree,	and	so	might	also	admit	of	a	moderate	
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threshold,	 the	moderate	 threshold	 I	 am	 concerned	with	 is	 that	 of	 the	 underlying,	scalar	capacity.70		This	leaves	us	without	an	analysis	of	the	sort	of	moderateness	that	we	should	look	 for	 in	 picking	 out	 the	 threshold	degree	 of	 reasons-responsiveness	 associated	with	 binary	 responsibility.	 That	 should	 be	 no	 surprise,	 at	 least	 pending	 a	 better	analysis	of	the	metaphysics	of	the	capacities	at	issue	as	well	as	a	better	analysis	of	the	 reasons	 for	 picking	 out	 a	 threshold	 at	 all.	 Accordingly,	 just	 as	 I	 appeal	 to	 the	intuitive	notion	of	 a	 scalar	 capacity,	 I	 appeal	 to	 the	 intuitive	notion	of	 a	 threshold	line	regularly	and	intelligibly	picked	out.	
2.4	 The	several	roles	for	empathy	Although	 further	 details	 remain	 to	 be	 filled	 in,	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	theory	can	nicely	account	for	many	of	our	central	judgments	of	moral	responsibility.	This	account	is	all	the	more	promising	once	we	notice	how	comfortably	the	reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 can	 accommodate	 our	 intuitions	 about	 other	 factors	 that	seem	to	matter.	Here	 I	consider	 two:	 	 the	role	of	empathy	 in	responsible	behavior	and	excuses	grounded	in	irresistible	urges.																																																									70	I	 am	 likewise	 skeptical	 of	 the	 other	 standards	 of	 moderateness	 offered	 in	 the	literature.	Brink	and	Nelkin,	for	instance,	offer	a	moderateness	standard	symmetric	between	its	cognitive	and	volitional	elements.	They	look	for	a	Goldilocks	standard:		“Where	 there	 is	sufficient	reason	 for	 the	agent	 to	act,	 she	regularly	recognizes	 the	reason	and	conforms	her	behavior	to	it”	(2013,	p.	294).	If	this	regularly	is	a	matter	of	 actual	 performance,	 then	 the	 test	 seems	 too	 sensitive	 to	 the	 agent’s	 potentially	idiosyncratic	 history.	 And	 if	 the	 test	 includes	 counterfactual	 performance,	 then	Brink	 and	 Nelkin	 should	 explain	 to	 us	 what	 would	 ground	 that	 regularity,	 for	 it	would	seem	that	the	regularity	is	grounded	by	the	moderateness	of	the	capacities.	In	any	 case,	 Brink	 and	Nelkin	might	 have	 identified	 a	 good	 indicator,	 just	 as	 Fischer	and	Ravizza	are	best	understood	as	offering	an	indicator,	but	it	is	not	clear	that	we	have	progressed	much	in	explanation.	
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In	abstract	 terms,	empathy	 is	“the	primary	means	 for	gaining	knowledge	of	other	minds”	(Stueber,	2017).	When	we	empathize	with	others,	we	share	in	some	of	the	 experience	 they	 might	 have.	 We	 might	 suffer	 if	 we	 understand	 them	 to	 be	suffering,	 and	 we	 might	 be	 pleased	 if	 we	 understand	 them	 to	 be	 pleased.	 It	 is	controversial	 whether	 the	 capacity	 for	 empathy	 or	 the	 activity	 of	 empathy	 are	required	 for	 moral	 responsibility.71	An	 empathetic	 will	 is	 a	 good	 will,	 and	 so	 we	might	plausibly	think	that	someone	who	acts	without	empathy	thereby	manifests	ill	will.	 Thus	 the	 lack	 of	 empathy	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 capacity	 for	 empathy	 might	 be	thought	to	explain	blameworthiness,	not	to	undermine	it.	But	we	should	not	be	too	quick	 to	 think	 that	 empathy	 cannot	 excuse.	 Accordingly,	 I	 here	 look	 at	 three	arguments	 claiming	 that	 the	 impaired	 capacity	 to	 empathize	 can	 lead	 to	compromised	responsibility.		The	 first	 compromised-empathy	 argument	 claims	 that	 the	 proper	functioning	 of	 empathy	 is	 important	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 reasons-
																																																								71	Nelkin	 (2011)	 provides	 a	 helpful	 overview	 of	 the	 controversy,	 finally	 taking	 a	position	which	is	a	significant	inspiration	for	mine.	And	we	see	similar	discussions	in	 the	debate	about	 the	relevance	of	psychopathy	(here	 taking	no	particular	stand	on	 the	 relationships	 between	 psychopathy,	 sociopathy,	 and	 antisocial	 personality	disorder).	 Though	 philosophers	 remain	 divided	 as	 to	 whether	 psychopathy	 can	excuse,	many	see	psychopathy	as	at	least	potentially	grounding	excuse	or	mitigation	in	 large	part	because	 the	psychopath	 lacks	 the	capacity	 for	empathy.	For	example,	Fine	 and	Kennett	 (2004),	 Levy	 (2007b),	 and	 Ishtiyaque	Haji	 (2010)	 all	 claim	 that	psychopathy	 interferes	 with	 moral	 cognition	 in	 a	 responsibility-compromising	fashion.	 And	 Nelkin	 (2015)	 provides	 a	 helpful	 discussion	 of	 how	 thinking	 about	psychopaths	 can	 help	 us	 clarify	 the	 relationship	 between	 attributability	 and	accountability.	
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responsiveness	capacities.72	Cognitively,	the	exercise	of	empathy	can	help	habituate	us	 to	 notice	 morally	 relevant	 facts.	 Plausibly,	 we	 are	 drawn	 to	 notice	 others’	interests	by	 the	operation	of	empathy	even	early	 in	development.	This	might	help	habituate	us	to	notice	those	facts.	With	repeated	exposure,	we	might	then	come	to	notice	 moral	 facts	 more	 regularly	 and	 more	 widely,	 eventually	 noticing	 them	without	 the	 experience	 of	 empathy.	 Volitionally,	 too,	 the	 exercise	 of	 empathy	 can	habituate	us.	Early	in	development,	the	operation	of	empathy	might	lead	us	to	act	in	accord	with	others’	interests.	Empathy	could	present	those	interests	as	mattering	to	us.	With	the	repeated	operation	of	empathy,	we	could	thereby	become	habituated	to	take	others’	interests	as	bearing	on	our	behavior,	eventually	doing	so	even	in	cases	without	the	experience	of	empathy.	On	 this	 argument,	 empathy	 plays	 an	 indirect	 role	 in	 determining	 moral	responsibility.	What	truly	matters	on	this	argument	is	the	contemporary	possession	of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities.	 A	 contemporary	 incapacity	 for	 empathy	might	nonetheless	serve	as	evidence,	several	 times	removed,	of	some	compromise	in	 the	 contemporary	 possession	 of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities.	 The	contemporary	 incapacity	 for	 empathy	 might	 be	 good	 if	 defeasible	 evidence	 of	 a	developmental	incapacity	for	empathy,	which	itself	would	be	good	evidence	for	the	lack	of	experienced	empathy	during	the	developmental	period,	which,	finally,	would	be	 good	 if	 defeasible	 evidence	 of	 the	 healthy	 development	 of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities.	 And	 despite	 the	many	 degrees	 of	 remove	 between	 the																																																									72	These	 are	 speculative	 arguments,	 needing	 empirical	work	 from	 other	 fields	 for	support.	For	now,	they	are	placeholders.	
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contemporary	lack	of	the	capacity	for	empathy	and	the	contemporaneous	capacities,	this	 evidentiary	 chain	 might	 reasonably	 license	 a	 contemporary	 responsibility	inference.	 Because	 direct	 evidence	 of	 the	 contemporary	 capacities	 is	 difficult	 to	come	 by,	 and	 because	 the	 indirect	 evidence	 will	 often	 be	 mixed,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	contemporary	 capacity	 for	 empathy	 might	 regularly	 be	 highly	 probative	 of	compromised	reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	The	 second	 empathy	 argument	 contends	 that	 empathy	 plays	 an	 important	helping	 role	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 capacities.	 Cognitively,	 the	 experience	 of	empathy	 can	 help	 to	 draw	 our	 attention	 to	 morally	 relevant	 facts.	 When,	 for	example,	 we	 consider	 some	 self-serving	 action,	 our	 empathy	might	 prompt	 us	 to	attend	 to	 the	 harm	 the	 action	might	 cause	 to	 others;	 in	 that	way,	 empathy	might	serve	to	make	us	more	reliably	sensitive	to	at	least	some	moral	reasons.73	Similarly,	empathy	might	serve	as	a	volitional	aid.	Sometimes	it	can	be	quite	tempting	to	act	improperly.	Often	it	can	seem	that	some	bit	of	wrongdoing	is	quite	prudential,	and	not	all	of	our	motivations	are	pure	of	heart.	Even	 if	we	know	the	right	way	to	act,	sometimes	it	can	require	a	strong	will	to	act	appropriately.	Empathy	might	help	in	these	cases.	Just	as	the	police	officer’s	presence	can	help	the	weak-willed	agent	steer	straight,	empathy	too	might	help	keep	wayward	inclinations	at	bay.	 In	these	ways,	
																																																								73 	There	 are	 sympathies	 between	 this	 empathy	 argument	 and	 the	 connection	between	 the	 scalar	 view	 of	 capacities	 and	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 they	 are	exercised.	The	capacities	exist	in	particular	contexts,	and	the	contexts	can	be	more	or	 less	 hospitable	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 capacities.	 The	 potential	 operation	 of	empathy,	at	least	in	this	second	argument,	is	part	of	those	contexts.	
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then,	 we	 might	 think	 that	 a	 healthy	 faculty	 for	 empathy	 makes	 an	 agent	 a	 more	reliable	responder	to	moral	reasons.	Even	supposing	that	empathy	can	play	this	sort	of	helping	role,	we	need	not	conclude	that	empathy	is	necessary	for	proper	behavior.	That	empathy	can	help	in	responding	 to	 moral	 reasons	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 lacking	 empathy	 makes	 it	impossible	 to	respond	to	moral	reasons.	Supposing	 that	 it	 remains	possible	 for	an	empathetically	 compromised	 agent	 to	 respond	 to	 moral	 reasons,	 we	 can	 ask	whether	the	lack	of	empathy	and	the	resulting	decrease	in	the	capacity	to	respond	to	reasons	might	provide	a	substantial	excuse	even	if	it	does	not	make	it	impossible	to	respond	 to	 reasons.	 As	 Brink	 (2013)	 argues,	 the	 lack	 of	 empathy	 could	 make	 it	harder	to	behave	appropriately	without	thereby	making	it	so	difficult	to	act	rightly	that	 excuse	 is	 warranted,	 so	 long	 as	 there	 are	 sufficient	 other	 routes	 to	 the	necessary	cognitive	and	volitional	resources.	For	example,	an	agent	could	pick	out	the	relevant	moral	reasons	by	looking	to	social	cues	or	legal	correlates,	by	asking	for	advice,	 or	 by	 purposefully	 inculcating	 the	 right	 habits.	 In	 order	 to	 know	whether	empathy’s	 effect	 is	 strong	 enough	 to	 bring	 an	 agent	 below	 the	moderate	 line,	we	would	need	 to	 know	 significantly	more	 about	 both	how	 to	 pick	 out	 the	moderate	line	 and	how	empathy	 interacts	with	 the	operation	of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	 For	 now,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 suspect	 that	 empathy’s	 role	 might	 be	significant	enough	that	the	lack	of	empathy	can	at	least	sometimes	provide	grounds	for	excuse.	
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The	final	compromised-empathy	argument	claims	that	empathy	is	necessary	for	 the	 sort	 of	 moral	 understanding	 required	 for	 moral	 responsibility.	 This	argument	follows	from	the	requirement	that	morally	blameworthy	agents	have	the	capacity	 to	 at	 least	 genuinely	 understand	 the	 reasons	 they	 transgress.	 Mere	parroting	 is	 not	 enough.	 Someone	 lacking	 empathy	 should	 nonetheless	 be	 able	 to	anticipate	 the	 causal	 consequences	 of	 his	 actions,	 and	 someone	 lacking	 empathy	should	also	be	able	to	measure	his	behavior	up	against	norms	(though	he	may	find	it	difficult	 to	 discern	 those	 norms).	 But	 this	 might	 not	 be	 enough	 for	 the	 sort	 of	genuine	understanding	required	for	moral	responsibility.	As	Neil	Levy	explains	with	respect	to	the	empathy	deficits	characteristic	of	psychopathy,	“Psychopaths	know,	at	least	 typically,	 that	 their	actions	are	widely	perceived	to	be	wrong,	 to	be	sure,	but	they	are	unable	to	grasp	the	distinctive	nature	and	significance	of	their	wrongness”	(2007b,	p.	132).	Just	as	the	experience	of	seeing	red	might	seem	necessary	to	truly	understand	 red,	 the	 experience	 of	 empathy	 might	 seem	 necessary	 to	 truly	understand	 certain	 sorts	 of	 moral	 facts.74	An	 argument	 along	 these	 lines	 could	establish	that	those	who	lack	the	capacity	for	empathy	thereby	lack	the	capacity	to	grasp	 the	 distinctive	 nature	 of	 moral	 reasons.	 And	 if	 they	 cannot	 grasp	 the	distinctive	nature	of	moral	reasons,	then	it	might	also	be	the	case	that	they	cannot	respond	to	those	reasons	as	distinctively	moral	reasons.	And	if	they	lack	the	ability	to	 respond	 to	moral	 reasons	qua	moral	 reasons,	 it	might	 seem	 inapt	 to	 apply	 the	distinctive	force	of	moral	blame	to	their	shortcomings.																																																									74	Does	 this	 require	 the	 contemporary	 experience	 of	 empathy	 or	 just	 some	 prior	experience	of	empathy?	I	leave	that	question	open.	
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That	 empathy	 can	 ground	 excuse	 in	 this	 way	 is	 tied	 to	 the	 unresolved	questions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 cognitive	 capacity	 required.	 Recall	 that	 I	distinguished	 between	 various	 degrees	 of	 understanding	 ranging	 from	 mere	parroting	 to	 robust	 grasp	 of	 foundational	 grounding.	 Mere	 parroting	 is	 not	sufficient,	 and	 robust	 understanding	 is	 too	demanding.	 It	 is	 unclear	 both	whether	and	how	empathy	might	be	relevant	to	genuine	understanding	of	moral	norms,	and	it	 is	unclear	exactly	what	 is	demanded	by	genuine	understanding	of	moral	norms;	accordingly,	resolving	the	question	of	empathy	is	 in	a	 large	sense	predicated	upon	resolving	the	more	foundational	question.	But	we	might	for	now	use	our	judgments	about	the	necessity	of	empathy	to	inform	our	answers	to	the	earlier	question.	Along	these	lines,	Brink	(2013)	contends	that	we	should	hold	the	psychopath	responsible,	claiming	the	psychopath’s	limited	access	to	the	reasons	to	act	otherwise	is	sufficient	to	 give	 him	 the	 requisite	 sort	 of	 control.	 The	 psychopath	 can	 understand	 that	 his	behavior	is	proscribed	by	a	norm	taken	seriously	by	others,	and	he	can	understand	that	transgressing	this	norm	will	be	taken	seriously	by	others.	 If	Brink	is	right,	we	should	 reject	 this	empathy	argument	and	 therefore	 set	 aside	 the	most	demanding	version	 of	 the	 cognitive	 requirement.	However,	 just	 as	 I	 left	 unresolved	 the	 exact	nature	of	the	knowledge	required,	I	leave	unresolved	this	third	empathy	argument.	Thus	 there	 are	 at	 least	 three	 potential	 roles	 that	 empathy	 could	 play	 in	 a	reasons-responsiveness	scheme,	none	of	which	require	augmenting	the	core	theory	of	 responsibility.	 The	 three	 roles	 are	 consistent,	 so	 accepting	 one	 does	 not	mean	abandoning	 any	 of	 the	 others.	 Fully	 defending	 any	 of	 these	 roles	 would	 require	
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further	significant	research,	philosophical	and	empirical.	In	the	meantime,	however,	the	 reasons-responsiveness	 theorist	 has	 strong	 grounds	 to	 claim	 to	 be	 able	 to	accommodate	 the	 intuition	 that	 the	 capacity	 for	 empathy	 can	 matter	 for	 moral	responsibility,	 by	 claiming	 that	 it	 matters	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 interaction	 with	 the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	
2.5	 The	excusing	potential	of	powerful	urges	Many	 responsibility	 theorists	 also	 accept	 that	 certain	 sorts	 of	 particularly	strong	 desires	might	 offer	 some	 excuse.	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza	 offer	 the	 example	 of	Judith,	who	has	a	“literally	irresistible	urge	to	punch	her	best	friend,	Jane”	(1998,	p.	231).75	By	 hypothesis,	 the	 urge	 that	 leads	 Judith	 to	 punch	 Jane	 is	 not	 reasons-responsive:	 	 “Judith	would	 strike	 Jane,	no	matter	what	kinds	of	 reasons	 to	 refrain	were	 present”	 (ibid.)	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 conclude	 that	 Judith	 is	 not	 morally	responsible	 for	 punching	 Jane.	 Likewise,	 Wallace	 accepts	 that	 there	 might	 be	irresistible	desires	which	compromise	moral	responsibility:	[C]onsider	the	...	case	of	addiction,	which	is	often	thought	to	involve	a	susceptibility	to	impulses	that	cannot	be	resisted.	…	If	these	impulses	are	truly	irresistible,	then	the	agent	will	not	genuinely	have	the	ability	to	 control	 his	 behavior	 in	 light	 of	 the	 moral	 obligations	 that	 the	impulses	lead	him	to	violate.	Even	if	he	can	perfectly	grasp	and	apply	the	 principles	 that	 support	 those	 obligations,	 so	 that	 he	 knows	 that	what	he	is	doing	is	wrong,	the	irresistibility	deprives	the	agent	of	the	capacity	 to	 act	 in	 conformity	 with	 them.	 …	 [T]o	 the	 extent	 that																																																									75	It	 might	 seem	 surprising	 that	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 recognize	 the	 possibility	 of	irresistible	 urges,	 given	 their	 claim	 that	 reactivity	 is	 “all	 of	 a	 piece.”	 Remember,	however,	that	they	predicate	reasons-responsiveness	of	particular	mechanisms,	not	of	 agents	 on	 the	whole.	 Accordingly,	 even	 if	 some	 of	 the	 agent’s	mechanisms	 are	reactive,	 some	 might	 not	 be.	 Moreover,	 as	 I	 argue,	 an	 urge	 might	 be	 irresistible	because	of	 its	 interaction	with	the	cognitive	capacity.	Even	 if	 the	agent’s	volitional	capacity	is	“all	of	a	piece,”	their	cognitive	capacity	need	not	be.	
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irresistible	 impulses	 deprive	 the	 agent	 of	 those	 abilities,	 it	 would	seem	unreasonable	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	morally	 accountable.	 (1994,	 p.	171)		However,	while	many	reasons-responsiveness	theorists	accept	that	there	might	be	excusingly	irresistible	urges,	neither	Fischer	and	Ravizza	nor	Wallace	explain	what	it	is	that	might	make	such	an	urge	excusing.	Here,	 as	 with	 the	 role	 of	 empathy,	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	moral	 responsibility	 has	 the	 resources	 to	 explain	 this	 intuitive	 feature	 of	 our	blaming	practices.	We	can	begin	to	understand	irresistible	urges	by	returning	to	the	two	 component	 capacities.	An	urge	 is	 irresistible	 if	 it	mars	 the	operation	of	 those	capacities.	So,	for	instance,	if	the	experience	of	an	urge	not	only	played	the	normal	motivating	function	of	desires	and	wants	but	also	blinded	the	experiencing	agent	to	the	moral	 reasons	 to	 resist	 the	urge	or	 to	mechanisms	 the	agent	might	employ	 to	resist	 the	 urge,	 then	 the	 urge	 is	 irresistible.	 The	 empirical	 psychology	 literature	provides	 us	 with	 evidence	 that	 desires	 can	 have	 such	 cognitive	 interference	effects:76	Our	attention	can	be	driven	by	our	desires.	As	Ap	Dijksterhuis	and	Henk	Aarts	explain,	“If	one	is	thirsty,	drinks	attract	more	attention	than	things	one	cannot	drink”	 (2010,	p.	 471).	Attention	 is	 a	 filtering	mechanism,	 and	 so	when	we	pursue	one	goal,	our	recognition	of	competing	goals	is	inhibited.	This	facilitates	our	pursuit	of	our	goals,	but	it	also	means	that	our	attentive	and	thus	cognitive	possibilities	are	limited	by	our	desires.	That	a	desire	 focuses	our	attention	does	not	mean	 that	we	cannot	attend	to	anything	else.	But	it	is	plausible	that	some	desires	might	so	capture	
																																																								76	My	discussion	here	largely	follows	Ap	Dijksterhuis	and	Henk	Aarts	(2010).	
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attention,	perhaps	by	virtue	of	their	strength,	that	they	make	it	significantly	harder	to	recognize	other	things	which	matter.	In	the	presence	of	such	a	strong	desire,	even	the	possession	of	an	ordinarily	sufficient	cognitive	capacity	might	not	be	sufficient	to	be	able	to	recognize	other	reasons.77		Imagine	 a	 long-time	 smoker	 who	 might	 ordinarily	 grasp	 the	 harms	 of	smoking	when	his	drive	for	nicotine	is	satiated	but	who,	in	the	throes	of	the	need	for	nicotine,	cannot	be	brought	to	think	about	the	downsides	of	smoking.	This	smoker,	at	 least	while	he	 is	 the	grips	of	 the	drive	 to	smoke,	 lacks	 the	sufficient	capacity	 to	recognize	the	reasons	not	to	smoke,	making	him	non-reasons-responsive.	While	the	literature	 on	 irresistible	 urges	 often	 focuses	 on	 unwilling	 addicts,78	this	 long-time	smoker	might	well	be	entitled	to	excuse	even	if	he	is	a	willing	addict.	After	all,	 the	long-time	 smoker	 might	 experience	 an	 unconflicted	 desire	 to	 smoke	 during	 the	throes	 of	 his	 urge.	 These	 willing	 addicts	 are	 those	 who	 fail	 to	 reach	 the	 proper	
																																																								77 	To	 the	 extent	 that	 irresistible	 urges	 compromise	 the	 relevant	 reasons-responsiveness	 component	 capacities	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 a	 feature	common	 to	 ordinary	 desires,	 it	 might	 seem	 that	 there	 should	 be	 at	 least	 partial	excuses	in	many	ordinary	cases.	If	urges	excuse	by	way	of	the	distraction	that	they	cause,	and	if	distraction	is	part	of	the	ordinary	and	healthy	operation	of	urges,	then	it	might	seem	that	all	urges	excuse.	But	that	might	seem	too	strong,	since	it	seems	implausible	that	so	many	ordinary	agents	are	not	fully	responsible.	I	raise	the	worry	only	to	set	it	aside.	While	a	full	defense	of	a	reasons-responsiveness	account	should	answer	this	concern,	for	my	purposes	it	is	enough	to	gesture	at	how	an	irresistible	urge	might	excuse,	raise	the	concern,	and	then	appeal	to	the	widespread	acceptance	of	the	excusing	force	of	irresistible	urges	among	reasons-responsiveness	theorists.	78	There	are	 two	ways	 that	we	might	 think	an	addict	 is	unwilling.	On	 the	ordinary	sense	of	an	unwilling	addict,	the	addict’s	coming	to	be	addicted	was	not	by	willing	or	voluntary	actions.	But	the	literature’s	sense	of	unwilling	addiction	is	different.	Here,	the	addict	is	unwilling	so	long	as,	in	the	throes	of	the	addiction,	the	addict	does	not	at	that	point	wish	to	be	addicted.	
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judgment	that	they	should	resist	their	addiction,	but	they	fail	to	reach	this	judgment	precisely	because	their	addiction	has	compromised	their	access	to	those	reasons.79	Thinking	about	 the	volitional	capacity	 leads	 to	a	second	class	of	 irresistible	urges.	 If	 the	experience	of	 an	urge	not	only	played	 the	normal	 function	of	desires	and	 wants	 but	 also	 compromised	 the	 experiencing	 agent’s	 capacity	 to	 act	 on	contrary	 judgments,	 then	 the	 urge	 is	 irresistible.	 Here,	 the	 lack	 of	 significant	philosophical	work	analyzing	the	volitional	capacity	limits	how	much	more	detailed	the	description	 can	be.	However,	 I	 can	 imagine	a	 long-time	 smoker	who	 is	deeply	aware	 of	 the	 harms	 of	 smoking	 and	 whose	 enjoyment	 of	 cigarettes	 has	 so	 long	abated	 that	 he	 is	 not	 even	 distracted	 by	 the	 urge	 for	 nicotine.	 This	 smoker	 can	explain	to	you	why	he	should	not	smoke	and	even	that	he	does	not	want	to	smoke,	and	he	can	explain	all	of	this	while	he	is	smoking.	However,	this	smoker	smokes	as	if	an	 automaton.	While	 in	 the	 throes	 of	 the	urge,	 he	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 act	 on	his	normative	 judgments,	 making	 him	 non-reasons-responsive.	 The	 irresistible	 urge	which	compromises	the	volitional	capacity	thus	makes	ready	sense	of	the	unwilling	addict.80		
																																																								79	For	 some,	 the	 relevant	 sorts	 of	 irresistible	 urges	 must	 meet	 two	 conditions:		a)	they	 must	 be	 in	 some	 sense	 irresistible,	 and	 b)	 they	 must	 conflict	 with	 some	important	aspect	of	 the	agent’s	practical	psychology.	For	example,	 John	Christman	(1991,	p.	16)	writes,	 “What	 is	problematic	about	compulsive	desires	 is	not	merely	that	they	are	compulsive--uncontrollable	at	the	moment	of	effectiveness--but	rather	that	they	often	are	in	manifest	conflict	with	the	agent’s	other	desires.”	Christman	is	concerned	 with	 the	 conditions	 of	 autonomy,	 but	 insofar	 as	 I	 am	 concerned	 with	moral	responsibility,	I	reject	that	second	sort	of	condition.	80	To	be	more	precise,	 the	 compromise	of	 this	volitional	 ability	excuses	 the	addict	from	his	 behavior	 in	 the	 throes	 of	 the	 addiction.	 The	 unwilling	 addict	 can	 still	 be	blameworthy	 if	 the	 addict	 is	 responsible	 for	 wrongfully	 becoming	 or	 allowing	
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And	 we	 should	 not	 be	 distracted	 by	 the	 vocabulary	 which	 populates	 this	debate.	 An	 urge	 need	 not	 be	 literally	 beyond	 all	 possible	 resistance	 to	 ground	excuse.	An	agent	might	still	retain	some	capacity	and	yet	be	below	the	 level	of	 the	moderate	capacity.	Consider	again	the	addict.	We	might	suspect	that	all	but	the	very	worst	of	the	addicts	could	resist	their	addictions	if	the	countervailing	reasons	were	pressing	enough.	The	addict	might	not	heed	his	own	welfare,	but	this	does	not	mean	that	 there	might	 not	 be	more	 pressing	 reasons	which	 could	 change	 his	 behavior,	such	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 law	 enforcement.	 That	 the	 addict	 retains	 some	 degree	 of	control,	 however,	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 addict	 retains	 moderate	 control.	Moreover,	the	excuses	which	can	be	grounded	by	these	urges	come	in	degrees.	The	worst	 addictions	 might	 excuse	 completely,	 but	 many	 strong	 addictions	 would	excuse	partially.	While	most	 urges	 that	 are	 irresistible	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 strong	 urges,	 not	 all	irresistible	urges	need	be	strong	urges.	What	matters	is	whether	the	urge	interferes	with	 the	 agent’s	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities,	 and	 so	 there	might	 be	 strong	urges	which	are	resistible,	and	there	might	be	moderate	or	even	weak	urges	which	are	irresistible.	We	should	be	careful	not	to	extend	an	excuse	just	because	an	urge	is	a	 very	 strong.	 That	 an	 urge	 is	 very	 strong	might	make	 it	 almost	 certain	 that	 the	agent	will	act	upon	the	urge,	but	this	is	in	large	part	because	very	strong	urges	are																																																																																																																																																																						himself	 to	 remain	 addicted.	 In	 that	 case,	 we	 could	 see	 the	 unwilling	 addict’s	behavior	 in	 the	 course	 of	 his	 addiction	 not	 as	 the	 wrongdoing	 for	 which	 he	 is	originally	 responsible	 but	 as	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	prior	wrongful	 behavior	 for	which	 we	may	 hold	 him	 responsible.	Wallace	 advances	 an	 argument	 along	 these	lines	looking	primarily	at	the	willing	addict,	though	the	argument	applies	equally	to	both.	
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likely	to	outweigh	other	urges,	even	other	appropriately	recognized	urges.	This	does	not	make	the	urge	irresistible.	Instead,	we	should	excuse	only	if	we	have	reason	to	think	that	the	strong	urge,	in	addition	to	(and	perhaps	because	of)	being	strong,	also	has	 a	 compromising	 effect	 on	 the	 agent’s	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities.	Likewise,	some	moderate	or	mild	urges	might,	despite	seemingly	readily	superable	to	outsiders,	interfere	with	an	agent’s	reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	This	might	be	especially	true,	for	instance,	of	the	urges	associated	with	certain	sorts	of	habits.	Accordingly,	while	strength	might	be	a	fair	predictor	of	irresistibility,	it	is	not	what	matters.	Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 that	 there	 is	 more	 than	 one	 way	 of	resisting	an	urge.81	An	agent	might	lack	the	capacity	to	resist	in	one	way	but	possess	the	capacity	to	resist	in	another	way.	That	undermines	the	agent’s	claim	to	excuse.	When	confronted	with	some	desire,	we	might	act	otherwise	either	by	acting	upon	some	 other	 desire	 (thereby	 circumventing	 the	 original	 desire)	 or	 by	 intentionally	resisting	 the	 desire.	 And	 when	 we	 act	 intentionally	 to	 resist	 a	 desire,	 we	 have	options.	We	might	conquer	it	by	brute	force,	willing	ourselves	to	resist	the	desire,	or	we	might	conquer	it	by	skilled	strategy,	intentionally	distracting	ourselves,	focusing	elsewhere,	and	the	 like.	Thus,	as	Al	Mele	(1990)	has	argued,	an	 irresistible	urge	 is	one	which	makes	all	of	a	number	of	alternative	actions	impossible.	Accordingly,	an	agent	 might	 lack	 the	 capacity	 for	 resisting	 an	 urge	 by	 brute	 force	 and	 yet	 be	responsible	 for	 acting	 on	 the	 urge,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 agent	 possessed	 the	 needed	
																																																								81	The	best	treatment,	which	I	largely	follow,	is	Al	Mele	(1990).	
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capacities	to	resist	the	urge	in	some	other	fashion.	The	cigarette	smoker	who	knows	that	 he	 cannot	 force	himself	 to	 refrain	 from	 smoking	once	he	has	 the	 cigarette	 to	hand	might	nonetheless	be	responsible	if	he	knows	that	he	could	distract	himself	by	running	or	the	like	but	fails	to	pursue	that	alternative	strategy.	
2.6	 Reasons-responsiveness	and	control	The	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 thus	 laid	 out	offers	 an	 appealing	 explanation	 of	 our	 patterns	 of	 blaming	 and	 excusing.	 The	account	 remains	 so	 far	 a	 promissory	 note,	 wanting	 for	 fuller	 development	 of	 the	notion	 of	 capacity	 at	 its	 heart	 as	 well	 as	 more	 sophisticated	 sociological	 and	philosophical	 work	 connecting	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 to	 our	practices.	However,	especially	when	we	attend	to	the	familiar	component	capacities	and	 when	 we	 see	 those	 capacities	 as	 scalar,	 the	 account	 offers	 a	 plausible	 and	attractive	 explanation	 of	 our	 practices,	 and	 it	 gives	 us	 promising	 programs	 for	further	 investigations	of	 the	 conditions	of	 responsibility,	 for	diagnosing	particular	agents,	and	for	determining	exactly	when	particular	conditions	should	or	should	not	excuse.	Moreover,	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	responsibility	offers	an	 attractive	 sense	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 control	 intuitively	 important	 for	 moral	responsibility.	That	appropriate	praise	and	blame	are	tied	to	control	has	long	been	recognized.	 As	 Aristotle	 explained,	 it	 is	 “on	 voluntary	 passions	 and	 actions	 [that]	praise	and	blame	are	bestowed”	 (1998,	1109b).	This	 is	quite	 close	 to	 the	 reactive	attitudes	account	of	moral	responsibility,	especially	if	we	think	voluntary	actions	are	
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those	 performed	 while	 in	 possession	 of	 the	 capacities	 for	 voluntary	 control.	Aristotle	 gives	 us	 the	 example	 of	 someone	 carried	 away	 by	 the	wind.	 If	 you	 later	blame	the	agent	carried	away	by	the	wind	for	having	left,	you	can	imagine	the	agent	defending	himself	by	explaining	that	he	was	forced	to	leave.	He	might	say,	“Because	I	 was	 forced	 by	 the	 wind,	 and	 because	 I	 had	 no	 control	 over	 the	 wind,	 I	 had	 no	control	 over	 not	 being	where	 you	 expected	me	 to	 be.	 You	 should	 not	 blame	me.”	Thus,	control	seems	to	be	an	important	condition	of	moral	responsibility.	Contemporary	philosophers	have	sometimes	seen	in	the	appeal	to	control	a	role	 for	 the	 Principle	 of	 Alternative	 Possibilities.	 On	 that	 principle,	 an	 agent	 has	control	over	an	action	in	the	sense	necessary	for	blame	only	if	there	are	alternative	courses	of	action	open	to	the	agent.82	If	not,	then	the	agent	did	not	have	control,	and	the	agent	should	not	be	blamed.	The	agent	carried	by	the	wind,	for	instance,	did	not	have	any	other	significant	possibilities	available	to	him.	No	matter	what	he	did,	the	wind	would	have	carried	him	away.	But	the	could-have-done-otherwise	principle	seems	to	run	afoul	of	Frankfurt	cases,	 cases	 where	 an	 agent	 could	 not	 have	 done	 otherwise	 only	 because	 of	 a	counterfactual	intervener	who	in	fact	contributes	nothing	other	than	ensuring	that	the	agent	could	not	have	done	otherwise.	In	Harry	Frankfurt’s	words:	Suppose	someone--Black,	let	us	say--wants	Jones	to	perform	a	certain	action.	Black	is	prepared	to	go	to	considerable	lengths	to	get	his	way,	but	he	prefers	 to	avoid	 showing	his	hand	unnecessarily.	 So	he	waits	until	 Jones	 is	 about	 to	 make	 up	 his	 mind	 what	 to	 do,	 and	 he	 does	nothing	unless	 it	 is	 clear	 to	him	 (Black	 is	 an	 excellent	 judge	of	 such																																																									82	For	 more	 on	 the	 Principle	 of	 Alternative	 Possibilities,	 see	 Peter	 van	 Inwagen	(1975)	and	Harry	Frankfurt	(1969),	among	many	others.	
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things)	that	Jones	is	going	to	decide	to	do	something	other	than	what	he	 wants	 him	 to	 do.	 If	 it	 does	 become	 clear	 that	 Jones	 is	 going	 to	decide	to	do	something	else,	Black	takes	effective	steps	to	ensure	that	Jones	decides	to	do,	and	that	he	does	do,	what	he	wants	him	to	do.	…	Now	suppose	that	Black	never	has	to	show	his	hand	because	Jones,	for	reasons	 of	 his	 own,	 decides	 to	 perform	 and	 does	 perform	 the	 very	action	 Black	 wants	 him	 to	 perform.	 (1969,	 pp.	 162–163	 subscripts	omitted)		There	 has	 been	 a	 mammoth	 literature	 refining,	 critiquing,	 and	 exploring	 the	Frankfurt	 cases.	 But	 many,	 Frankfurt	 and	 myself	 included,	 think	 it	 intuitive	 that	Jones	 is	 just	 as	 responsible	 for	 his	 action	 as	 he	would	 have	 been	 had	 Black	 been	absent.	Jones	seems	responsible	even	though	Black’s	presence	makes	it	the	case	that	Jones	could	not	have	done	otherwise.	Aristotle’s	conditions	of	the	voluntary	and	the	involuntary	can	explain	Jones’s	responsibility.	 Recall	 that	 Aristotle	 offered	 two	 formulations	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	involuntary	action:		an	action	is	involuntary	if	it	is	forced	by	outside	conditions	or	if	it	is	done	without	any	contribution	from	the	agent.	That	Jones	performed	the	action	on	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 own	 reasons-sensitive	 decision	means	 that	 Jones	made	 a	 true	contribution.	And	while	Black	remained	ready	to	compel	Jones’s	performance,	Black	did	not	 in	 fact	 compel	 Jones’s	performance,	and	so	we	should	accept	our	 intuition	that	Jones’s	action	was	not	forced.	As	Fischer	and	Ravizza	explain,	we	should	see	the	Frankfurt	 cases	 as	 distinguishing	 two	 notions	 of	 control,	 guidance	 control	 and	regulative	 control	 (1998,	 pp.	 31–34).	 Frankfurt	 agents	 like	 Jones	 lack	 regulative	control,	 because	 they	 cannot	bring	about	 any	alternative	 results,	 but	 they	possess	guidance	 control,	 for	 they	make	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 action’s	 coming	 about.	 The	
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intuition	 that	 Frankfurt	 agents	 like	 Jones	 are	 responsible	 shows	 us	 that	responsibility	is	about	guidance	control,	not	regulative	control.	The	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 provide	 a	 satisfying	 explanation	 of	the	 guidance	 control	 which	 marks	 Jones’s	 contribution	 to	 his	 action.83	Jones	 has	control	 over	 his	 action	 because	 his	 action	 stems	 from	 his	 recognition	 of	 certain	reasons	 that	 bear	 on	 his	 choice	 and	 his	 volition	 based	 upon	 that	 recognition.	Moreover,	we	are	given	no	reason	to	think	that	Jones	lacks	the	relevant	component	capacities	to	recognize	or	react	to	the	ordinary	reasons	not	to	kill.	That	Black	waits	in	the	wings	to	meddle,	should	Jones	fail	 to	recognize	the	reasons	that	 lead	him	to	act	 as	 he	 does,	 fail	 to	 care	 about	 those	 reasons,	 or	 fail	 to	 act	 upon	 those	 reasons,	guarantees	that	Jones	does	not	act	otherwise,	but	it	does	not	mean	that	Jones	fails	in	any	of	those	ways.	If	Jones	lacked	the	capacity	to	recognize	or	react	to	those	reasons,	he	might	still	act	as	he	does--after	all,	Black	might	so	compel	him.	The	possession	of	those	capacities	is	necessary	for	Jones’s	behavior	to	be	the	product	of	Jones’s	agency	in	 the	 right	 sort	 of	 way,	 and	 so	 the	 presence	 of	 those	 capacities	 can	 provide	 a	satisfying	 explanation	 of	 the	 intuitive	 pull	 of	 the	 Frankfurt	 cases,	 and	 thus	 of	 the	conditions	of	moral	responsibility.	These	capacities	can	even	serve	to	provide	a	satisfying,	compatibilist	reading	of	 the	 Principle	 of	 Alternative	 Possibilities. 84 	The	 Principle	 of	 Alternative	Possibilities	 requires	 that	 other	 possibilities	 be	 open	 and	 available.	 But	 what	 is	required	 for	 a	 possibility	 to	 be	 open	 and	 available	 is	 up	 for	 debate.	 The																																																									83	This	is	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	central	and	important	contribution.	84	I	thank	David	Brink	for	pushing	me	to	think	more	about	this.		
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incompatibilist	wants	to	claim	that	a	possibility	being	open	and	available	means	that	it	is	not	foreclosed	by	determinism,	the	laws	of	nature,	the	past,	and	the	rest.	But	the	reasons-responsiveness	 theorist	might	 claim	 instead	 that	a	possibility	 is	open	and	available	 to	an	agent	when	some	similarly	situated	agent	with	the	same	capacities	and	 in	 the	 same	 circumstances	 could	 bring	 about	 the	 possibility.	 If	 so,	 then	 some	deterministically	unavailable	possibilities	would	nonetheless	be	open	and	available.	That	is,	there	is	a	distinctively	reasons-responsiveness	way	to	read	the	Principle	of	Alternative	Possibilities.	That	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 can	 provide	 a	 satisfying	explanation	of	the	Principle	of	Alternative	Possibilities	reflects	the	broader	fact	that	the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 can	 provide	 a	 satisfying	 sense	 of	 the	 sort	 of	control	 intuitively	 involved	 in	 our	 ascriptions	 of	 responsibility.	 That	 explanatory	success	plus	the	extensional	promise	of	the	account	in	picking	out	the	paradigmatic	cases	of	responsibility,	compromised	responsibility,	and	irresponsibility	render	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	responsibility	compelling.	
	90	
Chapter	3	 The	question	of	history	
3.1	 The	disputed	role	for	history	The	 possession	 (or	 not)	 of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 is	 not	 a	fixed	fact.	It	is	an	ordinary	fact	that	an	agent	who	lacks	the	capacities	as	a	child	can	later	 possess	 them	 as	 an	 adult,	 some	 mental	 illnesses	 might	 strip	 away	 the	capacities	from	an	agent	who	once	possessed	them,	and	some	mental	illnesses	might	be	treated.	The	capacities	are	possessed	(or	not)	by	an	individual	at	some	particular	time.	 This	 means	 that	 we	 need	 to	 know	 which	 time	 or	 times	 matter	 in	 order	 to	evaluate	an	agent’s	responsibility	 for	some	behavior.	As	a	starting	point,	we	might	think	that	the	relevant	time	is	the	time	of	the	action.	We	can	see	this	in	the	general	contour	 of	 the	 excuses	we	 entertain.	 Being	 incapacitated	 prior	 to	 the	 behavior	 is	ordinarily	 no	 excuse	 at	 all,	 barring	 that	 the	 incapacitation	 had	 some	 effect	which	continued	 through	 the	 time	 of	 the	 behavior.	We	 blame	 adults	 after	 all!	 Likewise,	while	 being	 incapacitated	 after	 the	 behavior	 at	 issue	 raises	 problems	 about	 the	expression	 of	 blame,	 once	 the	 wrongdoer	 returns	 to	 competence,	 we	 ordinarily	resume	the	expression	of	blame.	Thus,	as	a	starting	point,	it	is	the	agent’s	capacities	at	the	time	of	the	behavior	which	matter.		But	 our	 intuitions	 and	 patterns	 of	 response	 also	 suggest	 that	 an	 agent’s	history	 can	 matter	 for	 his	 responsibility.	 There	 are	 two	 sorts	 of	 cases	 which	particularly	 support	 this	 suggestion:	 	 tracing	 cases	 and	 bad-history	 cases.	 In	 the	tracing	cases,	an	agent	 lacks	 the	requisite	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	when	he	acts,	but	he	is	responsible	for	 lacking	those	capacities.	The	standard	example	is	
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the	 extremely	 intoxicated	 wrongdoer.	 This	 wrongdoer’s	 intoxication	 mars	 his	normative	 psychology,	 undermining	 the	 component	 capacities	 which	 make	 for	reasons-responsiveness.	 If	 reasons-responsiveness	at	 the	 time	of	 the	behavior	 is	a	necessary	 condition	 of	 moral	 responsibility,	 then	 it	 seems	 that	 this	 agent	 is	 not	responsible.	 However,	 many	 severely	 intoxicated	 wrongdoers	 are	 intuitively	blameworthy,	and	so	 it	appears	 that,	whatever	 role	 reasons-responsiveness	at	 the	time	of	 the	behavior	might	play	 in	a	 theory	of	moral	 responsibility,	 contemporary	reasons-responsiveness	may	not	be	a	necessary	condition	of	moral	responsibility.	If	 the	 tracing	 cases	 challenge	 the	 thought	 that	 contemporary	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 necessary	 for	 moral	 responsibility,	 the	 bad-history	 cases	challenge	 the	 thought	 that	 contemporary	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 sufficient	 for	moral	 responsibility.	 One	 particularly	 powerful	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 wrongdoer	who	had	been	abused	and	neglected	as	a	child.	This	background	seems	to	mitigate	or	 block	 the	 agent’s	 blameworthiness	 even	 if	 the	 agent	 developed	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	Our	intuitions	about	these	bad-history	cases	thus	suggest	that	 history	 can	 tell	 against	 responsibility,	 just	 as	 our	 intuitions	 about	 the	 tracing	cases	suggest	that	history	can	tell	for	responsibility.	The	 implications	 of	 incorporating	 history	 go	 beyond	 accounting	 for	 these	central	 cases.	 Tracing	 is	 widely	 seen	 as	 an	 anodyne	 if	 necessary	 element	 of	 any	satisfying	 theory	 of	moral	 responsibility,	 one	 that	may	 be	 incorporated	 into	most	theories	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 without	 risking	 further	 complications.	 The	 bad-history	cases,	however,	are	often	seen	as	the	wedge	by	which	a	powerful	argument	
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for	incompatibilism	can	be	introduced.	This	is	most	plain	in	Pereboom	(2001,	2014).	Such	 incompatibilists	 argue	 that	 the	 best	 explanation	 for	 the	 intuition	 that	 a	 bad-history	 agent	 is	 not	 culpable	 is	 that	 her	 wrongdoing	 is	 the	 product	 of	 matters	outside	 of	 her	 control.	 If	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 the	 bad	 history	 is	 the	 source	 of	 the	agent’s	wrongdoing,	and	given	that	it	seems	clear	that	the	bad	history	is,	ordinarily,	outside	of	the	agent’s	control,	then	we	might	plausibly	advert	to	the	lack	of	control	over	a	determining	factor	to	explain	the	lack	of	responsibility.	That	lack	of	control	is	particularly	noticeable	 in	 the	bad-history	 cases,	but	 it	 is	plausibly	 true	of	 all	 of	us	that	our	behavior	is	the	product	of	factors	over	which	we	lack	control.	If	so,	goes	the	argument,	none	of	us	is	responsible.85	So	 we	 should	 ask	 whether	 history	 matters.	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 (1998,	 p.	170)	see	this	question	as	contrasting	two	classes	of	theories:		historical	theories	and	
																																																								85	Here,	I	have	presented	the	argument	to	incompatibilism	as:		 1.	 The	bad-history	agent	is	not	responsible.	2.	 The	best	explanation	of	the	bad-history	agent’s	not	being	responsible	is	that	his	behavior	is	the	product	of	factors	beyond	his	control.	3.	 That	explanation	extends	to	all	of	us.	C.	 So	no	one	is	morally	responsible.		Some	incompatibilists	present	the	argument	to	incompatibilism	as:			 1.	 The	bad-history	agent	is	not	responsible.	2.	 There	 is	 no	 plausibly	 relevant	 difference	 between	 the	 bad-history	agent	and	the	rest	of	us.		 C.	 No	one	is	morally	responsible.		I	elide	the	differences	between	these	two	arguments.	
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time-slice	theories.86	Fischer	(2000)	offers	examples	contrasting	the	two	classes	 in	other	domains:	size,	weight,	height,	shape,	and	symmetry	are	 intuitively	 time-slice	phenomena,	 while	 sunburns	 and	 counterfeiting	 are	 intuitively	 historical	phenomena.	Frankfurt	(1971)	presents	perhaps	the	most	famous	ahistorical	view	of	moral	responsibility	 in	his	mesh	account.	For	Frankfurt,	an	agent	 is	responsible	so	long	as	there	is	a	sufficient	mesh	between	the	agent’s	first-order	desires,	his	second-order	desires,	and	his	actions.	It	does	not	matter	how	those	desires	and	that	mesh	came	about:	The	 causes	 to	 which	 we	 are	 subject	 may	 also	 change	 us	 radically,	without	thereby	bringing	it	about	that	we	are	not	morally	responsible	agents.	It	is	irrelevant	whether	those	causes	are	operating	by	virtue	of	the	 natural	 forces	 that	 shape	 our	 environment	 or	 whether	 they	operate	 through	 the	 deliberative	 manipulative	 designs	 of	 other	human	agents.	We	are	the	sorts	of	persons	we	are;	and	it	is	what	we	are,	rather	than	the	history	of	our	development,	that	counts.	The	fact	that	someone	is	a	pig	warrants	treating	him	like	a	pig,	unless	there	is	reason	 to	believe	 that	 in	some	 important	way	he	 is	a	pig	against	his	will	 and	 is	 not	 acting	 as	 he	 would	 really	 prefer	 to	 act.	 (Frankfurt,	2002,	p.	28)		Frankfurt,	a	mesh	theorist,	takes	a	hard	ahistoricist	line.	But	we	should	ask	whether	a	similar	line	is	attractive	for	a	reasons-responsiveness	theorist.	
																																																								86	Probably	 in	part	because	different	 theorists	have	different	notions	of	 the	sort	of	history	which	might	be	philosophically	interesting,	the	vocabulary	in	this	debate	is	varied.	 The	 historical	 theories	 are	 sometimes	 also	 called	 external	 theories;	 the	ahistorical	 theories	 are	 sometimes	 also	 called	 internal	 theories,	 structuralist	theories,	and	time-slice	theories.		
94	
	
I	 begin	 by	 distinguishing	 between	 ways	 that	 history	 can	 matter.	 No	 one	should	 deny	 that	 there	 are	 some	 inoffensive	ways	 history	 could	matter.87	History	certainly	 plays	 important	 causal	 roles.	 As	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza	 describe	 it,	 history	casts	 a	 shadow	 (1998,	 p.	 194).	 That	 some	 agent	 is	 reasons-responsive	 now	 is	 the	product	of	the	agent’s	past--the	way	the	agent	was	raised,	the	properties	the	agent	inherited	at	birth,	etc.	That	some	agent	has	a	certain	quality	of	will	now	is	likewise	the	 product	 of	 the	 agent’s	 past--the	way	 the	 agent	was	 raised,	 the	 properties	 the	agent	inherited	at	birth,	etc.	Even	if	these	history	facts	are	not	wholly	determinative	of	 the	 agent’s	 possession	 of	 the	 capacities	 and	 quality	 of	 will	 now,	 any	 plausible	theory	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 concerned	 with	 either	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	capacities	or	Strawsonian	quality	of	will	must	admit	 that	history	 facts	are	causally	relevant.	Historical	facts	are	also	diagnostically	and	epistemically	relevant.	If	we	want	to	 know	whether	 some	 agent	 possesses	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 at	some	particular	point,	we	might	profitably	look	to	the	agent’s	history.	If,	as	is	more	than	plausible,	certain	pasts	tend	to	yield	healthy	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	more	than	others,	we	can	use	evidence	regarding	an	agent’s	past	as	evidence	of	the	present	possession	of	healthy	capacities.	And	it	is	also	more	than	plausible	that	the	capacities	 are	 relatively	 stable.	 If	 that’s	 so,	 we	might	 use	 evidence	 of	 the	 agent’s	possession	 of	 the	 capacities	 at	 one	 time	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	 agent	 possessed	 the	
																																																								87	Fischer	and	Ravizza	 (1998,	pp.	170–194)	give	an	especially	clear	account	of	 the	different	roles	history	might	play,	and	what	follows	borrows	liberally	but	not	exactly	from	them.	
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capacities	 at	 some	 other	 time--with	 the	 particular	weight	 of	 the	 evidence	 varying	based	upon	factors	like	the	separation	of	the	two	times,	intervening	events,	and	the	like.	 For	 both	 of	 these	 reasons,	 the	 agent’s	 history	would	be	 important	 diagnostic	evidence	of	 the	agent’s	moral	 responsibility,	because	 the	agent’s	history	would	be	good	evidence	of	the	agent’s	possession	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	at	the	time	of	the	behavior.	There	 are	 other	 historicist	 roles	 I’d	 like	 to	 mark	 and	 set	 aside,	 roles	suggested	 by	 the	 time-slice	 contrast.	 First,	 the	 time-slice	 contrast	 suggests	 that	history	is	only	one	of	two	non-time-slice	elements:		there	is	also	the	future.88	And	so	we	 could	 ask	 whether	 what	 happens	 after	 a	 bit	 of	 behavior	 affects	 the	 agent’s	responsibility	for	that	behavior.	Plausibly,	what	follows	a	particular	bit	of	behavior	does	 affect	 whether	 and	 how	 we	 should	 respond	 to	 the	 agent.	 We	 widely	 treat	consequences	as	relevant	to	our	responses.	The	criminal	law	treats	murderers	more	harshly	than	attempted	murderers,	and	the	merely	reckless	driver	is	castigated	less	severely	than	the	reckless	driver	who	causes	a	serious	accident.	This	feature	of	the	criminal	 law	 is	 consistent	 with	 how	 we	 treat	 each	 other	 in	 our	 interpersonal	relationships.	I	resent	someone	who	actually	harms	me	more	than	I	resent	someone	who	intends	to	harm	me	but	never	gets	the	chance.	Consequences	are	not	the	only	way	 that	 events	 subsequent	 to	 the	 initial	 behavior	 affect	 whether	 and	 how	 we	respond.	 How	 the	 agent	 and	 those	 impacted	 by	 the	 agent	 act	with	 respect	 to	 the	
																																																								88	The	 future	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 history.	However,	 both	 the	 future	 and	 the	 past	 are	readily	 contrasted	 with	 the	 time-slice,	 and	 so	 asking	 whether	 responsibility	 is	 a	time-slice	phenomenon	entails	asking	about	both	the	past	and	the	future.	
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agent’s	 wrongdoing	 often	 affects	 how	 we	 hold	 him	 to	 account	 for	 that	 behavior.	When	an	agent	repudiates,	apologizes,	or	makes	amends	for	a	bit	of	wrongdoing,	we	tend	 to	blame	him	with	 less	 force,	 if	at	all.	Similarly,	 if	 those	harmed	by	 the	agent	forgive	the	agent,	we	tend	to	blame	him	with	less	force,	if	at	all.89	And	we	might	also	look	 to	 the	 future	 to	determine	whether	 the	agent	who	acted	wrongly	 is	 the	same	agent	 we	 might	 now	 blame.	 Benjamin	 Matheson	 (2014)	 raises	 this	 question,	claiming	 that	 there	are	serious	questions	about	personal	 identity	which	should	be	addressed	in	determining	whether	to	blame.	I	set	aside	questions	about	the	relevance	of	the	future	to	responsibility.	While	philosophers	like	Fischer	and	Ravizza	often	treat	(perhaps	only	casually)	time-slice	accounts	 as	 the	 relevant	 contrast	 to	 history	 being	 relevant,	 rarely	 is	 the	 future	considered	alongside	the	past.	And	we	can	make	sense	of	the	distinctive	treatment	of	the	past.	The	past	seems	to	constrain	our	control	in	a	way	that	the	future	cannot.	Insofar	 as	 control	 has	 seemed	 to	 matter	 tremendously	 for	 most	 theorists	 about	responsibility,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 the	 past	 has	 interested	many	 theorists	 about	responsibility.	Accordingly,	I	too	set	aside	questions	about	the	future,	albeit	leaving	them	for	future	investigations,	not	rejecting	them	as	irrelevant.	There	are	 two	other	ways	 that	 the	 time-slice	contrast	might	 lead	us	astray.	First,	a	particularly	thin	notion	of	a	time	slice	might	be	insufficient	to	capture	all	of	the	 facts	 which	 would	 pick	 out	 the	 relevant	 actions,	 intentions,	 and	 the	 like.																																																									89 	Recent	 work	 on	 these	 phenomena--and	 especially	 forgiveness--has	 been	particularly	 significant	 in	 my	 own	 thinking	 about	 blame.	 For	 example,	 my	appreciation	of	the	seeing-as	element	of	the	reactive	attitudes	was	largely	sparked	by	thinking	of	how	forgiveness	relates	to	blame,	as	urged	by	Allais	(2008a,	2008b).	
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Plausibly,	no	actions	are	of	an	instant.	Even	a	quotidian	battery,	the	ordinary	punch,	takes	some	time	to	occur.	Similarly,	a	particularly	thin	notion	of	a	time	slice	might	exclude	 the	 ordinary	 interaction	 between	 intention	 and	 activity,	 surmising	 that	intentions	play	a	causal	role	and	surmising	that	causal	interactions	take	place	over	time.	 As	 David	 Zimmerman	 explains,	 “reasons-responsive	 decision-making	 is	 a	
process	 which	 takes	 up	 time	 and	 is	 thus	 not	 a	 ‘current	 time-slice’	 phenomenon”	(2002,	p.	210,	emphasis	in	original).90	Accordingly,	we	might	broaden	the	time-slice	view	 into	 a	 ‘chunky’	 time-slice	 view,	 wide	 enough	 to	 incorporate	 whatever	 is	minimally	necessary	to	pick	out	the	relevant	actions,	intentions,	and	the	like.	Doing	this	would	not	seem	to	incidentally	incorporate	the	sorts	of	history	involved	in	the	tracing	and	bad-history	cases.	Then,	even	if	we	widen	the	time-slice	view	enough	to	accommodate	the	full	action,	we	might	not	include	enough	time	to	be	certain	that	it	is	an	agent	which	we	are	 holding	 responsible.	 Plausibly,	 to	 be	 an	 agent	 requires	 persistence.91	Perhaps	there	are	agential	 features,	 like	elements	of	personality,	which	must	endure	stably	(even	 if	 not	 perfectly)	 for	 there	 to	 be	 an	 agent	 at	 all,	 or	 perhaps	 being	 an	 agent	requires	 causal	 connections	 between	 how	 one	 was	 and	 how	 one	 is.	 A	 wholly	unstable	being	might	be	no	agent	at	all,	but	instead	a	series	of	instant	quasi-agents																																																									90	Fischer	 (2004)	 himself	 later	 divided	 theories	 of	 responsibility	 into	 time-slice,	interval,	and	deeply	historical	theories.	Recognizing	the	role	of	intervals	of	history	is	how	 I	 understand	 Vargas’s	 comment	 that	 “Some	 structural	 features	 of	 agency	(deliberation,	 for	one)	have	a	certain	amount	of	 temporal	extendedness”	 (2006,	p.	355).	91	This	seems	to	be	the	case	to	me,	though	the	literature	on	the	question	of	history	includes	a	number	of	instant	agents	whose	plausibility	might	seem	to	challenge	the	supposition.	
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or	 a	 single,	 radically	 unstable	 quasi-agent.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 the	 persistence	requirements	 of	 agency	 are	more	 demanding	 than	 the	 historical	 requirements	 of	actions,	intentions,	and	the	like.	If	so,	then	a	case	where	the	facts	were	sufficient	to	ground	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	as	well	as	an	action,	an	intention,	and	the	like	might	all	be	present,	but	because	of	history	even	further	back,	there	might	be	 no	 agent	 to	 hold	 responsible.92	This	 can	 make	 for	 a	 further,	 deeper	 role	 for	history.	But	here,	as	with	the	broadening	potentially	required	to	account	for	actions,	intentions,	 and	 the	 like,	 we	might	 allow	 that	 history	matters	 for	 establishing	 the	existence	 of	 the	 relevant	 agent	 without	 thereby	 implicating	 the	 sorts	 of	 history	involved	in	the	tracing	and	bad-history	cases.	While	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 time-slice	 account	 of	 what	 matters	 for	 moral	responsibility	might	provide	a	good-enough	rough	contrast	to	the	accounts	of	moral	responsibility	 for	which	 history	 plays	 an	 essential	 role,	 there	 are	 too	many	ways	history	might	 plausibly	matter	 for	 the	 time-slice	 notion	 to	 be	 any	more	 than	 that	rough	contrast.	 Instead,	 the	question	of	history	I	am	interested	 in	 is	picked	out	by	normative	concerns:	 	getting	blame	right,	addressing	concerns	about	determinism,	and	 identifying	 the	 right	 explanation	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacity.	 As	 Ishtiyaque	 Haji	 (a	 historicist)	 writes,	 we	 are	 asking	whether	“moral	responsibility’s	key	conditions	can[]	be	specified	 independently	of	facts	 about	 how	 the	 person	 acquired	 her	 responsibility-grounding	 [or	 voiding]	
																																																								92	Of	course,	it	might	be	that	a	certain	phenomenon	only	counts	as,	e.g.,	an	intention	if	 it	 is	predicated	of	 an	 agent.	 In	 such	a	 case,	 the	history	 required	 for	 there	be	 an	intention	would	be	at	least	as	broad	as	the	history	required	for	there	to	be	an	agent.	
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psychological	 elements”	 (2013,	 pp.	 185–186).	 With	 that	 in	 mind,	 the	 argument	should	 revolve	around	 the	 two	motivating	 sorts	of	 cases,	 the	 tracing	 case	 and	 the	bad-history	case.	Instances	of	both	cases	seem	to	generate	intuitions	which	gainsay	the	 ahistoricist,	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility.	Accordingly,	 the	 argument	 for	 historicism	 will	 be	 augmented	 if	 I	 show	 that	 our	intuitions	 in	those	cases	can	be	accommodated.	To	this	end,	 I	will	show	that	those	intuitions	can	comfortably	be	explained	as	the	product	of	the	shadows	history	casts	upon	 the	 present,	 as	 marking	 something	 other	 than	 responsibility	 and	blameworthiness	or	praiseworthiness,	or	as	reasonably	expectable	errors.		
3.2	 Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	taking-responsibility	account	Before	 turning	 to	 that	 task,	 I	 want	 to	 examine	 the	 taking-responsibility	element	 of	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility.	 The	 taking-responsibility	account	 is	 interesting	 in	 its	own	right,	but	 I	 consider	 it	here	also	 to	show	how	 a	 theory	 of	moral	 responsibility	might	 accommodate	 the	 interests	 that	often	motivate	 historicism	 (intuitions	 about	 certain	 kinds	 of	 cases	 but	 also	 other	concerns)	 without	 abandoning	 the	 ahistoricism	 of	 its	 central	 reasons-responsiveness	commitments.	For	Fischer	and	Ravizza,	reasons-responsiveness	contemporaneous	with	the	relevant	action	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	moral	responsibility.	Reasons-responsiveness	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 moral	 responsibility	 for	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	because	 they	 accept	 tracing	 (which	 I	 take	 up	 in	 the	 next	 chapter).	 Reasons-responsiveness	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	 moral	 responsibility	 for	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	
100	
	
because	 they	 contend	 that	 an	 agent	must	have	previously	 taken	 responsibility	 for	the	relevant	elements	of	her	moral	psychology.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	argue	 that	we	cannot	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 our	 behavior	 unless	 we	 have	 come	 to	 have	 two	important	 self-directed	 attitudes.	 To	 have	 the	 first	 attitude,	 which	 I	 will	 call	 the	causal	attitude,	the	agent	must	take	herself93	to	be	causally	efficacious.	To	have	the	second	attitude,	which	I	will	call	the	target	attitude,	the	agent	must	take	herself	to	be	a	proper	target	for	judgments	of	moral	responsibility.	For	Fischer	and	Ravizza,	the	mere	possession	of	these	two	attitudes	is	not	sufficient--the	agent	must	have	come	to	have	the	attitudes	in	the	right	sort	of	way;	this	is	part	of	the	historicism	in	their	account	of	moral	responsibility.	Begin	 with	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 second	 attitude,	 the	 target	 attitude.	 An	agent	has	the	target	attitude	when	the	agent	“accept[s]	that	he	is	a	fair	target	of	the	reactive	attitudes”	(1998,	p.	211).	Fischer	and	Ravizza	argue	that	we	might	expect	that	an	agent	who	possesses	the	target	attitude	will	respond	to	blame	by	offering	a	justifying	 or	 excusing	 explanation,	 by	 experiencing	 guilt,	 and	 the	 like.94	An	 agent	who	 lacks	 the	 target	 attitude,	 however,	 might	 fail	 to	 take	 up	 the	 import	 of	 the	reaction,	 ignoring,	 rebuking,	 or	 becoming	 confused	by	 the	 expression	 of	 praise	 or	blame.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 agent	 has	 no	 sense	 that	 blame	 or	 praise	 could	 be	appropriate	 for	 them,	 and	 so	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 say	 that	 sanction	 will	 be	ineffective	or	inappropriate	in	the	absence	of	this	belief.																																																										93	Here,	 again,	 I	 am	 eliding	 distinctions	 that	 occupy	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 in	 part	because	of	their	particular	concern	with	mechanisms	rather	than	agents.	94	That	 is,	 an	 agent	 who	 possesses	 the	 target	 attitude	 is	 expected	 to	 respond	 to	blame	in	the	dialectical	ways	explored	by	McKenna	(2012).	
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I	 deny	 that	 the	 possession	 of	 the	 target	 attitude	 is	 a	 condition	 of	 moral	responsibility.	 I	 grant	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 depend	 upon	 target	 uptake	 to	function	normally,	but	 this	does	not	mean	we	should	complicate	our	conditions	of	responsibility.	Because	consideration	of	the	target	attitude	should	not	lead	us	to	add	any	 complications	 to	 our	 theory	 of	 responsibility,	 consideration	 of	 the	 target	attitude	should	not	lead	us	to	add	any	historicist	complications.	First,	as	I	laid	out	in	Chapter	 One,	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 have	 roles	 other	 than	 communication	 to	 the	actor.	 Even	 if	 that	 communication	 role	 is	 frustrated	 in	 some	 particular	 case,	 the	attitudes	 might	 yet	 fulfill	 their	 other	 roles.	 Second,	 and	 relatedly,	 this	 concern	confuses	matters	 of	 internal	 and	 external	 justification.	 That	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	might	fail	in	some	particular	instance	to	fulfill	the	roles	that	can	support	the	external	justification	 of	 the	 practice	 does	 not	 entail	 that	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	 are	 not	internally	 justified	 in	 that	 instance.	 Third,	 this	 concern	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	appropriateness	of	expressing	the	attitudes,	but	 the	appropriateness	of	expressing	the	attitudes	is	not	the	same	as	the	responsibility	of	the	agent.	This	is	an	apparent	instance	of	the	commission	of	the	moralistic	fallacy,	confusing	appropriateness	with	fittingness.	We	should	take	seriously	the	receptive	characteristics	of	the	agents	we	blame,	 since	uptake	 is	 important.	But	 this	does	not	have	 to	do	with	 responsibility	itself.95	
																																																								95	David	Brink	has	pointed	out	to	me	another	potential	role	for	the	target	attitude,	a	causal	role.	It	might	be	that,	in	order	to	develop	reasons-responsiveness,	the	agent	must	have	the	target	attitude.	That	the	target	attitude	might	play	a	causal	role	along	these	 lines	 is	plausible	 (although	not	obvious).	However,	even	supposing	 it	 is	 true	that	the	target	attitude	does	play	such	a	causal	role,	we	do	not	need	to	complicate	
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The	 causal	 attitude,	 by	 contrast,	 seems	 to	 have	 more	 to	 do	 with	responsibility.	 To	 have	 the	 causal	 attitude	 picked	 out	 by	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza,	 the	agent	“must	see	himself	as	the	source	of	his	behavior…;	he	must	see	that	his	choices	and	actions	are	efficacious	 in	the	world”	(1998,	p.	210).	An	 individual	who	had	no	sense	 that	 his	 choices	 could	 have	 effects	 in	 the	 world	 would	 therefore	 lack	 the	proper	understanding	of	the	import	of	his	choices	required	for	moral	responsibility.	What	would	someone	look	like	who	lacked	the	causal	attitude?	Fischer	and	Ravizza	appeal	 to	 Daniel	 Dennett’s	 example	 of	 someone	 who,	 having	 jumped	 off	 of	 the	Golden	 Gate	 Bridge,	 wonders	whether	 having	 done	 so	was	 a	 good	 idea	 (Dennett,	1984,	p.	104).96	The	jumper’s	deliberations	can	(presumably)	have	no	effect	at	this	point--and	 so	 long	 as	 the	 jumper	 recognizes	 this,	 that	 recognition	 is	 the	abandonment	 of	 the	 causal	 attitude.97	According	 to	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza,	 an	 agent	who	 lacks	 the	 causal	 attitude	 is	 “essentially	 passive,	 buffeted	by	 forces	 that	 assail	him”	 (1998,	 p.	 221).	 They	 offer	 the	 example	 of	 a	 sailor	 in	 a	 storm	who	 does	 not	believe	his	rudder	is	functioning;	because	he	does	not	think	he	can	have	any	effect,	he	just	allows	the	winds	to	drive	him	on.	Although	an	agent	who	globally	lacked	the	
																																																																																																																																																																					the	theory	of	responsible.	That	would	be	an	instance	of	shadow-casting,	of	the	past	being	relevant	to	the	present	because	of	the	effects	of	the	past	upon	the	present.	96	I	register	my	discomfort	with	the	casual	treatment	of	suicide	and	with	labeling	the	case	 of	 a	 suicide	 a	 case	 of	 “local	 fatalism,”	 in	 Dennett’s	words.	 This	 sort	 of	 case--where	action	set	in	motion	can	no	longer	be	retracted--is	quite	ordinary,	and	casual	discussion	of	the	man’s	“future	destination”	(1984,	p.	104)	is	untoward.	97 	It	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 here	 between	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 jumper’s	deliberations	 are	 causally	 inefficacious	 and	 the	 jumper’s	 recognition	 of	 that	 fact.	Both	matters	are	plausibly	relevant	to	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	scheme,	but	here	they	are	concerned	with	the	recognition.	
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causal	attitude	would	scarcely	be	an	agent,	all	of	us	are	regularly	at	least	locally	like	the	sailor,	lacking	the	causal	attitude.98	But	accepting	that	the	causal	attitude	is	important	does	not	entail	accepting	a	historicist	account	of	moral	responsibility.	The	mere	possession	of	an	attitude	does	not	 seem	 to	 require	 any	 more	 history	 than	 the	 mere	 possession	 of	 the	 other	phenomena	which	make	up	an	action,	such	as	intentions.	So	we	could	accept	that	the	causal	attitude	is	required	but	 just	see	that	as	another	element	needed	in	the	time	slice.	 The	 historicism	of	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza’s	 taking-responsibility	 account	 is	 in	the	 third	 element,	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 agent	 come	 to	have	 the	 two	 requisite	attitudes	 in	 the	 right	 sort	 of	 way.	 I’ve	 argued	 that	 the	 time-slice	 versions	 of	 the	attitudes	 can	 serve	 the	 functional	 roles	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza	 identify.	Nonetheless,	Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 argue	 that	 the	 beliefs	 must	 be	 “based	 on	 …	 evidence	 in	 an	appropriate	 way”	 (1998,	 p.	 236).	 They	 describe	 “the	 long,	 complex,	 and	 difficult	process	of	moral	education”	(1998,	p.	208,	quotation	marks	omitted).	This	involves	things	like	reacting	to	children	with	faux	reactive	attitudes,	treating	them	as	if	they	are	responsible	agents	in	order	to	teach	them	what	it	is	to	be	a	responsible	person	
																																																								98	That	 locally	 lacking	 the	 causal	 attitude	 is	 so	widespread	 raises	 questions	 about	how	we	should	treat	people	who	are	themselves	responsible	for	lacking	the	causal	attitude.	 How	 should	 we	 regard,	 for	 instance,	 people	 who	 falsely	 think	 to	themselves,	 “What	a	horrible	 situation,	 and	 it’s	 a	 shame	 there’s	nothing	 that	 I	 can	do”--especially	if	we	think	that	they	should,	with	even	only	slight	reflection,	be	able	to	 see	 that	 there	 is	much	 that	 they	 could	 do?	 One	 tempting	 solution	might	 be	 to	impute	the	causal	attitude	to	such	agents	so	that	we	can	hold	them	responsible.	But,	to	anticipate	my	later	argument,	I	reject	this	sort	of	tracing	strategy	elsewhere,	and	so	I	reject	it	here	as	well.	
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and	to	accustom	them	to	thinking	in	such	terms.	As	Fischer	explains,	“a	child,	fairly	early	on,	realizes	that	when	he	chooses	to	punch	his	sister	and	he	moves	his	arm	in	such	 a	 way	 that	 his	 sister	 is	 hit,	 she	 cries	 as	 a	 result	 of	 his	 choices	 and	 bodily	movements”	 (2000,	 p.	 389).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	 invite	 children	 to	 see	 that	 our	reactions	(including	the	faux	reactions)	are	a	function	in	part	of	the	manifestation	of	their	 willpower,	 of	 their	 choices	 and	 actions.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 child	 comes	 to	 see	himself	 as	 a	 moral	 agent	 in	 the	 way	 putatively	 required	 for	 holding	 the	 child	responsible.	Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 brief	 account	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 role	 of	 the	 moral	education	 of	 children	 is	 not	 implausible,	 even	 if	 best	 seen	 as	 a	 placeholder	 for	 a	substantive	 study.	 It	 would	 not	 be	 surprising	 if	 our	 self-regarding	 beliefs	 were	largely	 a	 function	 of	 how	 we	 are	 raised,	 of	 how	 adults	 both	 purposefully	 and	incidentally	 induce	us	to	regard	ourselves	when	we	are	young;	 in	 fact,	 it	would	be	surprising	were	this	not	the	case.	Indeed,	it	is	likely	that	certain	sorts	of	upbringing	are	all	but	necessary	for	an	agent	to	have	these	attitudes.	Late-in-life	inculcation	of	these	 attitudes	 may	 be	 difficult	 or	 even	 psychologically	 impossible.	 Therefore,	 I	readily	accept	that	the	past	 is	causally	relevant	to	the	contemporary	possession	of	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	two	agential	attitudes.99	
																																																								99	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	the	taking-responsibility	scheme	is	uncontroversial	other	than	its	claim	to	essential	historicism.	In	particular,	the	scheme	is	tied	closely	to	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 arguments	 about	 mechanisms	 and	 mechanism	individuation,	 and	 those	 are	 controversial	 claims.	 See,	 for	 instance,	 Seth	 Shabo	(2005).	 And	 there	 are	 worries	 about	 whether	 an	 agent	 could	 intentionally	 avoid	culpability	by	abandoning	either	of	the	beliefs.	See,	for	instance,	Neal	Judisch	(2005).	
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Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 see	 a	 thicker	 role	 for	 their	 third	 requirement	 than	 a	causal	 or	 evidential	 role.	 They	 appeal	 to	 reliabilist	 standards	 of	 epistemic	justification,	 insisting	 that	 the	 third	 element	 is	 an	 important,	 independent	element.100	But	 the	 dialectical	 justification	 of	 the	 third	 requirement	 is	 the	 need	 to	address	 bad-history	 cases.101 	Accordingly,	 given	 that	 we	 can	 satisfy	 all	 of	 the	functional	 desiderata	 of	 the	 taking-responsibility	 account	 without	 introducing	 a	historicist	 element	 to	 the	 theory	of	 responsibility,	we	 should	admit	 this	particular	historicist	element	only	 if	we	 lack	alternative,	ahistorical	explanations	of	 the	cases	which	challenge	historicism.	I	now	turn	to	that	challenge.			
																																																								100	As	Haji	(2000)	points	out,	there	are	suitable	internalist	epistemic	standards.	See	David	Zimmerman	(2002)	for	similar	concerns.	101 	Fischer	 (2004,	 2014)	 argues	 that	 we	 need	 the	 third	 element	 to	 avoid	manipulation	of	the	two	attitudes.	See	Eleanor	Stump	(2002)	for	a	statement	of	the	sort	 of	 manipulation-of-taking-responsibility	 concern	 Fischer	 is	 addressing.	 The	manipulation	 of	 taking	 responsibility	 might	 seem	 more	 worrisome	 than	 the	manipulation	 of	 the	 other	 components	 of	 an	 agent’s	 practical	 psychology.	 If	 these	two	 attitudes	 escape	 manipulation,	 then	 even	 if	 other	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	practical	 psychology	 are	 the	 product	 of	 manipulation,	 the	 agent	 would	 have	appropriately	considered	the	 features	and	 incorporated	 them	into	her	psychology.	It’s	not	 clear	 that	 this	 is	 enough	 to	avoid	manipulation	concerns,	but	 since	 I	 think	those	 concerns	 are	 adequately	 addressed	without	 the	 complication	 of	 the	 taking-responsibility	scheme,	I	set	aside	this	concern.	
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Chapter	4	 Resisting	tracing’s	siren	song	
It	 is	 an	 unfortunately	 familiar	 fact	 that	 intoxication	 can	 lead	 people	 to	 act	improperly,	 even	 criminally.	 Consider	 Elie	 Joseph	 Arsenault. 102 	In	 June	 1954,	Arsenault	 shot	and	killed	Harriet	Hinckley,	his	drinking	partner	and	 intimate.	The	murder	 occurred	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 days-long	 drinking	 binge,	 after	 Arsenault	 and	Hinckley	 had	 shared	 11	 pints	 of	 liquor	 accompanied	 by	 barbiturates.	 Arsenault	remembered	little--not	shooting	Hinckley,	not	telephoning	the	police,	not	confessing	to	the	crime.	Incapacitated	 wrongdoers	 like	 Arsenault	 pose	 a	 problem	 for	 reasons-responsiveness	accounts	of	moral	responsibility.	Those	accounts	are	powerful	and	popular--it	 seems	 right	 that	moral	 responsibility	 depends	 upon	 an	 agent’s	 having	the	 capacities	 to	 perceive	 and	 act	 upon	 moral	 reasons.	 But,	 while	 Arsenault’s	intoxication	likely	incapacitated	him	at	the	time	of	his	crime,	surely	he	should	not	be	excused	from	blame.	In	order	to	address	such	cases,	many	reasons-responsiveness	advocates	 include	 a	 tracing	 condition	 to	 supplement	 the	 ordinary	 conditions	 of	responsibility.	The	intoxicated	wrongdoer	is	blameworthy	despite	his	incapacitation	precisely	 because	 he	 is	 responsible	 for	 becoming	 incapacitated.	 We	 hold	 him	responsible	for	his	intoxicated	wrongdoing	by	tracing	back	to	his	responsibility	for	becoming	intoxicated.	Arsenault	was	responsible	for	becoming	intoxicated,	and	his	responsibility	 for	 the	 later	murder	 of	 Hinckley	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 that	 earlier	responsibility.																																																									102	State	v.	Arsenault,	152	Me.	121,	124	A.2d	741	(Maine	1956).	
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But	not	everyone	has	accepted	 tracing.	One	challenge	notes	 that	we	do	not	need	 tracing	 to	 blame	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agents.	 We	 can	 hold	 these	 agents	accountable	 for	 their	 behavior	 in	 becoming	 incapacitated	 and	 for	 the	 foreseeable	consequences	 of	 that	 behavior,	 and	we	 can	 do	 so	without	 taking	 on	 the	 apparent	costs	of	tracing.	I	go	further--I	claim	that	tracing	gets	things	wrong.	To	show	this,	I	consider	a	different	sort	of	case:	the	Odysseus	case.	Odysseus	incapacitated	himself	in	 order	 to	 sail	 safely	 past	 the	 Sirens.	 Arsenault’s	 incapacity	 was	 improper;	Odysseus’	was	not.	But	things	might	have	worked	out	poorly	for	Odysseus;	he	might	have	 committed	 some	wrongdoing	while	 incapacitated.	 If	 so,	 then	my	 intuition	 is	that	 Odysseus	would	 have	 been	 unlucky	 but	 not	 blameworthy.	 The	 core	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 agrees,	 but	 tracing	 accounts	 expose	 unlucky	 Odysseus	agents	to	blame.	Since	reasons-responsiveness	responsibility	appears	to	get	us	what	we	want	(as	urged	by	the	first	challenge)	and	tracing	gets	us	verdicts	that	we	do	not	want	(as	shown	by	my	new	challenge),	we	should	reject	tracing.	
4.1	 Ordinary	responsibility	and	the	motivation	for	tracing	Tracing	is	often	offered	as	a	supplement	to	reasons-responsiveness	accounts	of	 moral	 responsibility.	 Many	 reasons-responsiveness	 theorists	 deny	 that	 moral	responsibility	 can	 be	 an	 ahistorical	 evaluation	 because	 they	 see	 tracing	 as	 a	necessary	 element	 of	 any	 plausible	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility.	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza,	 for	 instance,	consider	Max,	a	drunk	driver.	Max	drinks	so	much	that	he	 is	“almost	 oblivious	 to	 his	 surroundings”	 (1998,	 p.	 49).	 Intoxicated,	 he	 attempts	 to	drive	 home	 and,	 unfortunately,	 strikes	 and	 kills	 a	 child	 in	 a	 crosswalk.	 By	
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assumption,	 Max’s	 intoxication	 left	 him	 non-reasons-responsive,	 both	 when	 he	decided	 to	 drive	 and	when	 he	 struck	 and	 killed	 the	 child.	 This	 suggests	 that	Max	might	be	excused	under	the	ordinary-responsibility	account’s	ahistorical	analysis	of	responsibility.	Nonetheless,	intuitively,	he	is	to	blame.	Cases	like	Max’s	suggest	that	ordinary	responsibility	is	explanatorily	inadequate.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	explain	that	drunk	drivers	 like	Max	are	responsible	 for	their	 intoxicated	 behavior	 because	 they	 are	 responsible	 for	 becoming	 intoxicated.	Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 hold	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agents	 responsible	 for	 their	culpably	 incapacitated	 wrongdoing	 by	 tracing	 responsibility	 for	 the	 wrongdoing	back	 to	 responsibility	 for	 the	 prior	 behavior	 that	 led	 to	 the	 incapacity.	 As	 they	explain:	When	one	acts	from	a	reasons-responsive	mechanism	at	time	T1,	and	one	can	reasonably	be	expected	to	know	that	so	acting	will	(or	may)	lead	to	acting	from	an	unresponsive	mechanism	at	some	later	time	T2,	one	can	be	held	responsible	for	so	acting	at	T2.	(1998,	p.	50)		Tracing	allows	us	to	hold	an	incapacitated	agent	responsible	for	her	wrongdoing	so	long	 as	 there	 was	 some	 prior	 moment	 when	 the	 agent	 could	 act	 to	 avoid	 her	incapacitation	 and	 could	 reasonably	 foresee	 her	 subsequent	 incapacity	 and	wrongdoing.	 I	 will	 call	 the	 account	 of	 reasons-responsiveness	 responsibility	supplemented	 by	 tracing	 “the	 tracing	 account,”	 noting	 that	 the	 tracing	 account	includes	both	traced	responsibility	and	ordinary	responsibility.	The	 tracing	 account	 offers	 to	 address	 the	 explanatory	 inadequacy	 that	appeared	to	threaten	ordinary	responsibility.	Return	to	Max,	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	drunk	driver.	By	hypothesis,	Max	was	not	incapacitated	at	the	time	he	was	drinking,	
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and	he	could	reasonably	have	been	expected	to	know	that	drinking	to	excess	could	lead	 him	 to	 act	 wrongly	 while	 incapacitated.103	When	 he	 did	 later	 drive	 while	intoxicated	 to	 the	point	of	 incapacity,	we	ground	responsibility	 for	 the	 intoxicated	driving	by	tracing	back	to	his	responsibility	for	drinking	to	the	point	of	intoxication.	In	addition	 to	appearing	 to	explain	our	 intuitions	about	culpable-incapacity	cases,	tracing	tracks	the	way	courts	have	regarded	intoxication	as	a	defense.104	The	Model	 Penal	 Code,	 prepared	 as	 an	 advisory	 guide	 for	 legislatures	 and	 courts,	provides	 an	 affirmative	 defense	 to	 defendants	 whose	 intoxication	 interferes	 with	their	 cognitive	 or	 volitional	 normative	 capacities,	 but	 it	 allows	 this	 defense	 only	when	 the	 intoxication	 was	 not	 self-induced.105 	Applying	 similar	 reasoning,	 the	Supreme	 Court	 of	Minnesota	 addressed	 the	 responsibility	 of	 a	 hit-and-run	 driver																																																									103	In	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 mechanism-specific	 terminology,	 we	 would	 say	 that	Max’s	drinking	was	the	product	of	a	reasons-responsive	psychological	mechanism.	104	The	 claim	 that	moral	 responsibility	 and	 criminal	 responsibility	 are	 related	 is	 a	substantive	and	potentially	controversial	but	widely	accepted	claim.	I	accept	but	do	not	here	defend	the	view	that	moral	responsibility	is	a	normative	condition	on	the	appropriate	 finding	 of	 criminal	 responsibility.	 Moreover,	 as	 George	 Vuoso	writes,	“Whatever	 one’s	 position	 on	 whether	 moral	 and	 legal	 responsibility	 are	 logically	related,	 it	 is	 a	 plain	 fact	 that	 in	 practice	 our	 criminal	 law	 is	 such	 that	 people	 are	generally	 held	 criminally	 responsible	 only	when	 they	would	 also	 be	 held	morally	responsible”	(1987,	p.	1663).	105	Section	 2.08(4).	We	 should	 distinguish	 two	 sorts	 of	 defenses	 available	 at	 law:	elemental	 defenses	 and	 affirmative	 defenses.	 An	 elemental	 defense	 contends	 that	one	of	the	crime’s	constitutive	elements	is	missing;	it	denies	that	the	defendant	has	committed	the	crime.	An	affirmative	defense,	by	contrast,	does	not	dispute	that	the	crime	was	committed,	but	 it	denies	that	the	defendant	should	be	held	accountable	for	the	crime.	It	is	not	controversial	that	intoxication,	self-induced	or	otherwise,	can	ground	an	elemental	defense.	Consider	burglary:	A	defendant	commits	burglary	by	breaking	 into	 a	 building	 with	 the	 intent	 to	 commit	 some	 further	 crime.	 If	 a	defendant	 is	so	 intoxicated	that	he	cannot	form	the	intent	to	commit	some	further	crime,	then	no	burglary	has	been	committed	(though	the	defendant	may	be	guilty	of	trespass).	However,	the	tracing	question	arises	when	we	consider	the	conditions	of	responsibility,	and	denials	of	responsibility	constitute	affirmative	defenses.	
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who	claimed	to	have	been	unwittingly	incapacitated	by	his	prescribed	medicine.106	The	court	ruled	that	the	medicated	defendant	could	be	excused	from	responsibility	if	 two	 conditions	 had	been	met:	 (a)	 the	medication	 caused	him	 to	 be	 temporarily	insane	and	 (b)	he	neither	had	known	nor	had	good	 reason	 to	know	 that	 it	would	have	this	effect.	If,	that	is,	the	medication’s	effect	had	caught	the	defendant	unaware,	then	 his	 incapacity	 would	 be	 considered	 involuntary,	 and	 the	 medication	 could	ground	an	affirmative	defense.	But	 if	 the	defendant	had	been	aware	of	 the	 risk	of	intoxication	 and	 so	 been	 responsible	 for	 becoming	 incapacitated,	 then	 the	medication’s	effect	would	provide	no	defense.	We	 might	 worry	 about	 the	 reasonable-expectation	 element	 of	 the	 tracing	scheme.	 Tracing’s	 extension	 of	 responsibility	 is	 usually	 constrained	 by	foreseeability.	We	see	this	in	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	tracing	scheme,	for	instance.	As	Vargas	 (2005b)	 objects,	 this	 constraint	 robs	 tracing	 of	 much	 of	 its	 explanatory	promise,	since	many	of	 the	cases	 in	which	tracing	might	seem	to	help	are	cases	 in	which	the	 later	wrongdoing	was	not	 foreseeable	at	 the	time	the	agent	constrained	her	 own	 agency.	 For	 instance,	 Vargas	 describes	 a	 manager	 who,	 as	 a	 teenager,	purposefully	 inculcates	 a	 cool	 but	 jerky	 persona,	 and	 later,	 acting	 on	 the	 jerky	persona,	unreflectively	mistreats	a	number	of	employees.	Vargas	denies	that	we	can	appeal	 to	 tracing	 to	 hold	 the	 manager	 responsible	 because	 he	 denies	 that	 the	mistreatment	was	foreseeable	when	the	manager	was	a	teenager.	
																																																								106	State	v.	Altimus,	306	Minn.	462,	238	N.W.2d	851	(Minn.	1976).	
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What	 about	 the	 more	 standard	 tracing	 cases?	 Is	 vehicular	 homicide	 a	foreseeable	 risk	 of	 social	 drinking?	 Fischer	 and	 Tognazzini	 write	 that	 “Drunk-driving	 cases	 are	 unproblematic	 precisely	 because	 everyone	 knows	 (or	 at	 least	
should	know)	that	too	much	alcohol	will	impair	the	ability	to	drive	a	car”	(2009,	p.	532).	But	it	being	foreseeable	that	the	agent	might	become	too	intoxicated	to	drive	safely	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 it	 being	 foreseeable	 that	 the	 agent	 might	 nonetheless	attempt	 to	 drive.	 Fischer	 and	 Tognazzini	 further	 explain	 that	 the	 foreseeability	constraint	does	not	require	that	you	know	what	your	wrongdoing	will	be	“in	all	its	florid	particularity,”	and	so	 I	here	grant	 tracing	advocates	 the	assumption	that	 the	agent’s	later,	untoward	behavior	was	foreseeable	at	the	earlier	time,	at	least	in	the	central	culpable-incapacity	cases	that	motivate	the	addition	of	tracing.107	We	 also	 should	 be	 careful	 about	 the	 cases	we	 are	 considering.	 Fischer	 and	Ravizza’s	Max	is	supposed	to	be	wholly	incapacitated,	rendered	functionally	insane.	However,	many	of	 the	culpably	 incapacitated	agents	we	actually	confront	are	only	partially	 incapacitated.	As	Douglas	Husak	(2012)	explains,	 the	capacities	to	reason	will	 often	 be	 impaired	 by	 intoxication	 but	 rarely	 destroyed.	 If	 the	 typical	 drunk																																																									107	This	 debate	 continues	 in	 the	 literature.	 Fischer	 and	 Tognazzini	 (2011b)	 have	since	offered	a	revised	version	of	their	2009	paper,	again	contending	that,	for	each	of	Vargas’s	cases,	either	the	agent	could	have	foreseen	the	wrongdoing	in	the	right	sort	of	way	or	the	agent	should	not	be	held	responsible.	Kevin	Timpe	(2011)	makes	a	 similar	 argument,	 claiming	 that	we	 can	defuse	Vargas’s	 cases	 by	 getting	 a	more	precise	 grasp	 on	 the	 epistemic	 condition	 of	 responsibility.	 Shabo	 (2015)	 has	recently	 offered	 a	 further	 argument	 in	 this	 thread,	 pointing	 to	 cases	 in	 which	responsibility	 seems	 to	outpace	 foreseeability.	 If	 tracing	 requires	 foreseeability	 as	Fischer	and	Ravizza	suggest,	then	the	cases	offered	by	Vargas	and	Shabo	should	give	us	 concern	 about	 just	 how	 much	 explanatory	 power	 tracing	 can	 offer.	 However,	because	 the	 Odysseus	 cases	 provide	 independent	 grounds	 for	 rejecting	 tracing,	 I	leave	the	foreseeability	worries	aside.	
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driver	is	only	partially	incapacitated,	then	the	typical	drunk	driver	remains	partially	reasons-responsive.	 And	 because	 drunk	 drivers	 are	 often	 partially	 reasons-responsive	 at	 the	 time	 they	 drive	 drunk,	 they	 are	 partially	 responsible	 for	 their	drunk	 driving	 as	 wrongdoing	 even	 without	 tracing.	 If	 we	 are	 not	 careful,	 our	intuitions	about	the	rare	fully	incapacitated	drunk	driver	could	be	influenced	by	our	experiences	with	much	more	 common	partially	 incapacitated	drunk	drivers.	 But	 I	will	assume	due	care	in	this	regard.	Tracing	 skeptics	 like	Matt	 King	 (2014),	 Andrew	 Khoury	 (2012),	 and	 Larry	Alexander	 (2013)	 argue	 that	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account	 can	 account	 for	cases	 such	 as	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 drunk	 driver	 even	 without	 tracing.	 As	 King	explains,	becoming	intoxicated	to	the	point	of	incapacity	creates	risk,	and	often	that	risk	 is	 unwarranted.	 When	 an	 agent	 creates	 an	 unwarranted	 risk,	 the	 agent	 is	reckless	if	he	is	aware	of	the	risk,	and	he	is	negligent	if	he	is	not	aware	of	the	risk	but	should	 be.	 It	 is	 a	 familiar	 feature	 of	 ordinary	 responsibility	 that	 we	 hold	 agents	responsible	 for	 their	 reckless	 or	 negligent	 conduct	 and	 for	 the	 foreseeable	consequences	of	that	conduct,	and	so	we	can	hold	the	culpably	incapacitated	agents	responsible	 for	 their	 reckless	 or	 negligent	 conduct	 in	 becoming	 incapacitated	 as	well	as	for	the	foreseeable	consequences	of	their	recklessness	or	negligence.	We	can	hold	 drunk	 drivers	 responsible	 for	 acting	 improperly	 and	 for	 the	 foreseeable	
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consequences	 of	 that	 improper	 action	 without	 needing	 tracing,	 and	 so	 ordinary	responsibility	can	avoid	the	explanatory-inadequacy	worry.108	But	 tracing’s	 advocates	 have	 insisted	 that	 ordinary	 responsibility	 is	 not	sufficient.	 Timpe	 contends	 that	 “it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 ...	 how	 one	 could	 account	 for	 a	drunk	 driver’s	 being	 responsible	 for	 running	 over	 a	 pedestrian	without	 a	 tracing	clause”	 (2011,	 p.	 12).	 According	 to	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza,	 tracing	 is	 a	 “refinement”	developed	 to	 address	 a	 “problem”	 for	 their	 reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 of	responsibility	 (1998,	 p.	 49).	And	Fischer	 later	writes	with	Tognazzini	 that	 tracing	was	 a	 “component	 [that]	 must	 be	 added	 to	 get	 a	 plausible	 theory	 of	 moral	responsibility”	(2009,	p.	532	emphasis	added).	Tracing’s	advocates	see	tracing	as	a	necessary	addition	to	the	theory	of	responsibility.	Merely	being	responsible	for	the	foreseeable	consequences	of	some	prior	action	is	not	sufficient.	
																																																								108	King	 also	 suggests	 that	 tracing	 brings	 complications	we	 can	 avoid	 if	 we	 reject	tracing,	 citing	 McKenna	 (2008b),	 George	 Sher	 (2009),	 Angela	 Smith	 (2008),	 and	Vargas	 (2005b).	 If	 foreseeability	 constrains	 responsibility,	 how	plausible	 is	 it	 that	the	ultimate	wrongdoing	is	foreseeable	before	the	agent	has	become	incompetent	in	the	tracing	cases?	And	what	about	tracing	cases	in	which	the	agent	has	incapacitated	himself	 thoughtlessly?	 Is	 it	 reasonable	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	 accountable	 for	 that	oversight	even	if	the	agent	was	never	cognizant	of	the	possibility	of	precaution?	But	concerns	 like	 these	 cannot	 tell	 against	 tracing.	 At	 best,	 they	 serve	 to	 delimit	 the	scope	 of	 tracing	 to	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 ultimate	 wrongdoing	 was	 foreseeable	 or	perhaps	even	foreseen	at	the	time	the	agent	acted	to	incapacitate	himself	or	failed	to	prevent	his	incapacitation.	We	might	think	that	at	least	some	cases	of	agents	such	as	Max	and	Arsenault	are	like	this.	Further,	that	the	tracing	account	must	address	these	sorts	of	concerns	does	not	give	the	ordinary-responsibility	account	any	advantage,	since	 that	 account	 must	 address	 the	 same	 sorts	 of	 concerns.	 Foreseeability	 and	control	matter	for	the	ordinary-responsibility	account’s	notion	of	responsibility	for	consequences.	 Responsibility	 for	 consequences	 is	 how	 King	 hopes	 to	 explain	 the	responsibility	of	the	culpably	incapacitated	actor,	and	so	rejecting	tracing	does	not	sidestep	 these	problems,	which	 are	 really	 questions	 for	 accounts	 of	 responsibility	more	broadly.	The	skeptics’	better	argument	is	the	explanatory-adequacy	argument.	
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To	defend	this	position,	the	tracing	advocate	needs	to	show	both	that	tracing	makes	a	difference	and	that	we	should	want	our	theory	of	responsibility	to	include	that	 difference.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 chapter,	 however,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 tracing’s	advocates	cannot	achieve	both	of	these	goals.	On	the	most	plausible	understanding	of	the	sort	of	difference	tracing	might	make,	it	is	a	difference	we	should	reject.	
4.2	 Tracing	and	the	Odysseus	cases	4.2.1	 The	difference	tracing	can	make	The	tracing	advocate	needs	to	identify	a	substantive	difference	between	the	tracing	 account	 and	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account.	 Start	 by	 considering	 the	formal	 differences.	We	 can	 identify	 (at	 least)	 two	 sorts	 of	 responsibility	 that	 are	formally	 distinguished	 by	 their	 objects--action	 responsibility	 and	 consequence	responsibility--though	 this	 does	 not	 yet	 require	 that	 there	 be	 any	 substantive	difference	tracking	this	formal	difference.	The	ordinary-responsibility	account	holds	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	responsible	for	the	original	incapacitating	act	A1	as	a	bit	of	action109	and	for	the	culpably	incapacitated	act	A2	and	any	further	harms	(H)	as	consequences	of	the	original	incapacitating	act:		 	 Ordinary	Responsibility:	 𝐴 𝐴! + 𝐶!!{𝐴!,𝐻}	The	tracing	account	adds	to	ordinary	responsibility	that	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	is	also	responsible	for	the	incapacitated	action	by	virtue	of	tracing:		 	 Tracing	Responsibility:	 𝐴 𝐴! + 𝐶!! 𝐴!,𝐻 + 𝑇{𝐴!}	
																																																								109	I	set	aside	any	distinction	between	actions	and	omissions	here,	recognizing	that	responsibility	 for	 omissions	 presents	 a	 rich	 set	 of	 questions.	 The	 important	distinction	for	considering	tracing	is	that	between	actions	and	consequences.	
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But	 we	 should	 remember	 that	 the	 tracing	 account’s	 extension	 of	 tracing	responsibility	 is	 supposed	 to	 supplement	 ordinary	 responsibility’s	 account	 of	responsibility	 for	 action.	 That	 means	 that	 tracing	 allows	 us	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	responsible	 for	both	 the	original	and	the	 later	actions	qua	actions,	both	with	 their	concomitant	consequences:		 	 Tracing	Responsibility:	 𝐴 𝐴! + 𝐶!! 𝐴!,𝐻 + 𝐴 𝐴! + 𝐶!!{𝐻}	We	can	 see	 that	 there	are	 two	 formal	differences	between	ordinary	 responsibility	and	 tracing	 responsibility:	 (a)	 tracing	 duplicates	 some	 of	 the	 ordinary	responsibility’s	 objects	 of	 responsibility,	 since	 A2	 and	 H	 each	 appear	 twice	 in	tracing’s	 accounting	 of	 responsibility,	 and	 (b)	tracing,	 but	 not	 ordinary	responsibility,	 allows	 us	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	 responsible	 for	 A2,	 the	 culpably	incapacitated	action,	as	an	action	instead	of	only	as	a	consequence.	Does	 the	 duplication	 matter? 110 	It	 is	 hard	 to	 decide	 this	 without	 first	determining	 whether	 we	 are	 right	 to	 want	 tracing.	 Suppose	 that	 the	 duplication	leads	to	increased	blame.	If	tracing’s	duplication	leads	to	excessive	blame,	then	that	tells	 against	 tracing,	 and	 if	 tracing’s	 imposition	 of	 culpability	 appears	 to	 be	 an	instance	 of	 double	 jeopardy,	 so	much	 the	 worse	 for	 tracing.	 But	 if	 it	 is	 true	 that	tracing	 is	 an	 appropriate	 addition	 to	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 scheme,	 then	
																																																								110	David	Brink	and	an	anonymous	referee	have	both	pressed	me	on	this	duplication.	Here	we	 see	 the	 problem	 that	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 faces	 throughout.	 The	 tracing	advocate	needs	to	find	a	substantive	difference	between	ordinary	responsibility	and	tracing	 that	 is	 worth	 having.	 The	 duplication	 presents	 an	 apparent	 substantive	difference.	If	the	tracing	advocate	finds	some	way	to	avoid	the	duplication,	then	the	tracing	advocate	faces	renewed	pressure	to	find	some	alternative	way	to	distinguish	the	tracing	account	from	the	ordinary-responsibility	account.	
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tracing’s	 duplication	 leads	 to	 the	 right	 degree	 of	 blame	 in	 the	 culpable-incapacity	cases,	and	it	is	ordinary	responsibility	that	has	got	things	wrong,	letting	the	culpably	incapacitated	agents	off	too	leniently.	And	even	this	line	of	thinking	takes	as	a	given	that	 the	 elements	 appearing	 twice	 heightens	 the	 degree	 of	 blame	warranted,	 but	that	is	an	open,	substantive	question.	So	the	mere	fact	of	formal	duplication	does	not	tell	against	tracing.		My	 argument	 focuses	 instead	 on	 the	 second	 formal	 difference.	 Unlike	ordinary	 responsibility,	 tracing	 allows	 us	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	 responsible	 for	 the	culpably	incapacitated	action	both	as	a	consequence	of	the	incapacitating	action	and	as	 an	 action	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 But	 this	 formal	 difference	matters	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	concomitant	substantive	difference	between	action	responsibility	and	consequence	responsibility.	 It	 is	 nearly	 axiomatic	 that	 being	 responsible	 for	 doing	 wrong	 can	make	an	otherwise	blameless	person	blameworthy.	It	can	be	appropriate	to	resent	someone	who	has	done	wrong	on	 the	basis	of	 that	wrongdoing,	 even	 if	 they	have	otherwise	 acted	 appropriately,	 and	 it	 can	 be	 appropriate	 to	 punish	 someone	who	has	done	wrong	on	the	basis	of	that	wrongdoing,	even	if	they	have	otherwise	acted	appropriately.111	This	 exposure	 to	 blame	 is	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 accountable	 for	 a	wrongful	action.	
																																																								111	Actually,	in	both	cases,	it	would	be	more	accurate	to	say	that	we	have	something	like	a	prima	facie	reason	to	resent	or	to	punish,	not	an	all-things-considered	reason.	For	 example,	 there	 might	 be	 reasons	 against	 resenting	 or	 punishing	 the	blameworthy	agent--perhaps	the	costs	of	resentment	and	punishment	or	the	harms	that	 might	 befall	 third	 parties--which	 make	 it	 the	 case	 that,	 while	 there	 is	 some	reason	to	resent	or	to	punish,	all	things	considered	it	would	be	best	not	to.	I	set	that	difference	aside	here.	
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What	about	consequence	responsibility?	It	seems	uncontroversial	that	being	responsible	for	a	bad	consequence	matters.	It	can	obligate	an	agent	to	make	repair,	and	 it	 can	make	 it	 appropriate	 for	 an	 agent	 to	 feel	 a	 special	 sort	 of	 regret.	 Being	responsible	for	a	bad	consequence	can	also	matter	for	an	agent’s	blameworthiness,	though	 this	 is	 more	 controversial.112	It	 can	 increase	 the	 degree	 of	 an	 otherwise-blameworthy	 agent’s	 blameworthiness,	 and	 it	 can	 change	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 agent’s	blameworthiness.	However,	being	responsible	for	a	bad	consequence	cannot	render	an	 otherwise	 blameless	 person	 blameworthy.	 It	would	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 resent	someone	 who	 has	 done	 nothing	 wrong,	 even	 if	 they	 have	 caused	 harm.	 That	 is,	responsibility	for	consequences	can	affect	the	degree	or	scope	of	blameworthiness,	but	 it	 cannot	by	 itself	 affect	 the	 fact	 of	blameworthiness.	Only	 responsibility	 for	 a	wrongdoing	as	an	action	can	affect	the	fact	of	blameworthiness.	Consider	 a	 surgeon	 who	 performs	 a	 risky	 but	 appropriate	 surgery.	 All	surgeries	carry	the	risk	that	something	will	go	wrong,	even	if	the	surgeon	takes	all	appropriate	precautions	and	makes	no	mistakes.	Sometimes	things	just	do	not	work	out.	 Imagine	 a	 surgeon	 who	 performs	 a	 consented-to,	 warranted	 surgery	competently,	 and	 yet	 the	 surgery	 results	 in	 disaster	 for	 the	 patient,	 even	 the																																																									112	Responsibility	for	bad	consequences	can	matter	for	blameworthiness	even	if	we	reject	 resultant	 moral	 luck.	 As	 Michael	 Zimmerman	 (2002)	 explains,	 rejecting	resultant	moral	 luck	 does	 not	mean	 that	 consequences	 become	wholly	 irrelevant.	Even	 if	 we	 set	 aside	 any	 possible	 import	 for	 blame,	 being	 responsible	 for	consequences	can	have	other	normative	import.	Moreover,	rejecting	resultant	moral	luck	 is	 controversial,	 and	many	 reasons-responsiveness	 theorists	 accept	 resultant	moral	 luck.	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza,	 for	 instance,	 have	 an	 extended	 treatment	 of	 the	conditions	of	responsibility	for	consequences.	And	it	is	common	to	see	the	criminal	law	 as	 accepting	 resultant	 moral	 luck,	 punishing	 completed	 crimes	more	 harshly	than	merely	attempted	crimes.	
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patient’s	 death.	 The	 death	 was	 a	 foreseeable	 result	 of	 the	 surgeon’s	 behavior	 in	performing	 the	 surgery,	 and	 the	 surgeon	 was	 responsible	 for	 her	 behavior	 in	performing	the	surgery.	So,	in	some	sense,	the	surgeon	might	be	responsible	for	the	patient’s	 death.	 However,	 the	 surgeon	 is	 not	 responsible	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 moral	responsibility	 I	 am	 centrally	 concerned	 with;	 intuitively,	 the	 surgeon	 is	 not	blameworthy	for	the	patient’s	death.	It	would	be	appropriate	for	the	surgeon	to	feel	a	special	sort	of	regret	 for	being	involved	with	the	patient’s	death,	and	it	might	be	appropriate	 for	 the	 surgeon	 to	 make	 some	 effort	 at	 repair	 or	 amends,	 perhaps	toward	 the	 patient’s	 family.	 But	 it	 would	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 blame,	 resent,	 or	punish	 the	 surgeon.	 By	 contrast,	 consider	 a	 surgeon	 who	 performs	 a	 risky	 and	inappropriate	 surgery.	 Luckily,	 the	 surgery	 is	 a	 success.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 seems	appropriate	 for	 us	 to	 blame	 the	 surgeon.	 It	 is	wrong	 to	perform	an	 inappropriate	surgery.	Being	responsible	for	the	wrongdoing	is	sufficient	to	expose	the	surgeon	to	blame,	even	if	there	are	no	further	harms.113	To	 reprise,	 one	 formal	 difference	 between	 tracing	 responsibility	 and	ordinary	responsibility	 is	 that	tracing	responsibility	allows	us	to	hold	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	responsible	for	the	culpably	incapacitated	wrongdoing	both	as	a	consequence	 and	 as	 an	 action,	 whereas	 ordinary	 responsibility	 only	 allows	 us	 to	hold	 the	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agent	 responsible	 for	 the	 culpably	 incapacitated																																																									113	David	Brink	and	Sam	Rickless	have	pressed	me	to	think	more	about	the	role	of	consent	 in	 these	 surgery	 cases.	 Consent	 seems	 important	 to	 the	 permissibility	 of	performing	surgery,	but	 it	does	not	 seem	to	me	 to	do	all	of	 the	normative	work.	 I	expect	 the	 surgeon	 to	 exercise	 her	 own	 judgment	 regarding	 the	 propriety	 of	 the	surgery,	 independent	 of	 the	 patient’s	 evaluation.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 complicated	matter,	worthy	of	further	consideration.	
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wrongdoing	as	a	consequence.	But	to	meaningfully	distinguish	the	two	accounts,	we	need	to	identify	a	substantive	difference	tracking	that	formal	difference.	Since	action	responsibility	 can	 ground	blameworthiness	 for	 otherwise	 innocent	 agents,	 tracing	(but	 not	 ordinary	 responsibility)	 makes	 foreseeable	 incapacitated	 behavior	sufficient	 to	 hold	 an	 otherwise	 blameless	 agent	 blameworthy.	 This	 creates	 the	possibility	of	an	extensional	difference	between	ordinary	responsibility	and	tracing	responsibility.		4.2.2	 Tracing	gets	things	wrong	Recall	Odysseus’	 encounter	with	 the	Sirens.	Odysseus	and	his	men	were	 to	sail	past	the	Sirens	on	their	return	to	Ithaca.	Circe	had	warned	Odysseus	that	anyone	hearing	 the	 Sirens’	 song	would	 be	maddened	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 stay,	 never	 to	 return	home.	 Odysseus	 had	 his	men	 stuff	 their	 ears	with	wax.	 But	 Odysseus,	wanting	 to	hear	 the	 Sirens’	 song,	 had	 his	 men	 bind	 him	 to	 the	 ship’s	 mast	 instead.	 When	Odysseus	 and	 his	men	 approached	 the	 Sirens,	 Odysseus	 heard	 their	 song,	 and	 he	was	 filled	 with	 desire	 to	 stay	 with	 the	 Sirens.	 But	 he	 was	 bound	 to	 the	 mast,	incapacitated,	 and	 his	 men	 would	 not	 unbind	 him,	 so	 he	 could	 not	 act	 upon	 his	desire.	Odysseus	and	his	men	passed	safely.	Or	 consider	 a	 case	Derek	Parfit	 (1984)	developed	 from	Thomas	 Schelling’s	
The	Strategy	of	Conflict	 (1980).	 In	 that	 case,	 an	 armed	 robber	 threatens	 to	 kill	 an	agent’s	children	unless	the	agent	unlocks	a	gold-filled	safe.	The	agent	knows	that	it	would	be	irrational	to	provide	the	gold	(since	then	the	armed	robber	would	kill	the	agent	and	her	children	to	stop	them	from	reporting	the	crime),	and	she	also	knows	
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that	 it	 would	 be	 irrational	 to	 ignore	 the	 threat	 (since	 that	would	 risk	 the	 robber	killing	one	of	the	children	to	spur	the	agent	to	action).	The	best	choice	is	to	take	a	drug,	“conveniently	at	hand,”	which	would	render	the	agent	 irrational.	The	agent’s	irrationality	would	leave	the	armed	robber’s	threats	ineffective,	since	the	irrational	agent	would	 no	 longer	 be	moved	 by	 concern	 for	 her	 children.	 The	 armed	 robber	would	hopefully	recognize	that	and	decide	that	his	best	remaining	option	would	be	to	 escape	 (presumably	 without	 harming	 the	 agent	 or	 her	 children,	 perhaps	 to	minimize	 his	 criminal	 exposure).	 As	 Parfit	 acknowledges,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	irrational	 agent	 would	 harm	 herself	 or	 her	 children	 during	 the	 period	 of	 her	irrationality.	 But	 Parfit	 contends	 that	 it	 is	 still	 appropriate	 for	 the	 agent	 to	 cause	herself	to	become	irrational,	since	that	risk	is	outweighed	by	the	need	to	defuse	the	armed	 robber’s	 threats.	 As	 Parfit	 explains,	 “On	 any	 plausible	 theory	 about	rationality,	it	would	be	rational	for	me,	in	this	case,	to	cause	myself	to	become	for	a	period	irrational”	(1984,	p.	13).	In	 Odysseus’	 case	 and	 in	 Parfit’s	 rational-irrationality	 case,	 the	 agents	 use	their	 compromised	 agency	 as	 a	 tool.	 Both	 agents	 solve	 some	 problem--how	 to	experience	the	beauty	of	 the	Sirens’	song	without	becoming	 its	victim,	and	how	to	defuse	 the	 invader’s	 threat--by	 giving	 up	 control.	 Although	 giving	 up	 control	was	risky,	 since	 things	 could	 have	 worked	 out	 poorly,	 the	 risk	 was	 justified.114	And	
																																																								114	Or,	perhaps	more	accurately,	the	cases	are	presented	to	us	as	cases	in	which	we	are	supposed	to	take	the	risk	to	be	justified.	Odysseus	is	supposed	to	be	a	hero,	and	his	 cleverness	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 his	 virtue.	 Some	 modern	 readers	 might	 find	themselves	less	impressed	with	his	willingness	to	risk	the	lives	of	those	loyal	to	him.	And	some	readers	might	likewise	be	unconvinced	of	Parfit’s	parent’s	assessment	of	
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because	 both	 agents	 purposefully	 brought	 about	 their	 own	 incapacity,	 it	 was	foreseeable	to	both	agents	that	their	behavior	would	lead	to	their	incapacity.115	Both	Odysseus	and	Parfit’s	parent	acted:	a)	competently,	b)	in	a	way	that	foreseeably	led	to	the	agent’s	own	risky	incapacitation,	and	yet	c)	morally	appropriately.	Call	such	cases	Odysseus	cases.	Odysseus	agents	act	in	a	way	that	foreseeably	(and	sometimes	purposefully)	 leads	 to	 their	 own	 incapacitation,	 and	 they	 do	 so	 while	 they	 are	competent.	Accordingly,	 they	are	responsible	 for	 incapacitating	 themselves.	Unlike	the	 culpable-incapacity	 cases,	 however,	 the	Odysseus	agents	 are	not	blameworthy	for	incapacitating	themselves.	Homer’s	 and	 Parfit’s	 cases	 are	 fantastic	 and	 fictional.	 But	 there	 are	 also	ordinary	Odysseus	cases.	Going	to	sleep	presents	an	Odysseus	case.	Being	asleep	is	risky.	 The	 sleeping	 agent	 is	 unaware	 of	 his	 surroundings,	 unaware	 of	 risks	 that	might	present	themselves,	and	unable	to	react.	But,	at	least	in	normal	circumstances,	those	risks	are	slight	and	outweighed	by	the	benefits	of	sleep.	Similarly,	becoming	medically	 incapacitated	 is	 risky.	 Being	 sedated	 or	 anesthetized	 entails	 giving	 up	control,	 and	 that	 presents	 some	 risk.	 However,	 anesthetic	 and	 sedation	 are	important	 and	 valuable	 elements	 of	modern	medicine,	 and	 the	 risks	 they	 present	are	usually	outweighed	by	the	benefits	they	offer.	These	agents	who	tie	themselves	
																																																																																																																																																																					the	 relative	 risks	 involved.	 Even	 if	 skeptical	 readers	 doubt	 these	 particular	 cases,	they	 should	 be	 able	 to	 discern	 the	 pattern	 involved	 and	 imagine	 their	 own	 cases,	perhaps	 even	 more	 fanciful,	 and	 I	 will	 shortly	 present	 more	 quotidian	 Odysseus	cases.	115	For	both	of	these	agents,	risky	incapacity	was	a	tool	used	to	achieve	some	goal.	But	 this	 is	 not	 the	 key	 fact.	 We	 could	 imagine	 an	 Odysseus	 agent	 for	 whom	 the	incapacity	is	a	foreseeable	side	effect.	
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to	 masts,	 take	 irrationality	 pills,	 go	 to	 sleep,	 take	 sedatives,	 or	 the	 like	 willingly	incapacitate	 themselves,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 do	 so	 culpably.	 So	 Odysseus	 cases	 are	 a	feature	of	our	ordinary	lives,	not	merely	a	philosopher’s	construction.	The	test	case	we	need	to	distinguish	tracing	from	ordinary	responsibility	is	a	special	sort	of	Odysseus	case.	In	addition	to	the	incapacitation’s	being	non-culpable,	two	 further	 conditions	 must	 be	 met.	 First,	 unlike	 Odysseus	 himself,	 whose	incapacitation	 was	 external,	 the	 test	 agent’s	 incapacitation	 should	 be	 internal,	arising	because	the	agent’s	normative	capacities	are	compromised.	It	is	easy	enough	to	 imagine	 some	medications	working	 this	way,	 such	as	Parfit’s	 convenient	pill	 or	the	physician’s	sedative.	Second,	again	unlike	in	Odysseus’	case,	things	have	to	work	out	 poorly.	 In	 particular,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 some	 second	 bit	 of	 behavior,	 occurring	during	the	incapacity,	that	is	wrongful	behavior.116	
																																																								116	The	tracing	account	extends	action	responsibility	to	the	later	behavior.	Extending	action	 responsibility	 (and	 not	 merely	 consequence	 responsibility)	 matters	 for	blaming	 only	 when	 the	 later	 behavior	 is	 wrongdoing.	 So,	 to	 contrast	 the	 tracing	account	and	the	ordinary-responsibility	account,	it	is	important	that	the	second	bit	of	behavior	be	wrongful	behavior.	In	this	chapter,	I	am	agnostic	as	to	the	conditions	of	 behavior’s	 being	 wrongful.	 However,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 wrongful	 behavior	requires	 the	possession	of	 certain	mental	 states,	 and	 it	might	be	 that	 some	of	 the	conditions	 that	 mar	 responsibility	 also	 sometimes	 preclude	 wrongfulness.	 For	instance,	recall	the	example	of	the	intoxicated	burglar	from	n.105,	where	I	explained	that	 if	 the	 intoxication	 made	 it	 impossible	 for	 the	 agent	 to	 form	 the	 requisite	intention,	 the	 agent	 did	 not	 commit	 burglary.	 Set	 aside	 those	 cases,	 and	 focus	 on	cases	in	which	an	incapacitated	agent	can	still	act	wrongfully.	This	limitation	marks	a	significant	difference	between	culpable	incapacity	and	culpable	 ignorance.	 The	 ultimate	 behavior	 in	 the	 culpable-incapacity	 cases	 is	wrongdoing,	 and	 we	 are	 asking	 whether	 to	 hold	 the	 agent	 responsible.	 On	 a	common	understanding,	the	ultimate	behavior	in	the	culpable-ignorance	cases	is	not	ordinary	wrongdoing,	precisely	because	the	agent	is	ignorant	of	some	fact	that	bears	on	 the	 behavior’s	 inappropriateness,	 and	 we	 are	 asking	 whether	 to	 treat	 the	behavior	 as	wrongdoing	 nonetheless.	 For	 a	 clear	 treatment	 of	 culpable	 ignorance	
123	
	
We	 can	 imagine	 this	 sort	 of	 case	 by	 modifying	 the	 case	 of	 Parfit’s	 self-incapacitated	parent.	 Imagine	that	 the	robber	behaves	as	expected,	reacting	to	the	parent’s	 irrationality	 by	 making	 his	 escape.	 It	 takes	 some	 time,	 however,	 for	 the	drug	 to	 wear	 off.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 parent	 irrationally	 but	 purposefully--and	therefore	wrongfully--harms	her	children.	Is	she	blameworthy	for	that	wrongdoing?		Or	consider	a	more	ordinary	case.	Imagine	a	surgery	patient,	recovering	from	a	 desperately	 needed	 surgery,	 slowly	 emerging	 from	 the	 grip	 of	 a	 powerful	anesthetic.	Awake	but	still	quite	drugged,	the	patient	mistreats	the	attending	nurses,	making	 repeated	 rude,	 impatient,	 and	 insulting	 demands.	 Because	 the	 anesthesia	was	 a	 necessary	 element	 of	 a	 necessary	 surgery,	 the	 patient	 was	 properly	incapacitated,	 even	 knowing	 that	 there	 was	 a	 good	 chance	 the	 patient	 would	 act	impulsively	while	 recovering	 from	 the	 anesthetic.	 In	 fact,	 the	hospital	 requires	 its	patients	to	remain	under	observation	for	a	substantial	period	after	surgery	exactly	because	 of	 the	 anesthetic’s	 effects	 on	 appropriate	 judgment.	Many	 times	 patients	remain	asleep	throughout	that	period,	but	in	this	case	the	patient	awoke	and	acted	wrongly.	Is	the	patient	responsible	for	that	wrongdoing?	Ordinary	 responsibility	 would	 not	 render	 these	 agents	 blameworthy.	Because	 their	 incapacitating	 actions	 were	 justified,	 there	 is	 no	 blame	 to	 be	 had	there.	What	about	the	 incapacitated	wrongdoings?	These	unlucky	Odysseus	agents	are	 incapacitated	 when	 they	 act	 wrongfully.	 Because	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 a	necessary	 condition	 of	 responsibility	 for	 wrongdoing	 under	 the	 ordinary-																																																																																																																																																																					invoking	a	distinction	parallel	 to	 that	between	 the	ordinary-responsibility	account	and	the	tracing	account,	see	Holly	Smith’s	“Culpable	Ignorance”	(1983).	
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responsibility	scheme,	the	agents	are	not	responsible	for	their	wrongdoings	as	a	bit	of	 action.	 The	wrongful	 behaviors	 were	 foreseeable	 in	 light	 of	 the	 agents’	 earlier	actions	 in	 becoming	 incapacitated,	 and	 so	 they	might	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 the	wrongdoings	 as	 consequences.117	Hence,	 it	 might	 be	 that	 they	 should	 feel	 regret,	make	 amends,	 or	 the	 like.	 However,	 as	 consequences,	 the	 incapacitated,	wrongful	behaviors	cannot	render	the	otherwise-blameless	agents	blameworthy.	Contrast	 this	 with	 tracing	 responsibility.	 Because	 the	 incapacitated	wrongdoings	were	the	foreseeable	upshots	of	the	agents’	earlier	behaviors,	we	trace	responsibility	 for	 the	 incapacitated	wrongdoings	back	 to	 the	agent’s	 responsibility	for	their	 incapacitating	actions.	Tracing	thus	holds	the	agents	responsible	for	their	incapacitated	wrongdoings	 as	 actions.	 Since	 the	agents	would	 thus	be	 responsible	for	a	bit	of	wrongdoing,	the	tracing	account	entails	that	the	agents	are	blameworthy.	By	 considering	 Odysseus	 cases,	 I	 have	 identified	 cases	 in	 which	 ordinary	responsibility	 and	 tracing	 responsibility	 disagree	 about	 whether	 an	 agent	 is	blameworthy.	 The	 tracing	 account	 holds	 unlucky	 Odysseus	 agents	 blameworthy,	and	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account	 does	 not.	 Between	 the	 two,	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account	 offers	 the	 more	 attractive	 verdict.	 Intuitively,	 the	 unlucky	Odysseus	agents	are	not	blameworthy.	When	I	imagine	the	modified	Parfit	case,	for	
																																																								117	It	might	seem	strange	that	it	is	true	both	that	the	later,	wrongful	behavior	was	a	foreseeable	consequence	of	the	agent’s	earlier	behavior	and	that	the	agent’s	earlier	behavior	was	not	wrongdoing.	However,	there	is	nothing	improper	about	this.	Lots	of	behavior	runs	risks,	and	so	long	as	we	think	that	some	risks	can	be	justified,	there	is	room	to	think	that	a	bit	of	behavior	might	not	be	wrong	even	when	it	results	in	a	bad	outcome.	Why	would	anything	change	about	this	just	because	the	bad	outcome	involves	a	risked	bit	of	wrongdoing?	
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instance,	 I	 lack	the	 intuition	that	the	parent	 is	blameworthy,	and	I	 lack	the	related	intuition	 that	 she	 could	 appropriately	 be	 punished.	 Instead,	 intuitively,	 she	 seems	unlucky.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 imagine	 the	 parent	 feeling	 regret,	 and	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 imagine	thinking	poorly	of	her	if	she	does	not	feel	that	regret	or	if	she	fails	to	make	an	effort	to	 address	 the	 harms	 she	 has	 caused.	 And	 I	 could	 imagine	 feeling	 terrible	 for	 the	parent	 who	 harmed	 her	 own	 child.	 But	 she	 does	 not	 seem	 blameworthy.	 I	 feel	sympathy,	not	resentment,	toward	the	parent.	These	intuitions	comport	with	thinking	of	responsibility	as	tracking	the	fair	opportunity	to	avoid	wrongdoing.	Imagine	holding	the	parent	blameworthy.	You	can	imagine	 her	 asking	 what	 she	 should	 have	 done	 differently.	 Should	 she	 have	refrained	 from	 taking	 the	 drug,	 thereby	 exposing	 herself	 and	 her	 family	 to	 the	robber’s	 threats?	Given	the	options	available,	she	had	no	 fair	opportunity	 to	avoid	the	risk	of	the	wrongdoing,	and	so	she	did	not	have	a	fair	opportunity	to	avoid	the	wrongdoing.	 Contrast	 this	 with	 the	 culpable-incapacity	 cases	 in	 the	 tracing	literature,	 in	which	the	agent	did	have	a	fair	opportunity	to	avoid	the	wrongdoing.	The	 drunk	 driver,	 for	 instance,	 had	 the	 fair	 opportunity	 to	 avoid	 the	wrongdoing	when	the	drunk	driver	had	the	opportunity	not	to	become	intoxicated	to	the	point	of	incapacity.	It	is	ordinarily	fair	to	ask	someone	not	to	drink	to	incapacitation.	In	 the	 Odysseus	 cases,	 ordinary	 responsibility	 gets	 the	 verdicts	 right,	 and	tracing	 responsibility	 gets	 the	 verdicts	 wrong.	 That	 and	 ordinary	 responsibility’s	ability	 to	 ground	blame	 in	 the	original	 culpable-incapacity	 cases	 give	us	 sufficient	reason	to	reject	tracing	and	stick	with	ordinary	responsibility.	
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The	 Odysseus	 cases	 pose	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 tracing	 account	 because	 the	tracing	 advocate	 appears	 committed	 to	 three	 propositions:	 1)	tracing	 extends	responsibility	in	cases	of	responsible	but	non-culpable	incapacity,	2)	tracing	extends	action	 responsibility	 in	 particular,	 and	 3)	being	 action	 responsible	 for	 a	 bit	 of	wrongdoing	 is	sufficient	 for	blameworthiness.	 If	 those	three	propositions	are	true,	then	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 is	 committed	 to	 holding	 the	 Odysseus	 agents	blameworthy,	and	that	tells	against	tracing.	So	could	a	defender	of	tracing	not	fend	off	my	 attack	 by	 denying	 one	 of	 those	 three	 propositions?	Why	 not,	 for	 instance,	limit	tracing	only	to	cases	of	culpable	incapacity?		The	 problem	 for	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 is	 not	 just	 that	 any	 such	 limitations	appear	 ad	 hoc.118	The	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 can	 appeal	 to	 these	responses	 only	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 making	 the	 tracing	 account	 substantively	indistinguishable	 from	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account,	 and	 that	 would	 be	 to	abandon	a	substantive	account	of	tracing.	If	the	tracing	advocate	rejects	one	of	these	three	 propositions,	 then	 she	 will	 run	 into	 the	 strongest	 version	 of	 the	 objection	suggested	by	skeptics	like	Alexander,	Khoury,	and	King,	that	ordinary	responsibility	gives	us	everything	that	tracing	gives	us.	
																																																								118	As	Dana	Nelkin	has	pointed	out	to	me,	this	limitation	might	not	appear	ad	hoc	to	everyone.	Of	course,	the	same	distinction	can	seem	ad	hoc	to	one	and	principled	to	another.	I	tentatively	hypothesize	that	this	distinction	is	more	likely	to	seem	ad	hoc	to	 someone	 who	 thinks	 the	 manifestation	 of	 quality-of-will	 is	 the	 fundamental	matter	of	responsibility	and	more	likely	to	seem	principled	to	someone	who	thinks	that	 fairness	 is	 the	 fundamental	matter,	 but	 that	 is	 a	 very	 tentative	hypothesis.	 In	any	 case,	 as	 I	 explain,	 even	 if	 this	 limitation	 is	 not	 ad	 hoc,	 the	 resulting	 scheme	abandons	 any	 substantive	 distinction	 between	 tracing	 and	 non-tracing	 accounts,	and	that	is	the	bigger	problem	for	the	tracing	advocate.	
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Start	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 limiting	 tracing	 only	 to	 cases	 of	 culpable	incapacity.	Tracing’s	advocates	do	not	permit	tracing	 in	all	cases	of	 incapacity.	For	example,	Fischer	and	Ravizza	point	to	Roger	O.	Thornhill,	Cary	Grant’s	character	in	
North	by	Northwest,	who	is	forced	to	drink	bourbon	when	his	enemies	want	to	stage	a	driving	accident.	Although	Thornhill	drives	while	intoxicated,	he	is	not	responsible	for	his	behavior,	because	he	is	not	responsible	for	becoming	intoxicated.	There	is	no	responsibility	to	trace	back	to,	and	so	Fischer	and	Ravizza	 limit	tracing	to	cases	of	responsible	incapacity.	It	 might	 seem	 natural	 to	 strengthen	 the	 restriction	 and	 limit	 tracing’s	extension	of	responsibility	to	cases	in	which	the	agent	was	not	just	responsible	but	also	 blameworthy	 for	 her	 underlying	 incapacity.	 Were	 tracing’s	 application	restricted	in	this	way,	tracing	would	not	extend	responsibility	in	the	Odysseus	cases	because	the	underlying	incapacitation	is	not	blameworthy	in	those	cases.119	But	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 faces	 a	 dilemma	 here.	 The	 tracing	 advocate	 does	avoid	the	threat	of	the	Odysseus	cases	by	restricting	tracing	only	to	cases	in	which	the	underlying	 incapacity	 is	culpable.	But,	 in	doing	so,	 the	 tracing	advocate	makes	tracing	 duplicative	 of	 ordinary	 responsibility.	 Even	without	 tracing,	 the	 ordinary-
																																																								119	We	 might	 think	 of	 this	 limitation	 in	 inheritance	 terms.	 Because	 the	 traced	responsibility	 is	rooted	in	the	responsibility	for	the	underlying	incapacity,	 it	might	not	be	 surprising	 if	 the	 traced	 responsibility	 inherited	 some	of	 the	 features	of	 the	underlying	 incapacity.	 In	 the	 Odysseus	 cases,	 the	 underlying	 incapacitation	 is	justified.	It	might	seem	natural	in	those	cases	to	think	that	the	traced	responsibility	would	 inherit	 the	 normative	 effect	 of	 the	 justification	 of	 the	 underlying	incapacitation.	And	 if	 that’s	 so,	 then	 the	 tracing	does	not	extend	blameworthiness-grounding	 responsibility.	 I	 thank	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 for	 pointing	 out	 that	 this	response	can	be	thought	of	in	inheritance	terms.	
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responsibility	 account	 can	 explain	 why	 the	 consequences	 of	 an	 agent’s	 culpable	incapacity	can	heighten	her	blame,	obligate	her	to	make	repair,	and	the	like.	What	is	left	 for	 the	 traced	 responsibility	 to	 do	 in	 such	 a	 case?	 If	 tracing	 is	 limited	 only	 to	cases	 of	 culpable	 incapacity,	 then	 it	 adds	 nothing	 to	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	account.	The	tracing	advocate	will	face	the	same	objection	if	he	attempts	to	avoid	the	threat	 of	 the	 Odysseus	 cases	 by	 denying	 my	 dialectical	 presumption	 that	 tracing	extends	action	responsibility.	Although	the	tracing	advocates	suggest	that	tracing	is	intended	 to	 supplement	 action	 responsibility,	 the	 conditions	 of	 extending	 tracing	responsibility--control	 at	 some	 earlier	 point	 when	 the	 later	 wrongdoing	 is	foreseeable--parallel	the	conditions	required	for	holding	an	agent	responsible	for	a	consequence.	And	if	we	understand	tracing	as	extending	consequence	responsibility	instead	 of	 action	 responsibility,	 then	 the	 Odysseus	 cases	 pose	 no	 problem.	 Mere	consequence	 responsibility	 cannot	 render	 an	 otherwise	 blameless	 agent	blameworthy,	and	so	 if	only	consequence	responsibility	 is	extended,	 the	Odysseus	agents	will	 not	be	exposed	 to	blameworthiness.	 If	 the	 tracing	advocate	 appeals	 to	this	 response,	 however,	 tracing	 becomes	 substantively	 indistinguishable	 from	ordinary	 responsibility.	 Even	 without	 tracing,	 ordinary	 responsibility	 can	 explain	why	 the	 culpably	 incapacitated	agent	 is	blameworthy	 for	 the	 consequences	of	her	responsible	agency.	If	tracing	does	no	more	than	extend	consequence	responsibility,	then	it	adds	nothing	new	to	the	ordinary-responsibility	account.		
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Could	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 deny	 that	 being	 action	 responsible	 for	wrongdoing	 grounds	 blameworthiness?	 If	 being	 responsible	 in	 this	 way	 for	wrongdoing	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	 blameworthiness,	 then	 there	 is	 room	 to	 hold	 the	Odysseus	 agents	 responsible	 for	 their	 wrongdoing	 without	 holding	 them	blameworthy.	 This	 strategy	 requires	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 to	 take	 a	 controversial	stand	on	a	foundational	question	about	moral	responsibility,	and	that	should	make	this	the	least	tempting	distinction	of	the	three.	I	suggested	that	it	is	nearly	axiomatic	that	 an	 agent’s	 being	 blameworthy	 is	 entailed	 by	 her	 being	 responsible	 for	 a	wrongdoing	 as	 an	 action.	 But	 not	 everyone	 accepts	 that	 responsibility	 for	wrongdoing	 is	 sufficient	 for	 blameworthiness.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 discussion	 with	Pereboom,	Fischer	writes,	“It	is	crucial	here	to	keep	in	mind	the	distinction	between	moral	 responsibility	 and	 (say)	 moral	 blameworthiness	 (or	 praiseworthiness)”	(2004,	p.	157).	Fischer	explains	 that	 an	agent’s	history--things	 like	manipulation--could	 make	 it	 inappropriate	 to	 hold	 a	 responsible	 wrongdoer	 blameworthy.	 And	McKenna	(2012)	argues	that	reasons-responsiveness	and	wrongdoing	alone	are	not	sufficient	 for	 blameworthiness;	 he	 requires	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 a	 quality-of-will	condition	 in	 addition.	 Of	 course,	 it	 might	 be	 that	 Fischer’s	 concern	 about	manipulation	and	McKenna’s	 concern	about	quality	of	will	 are	best	understood	as	telling	 against	 responsibility,	 and	 only	 thereby	 against	 blameworthiness.	 In	 any	case,	 these	 particular	 constraints	 will	 not	 help	 the	 tracing	 advocate.	 There	 is	 no	reason	 to	 think	 that	 all	 Odysseus	 agents	 are	 manipulated	 agents,	 and	 it	 is	 easy	enough	to	imagine	Odysseus	agents	who	might	satisfy	a	quality-of-will	condition	at	
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the	 time	of	 the	 incapacitated	wrongdoing.	Nonetheless,	we	can	see	 the	conceptual	possibility	 that	 responsibility	 for	 wrongdoing	 might	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	blameworthiness.		The	tracing	advocate	here	faces	the	same	bind	he	faced	elsewhere.	In	order	to	defend	a	substantive	tracing	account,	the	tracing	advocate	needs	to	identify	some	significant	 difference	 between	 tracing	 responsibility	 and	 ordinary	 responsibility.	 I	have	identified	one	plausible	difference	between	tracing	responsibility	and	ordinary	responsibility,	 but	 accepting	 that	 difference	 tells	 against	 tracing.	 If	 the	 tracing	advocate	 therefore	 denies	 that	 action	 responsibility	 is	 a	 distinct	 type	 of	responsibility	 (or,	 at	 least,	 is	 distinctive	 in	 the	 way	 I	 have	 suggested),	 then	 the	tracing	 advocate	 has	 no	 grounds	 for	 holding	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 action	responsibility	 and	 consequence	 responsibility	 is	more	 than	merely	 formal.	 So	 the	tracing	advocate	can	deny	that	action	responsibility	is	distinctive	in	this	way	only	by	abandoning	the	substantive	tracing	account.	This	 dooms	 tracing.	 The	 tracing	 advocate	 needs	 to	 show	 both	 that	 tracing	makes	 a	 real	 difference	 and	 that	 we	 should	 want	 our	 theory	 of	 responsibility	 to	accommodate	that	difference.	However,	the	most	promising	way	to	distinguish	the	tracing	account	from	the	ordinary-responsibility	account--understanding	tracing	as	extending	 action	 responsibility--commits	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 to	 holding	 unlucky	Odysseus	 agents	 responsible	 and	 therefore	 blameworthy.	 Since	 the	 unlucky	Odysseus	 agents	 are	 intuitively	 not	 blameworthy,	 the	 tracing	 advocate	 can	distinguish	 the	 tracing	 account	 from	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account	 only	 by	
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rendering	the	tracing	account	extensionally	inadequate.	The	only	apparent	ways	to	defuse	 the	 threat	 from	 the	 Odysseus	 cases	 amount	 to	 abandoning	 tracing	 as	 a	substantive	 addition.	Accordingly,	 the	Odysseus	 cases	 tell	 us	 to	 reject	 tracing	 as	 a	substantive	addition	to	responsibility.	Abandoning	tracing	as	a	substantive	addition	does	not	mean	that	there	is	no	room	for	tracing	in	our	thinking	about	moral	responsibility.	Even	if	tracing	is	not	a	substantive	addition,	it	might	yet	serve	as	a	helpful	heuristic.	Given	the	similarities	between	 the	 conditions	 of	 applying	 tracing	 and	 the	 conditions	 of	 applying	responsibility	 for	 consequences,	 we	 might	 charitably	 understand	 the	 arguments	offered	by	the	tracing	advocates	as	intending	to	draw	our	attention	to	the	role	that	responsibility	 for	 consequences	 can	 play	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 some	 of	 the	consequences	 at	 issue	 are	 further	 actions.	 Indeed,	 philosophers	working	 on	 other	problems	 have	 not	 always	 treated	 the	 tracing	 account	 and	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	account	as	distinctive	accounts	of	responsibility.	Neal	Judisch	(2005),	for	 example,	 moves	 between	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 tracing	 account	 and	 their	account	of	responsibility	for	consequences	in	discussing	a	challenge	to	their	taking-ownership	condition.	And	consider	Vargas:	 “We	hold	 someone	responsible	 for	 the	results	 of	 drunk	driving,	 not	 because	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 agent	 they	 are	when	 they	 get	behind	 the	 wheel,	 but	 rather,	 because	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 agent	 they	 were	 when	 they	started	to	drink”	(2013,	p.	273).	This	line	of	thinking	allows	that	tracing	might	be	an	instance	 of	 ordinary	 responsibility	 for	 consequences,	 not	 a	 distinctive	 sort	 of	responsibility	 for	wrongdoing.	Noticing	 the	 importance	of	recognizing	 the	cases	 in	
132	
	
which	 an	 important	 consequence	 of	 our	wrongdoing	 is	 some	 further	wrongdoing	would	 be	 an	 interesting	 result,	 though	 it	 would	 be	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 tracing	advocates’	 arguments,	 given	 their	 insistence	 that	 the	 addition	 of	 tracing	makes	 a	substantive	difference.	
4.3	 Considering	three	objections	I	 have	 argued	 that	we	do	not	need	 tracing	 to	blame	 culpably	 incapacitated	agents	like	the	drunk	driver,	and	I	have	argued	that	tracing	threatens	to	hold	non-culpable	agents	like	Parfit’s	parent	or	the	surgery	patient	blameworthy.	But	tracing	has	been	persistently	attractive,	and	so	here	I	consider	three	worrisome	objections	to	abandoning	tracing.	First,	 tracing	seems	 to	make	good	 the	 idea	 that	no	one	should	benefit	 from	their	 own	 wrongdoing.120	Being	 permitted	 an	 excuse	 might	 seem	 good	 for	 the	wrongdoer;	the	excuse	enables	the	wrongdoer	to	avoid	blame	that	might	otherwise	be	 appropriate.	 Incapacity	 is	 the	 sort	 of	 condition	 that	 can	 ground	 an	 excuse.	However,	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	brings	about	his	own	incapacity,	and	he	does	so	by	acting	wrongfully.	Permitting	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	to	point	to	his	 own	 incapacitation	 as	 grounds	 for	 an	 excuse	 might	 then	 seem	 to	 violate	 the	general	 principle	 against	 allowing	 wrongdoers	 to	 benefit	 from	 their	 wrongdoing.	
																																																								120	This	general	principle	is	a	feature	of	American	law	familiar	to	many	philosophers	from	Ronald	Dworkin’s	 discussion	of	 the	New	York	 case	Riggs	v.	Palmer,	 115	N.Y.	506	 (1889)	 in	 Law’s	 Empire	 (1986).	 In	 that	 case,	 Elmer	 Palmer	 murdered	 his	grandfather	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 grandfather	 died	 before	writing	 Palmer	 out	 of	 his	will.	As	the	court	explained	in	ruling	against	Palmer,	New	York’s	probate	law	was	to	be	 interpreted	 in	 light	 of	 the	 general	 principles	 within	 the	 law,	 including	 the	principle	against	allowing	wrongdoers	to	benefit	from	their	wrongdoing.	
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The	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agent	 would	 have	 garnered	 an	 ostensibly	 beneficial	excuse,	and	he	would	have	done	so	by	acting	wrongfully.	At	 the	extreme,	allowing	culpably	incapacitated	agents	an	excuse	for	their	culpably	incapacitated	wrongdoing	might	 even	 seem	 to	 give	wrongdoers	 a	 strategy	 for	 insulating	 themselves	 against	recrimination.	As	the	Maine	court	explained	in	Arsenault:	[T]he	 defense	 of	 insanity	 should	 never	 be	 extended	 to	 apply	 to	voluntary	intoxication	in	a	murder	case.	It	would	not	only	open	wide	the	door	to	defenses	built	on	frauds	and	perjuries,	but	would	build	a	broad,	 easy	 turnpike	 for	 escape.	 All	 that	 the	 crafty	 criminal	 would	require	 for	a	well-planned	murder,	 in	Maine,	would	be	a	 revolver	 in	one	hand	to	commit	the	deed,	and	a	quart	of	intoxicating	liquor	in	the	other	with	which	to	build	his	excusable	defense.		Accepting	tracing,	and	thereby	refusing	to	grant	the	culpably	incapacitated	agent	an	excuse,	can	ensure	that	there	is	no	“broad,	easy	turnpike	for	escape.”	We	 can	 set	 aside	 this	 worry.	 In	 order	 to	 know	 whether	 someone	 has	benefited,	 we	 have	 to	 know	 what	 the	 relevant	 comparison	 is.	 In	 the	 culpable-incapacity	 cases,	 the	 agent’s	 earlier,	 competent	 wrongdoing--the	 improper,	 self-incapacitating	 behavior--makes	 the	 agent	 more	 blameworthy	 than	 he	 otherwise	would	 be.	 He	 is	 blameworthy	 for	 that	 initial	 behavior,	 and	 then	 he	 risks	 being	blameworthy	for	further	harms	(including	his	later	improper	behavior)	that	result.	That	is	significant	blame	that	the	agent	could	have	avoided	by	not	acting	improperly	from	the	outset.	 So	 the	agent	 is	not	made	better	off	by	way	of	his	wrongdoing	 (at	least	not	in	terms	of	escaping	blame).	Nor	is	the	agent	better	off	than	someone	who	is	involuntarily	incapacitated.	Both	are	similarly	excused	from	action	responsibility	for	 their	 incapacitated	 wrongdoings,	 but	 only	 the	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agent	 is	
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blameworthy	for	being	incapacitated.	Recognizing	this,	we	can	see	both	why	tracing	might	have	seemed	attractive	in	this	way	and	why	we	need	not	actually	worry	about	it.	 Second,	we	might	 think	 tracing	 is	appropriate	because	 it	seems	to	offer	 the	best	 explanation	 of	 a	 comparative	 pattern	 of	 blaming	 we	 see	 in	 both	 ordinary	morality	and	the	law:	We	blame	unlucky	culpably	incapacitated	agents	who	commit	some	further	wrongdoing	more	 frequently	and	more	harshly	 than	we	blame	 lucky	culpably	incapacitated	agents.	Consider	again	the	drunk	drivers.	Drunk	drivers,	and	especially	 drunk	 drivers	 who	 cause	 further	 harm,	 are	 exposed	 to	 significant	 and	appropriate	 blame	 and	punishment.	What	 about	 agents	who	drink	 to	 the	point	 of	incapacity	 but	 then,	 luckily,	 neither	 drive	while	 intoxicated	 nor	 cause	 any	 further	harm?	They	are	subjected	to	 less	 frequent	and	 less	severe	blame	and	punishment,	both	in	ordinary	morality	and	in	the	law.	This	 comparative	pattern--that	drunk	drivers	 are	punished	more	often	and	more	 severely	 than	 the	 merely	 drunk--might	 suggest	 that	 culpably	 incapacitated	agents	are	being	held	responsible	for	their	culpably	incapacitated	wrongdoing	as	a	bit	of	action.	Recall	that	it	is	responsibility	for	wrongdoing	that	is	supposed	to	mark	the	difference	between	blameworthy	and	non-blameworthy	agents.	Since	the	drunk	drivers	and	 the	merely	drunk	alike	drank	 to	 the	point	of	 incapacitation,	and	since	the	merely	 drunk	 sometimes	 appear	 not	 to	 be	 blamed,	 then	 it	might	 appear	 that	drinking	 to	 the	 point	 of	 incapacitation	 is	 not	 being	 treated	 as	 action.	 Hence,	 the	
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wrongdoing	that	grounds	the	blameworthiness	of	the	drunk	drivers	might	seem	to	be	their	drunk	driving.	That	 we	 do	 blame	 those	who	 commit	 vehicular	 homicide	more	 than	mere	drunk	drivers	and	mere	drunk	drivers	more	than	mere	drunks	does	not	mean	that	we	 should	 blame	 in	 these	 ways.	 Our	 practices	 are	 not	 immune	 to	 criticism	 and	revision.	 For	 instance,	 Khoury	 and	 Alexander	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 our	 competent	behavior	that	matters	for	blame,	not	whatever	follows.	And	so	perhaps	we	should	be	blaming	 those	 who	 kill	 less	 than	 we	 do,	 though	 we	 might	 still	 expect	 contrition,	compensation,	 and	 the	 like	 from	 them.	And	probably	we	 should	blame	 those	who	culpably	incapacitate	themselves	more	than	we	do.	After	all,	drinking	to	the	point	of	incapacity	is	ordinarily	dangerous	behavior.	People	who	are	that	intoxicated	cause	a	whole	range	of	harms,	and	drunk	driving	accidents	are	merely	one	such	particularly	deadly	 result.121	Even	 if,	 fortuitously,	 no	 further	 harm	 results,	we	 should	 sanction	that	 dangerousness.	 And	we	might	 accept	 one	 of	 these	 latter	 conclusions	without	committing	to	Khoury	and	Alexander’s	strict	denial	of	resultant	moral	luck.	If	some	such	 revisionary	 explanation	 is	 available,	 then	 the	 need	 to	 explain	 the	 extant	comparative	pattern	is	gone.																																																									121	As	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 noted,	 drinking	 to	 intoxication	 need	 not	 always	 be	reckless.	For	 instance,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 imagine	 someone	who,	prior	 to	drinking	 to	the	 point	 of	 incapacitation,	 takes	 precautions	 to	 preclude	 later	 incapacitated	misbehavior,	such	as	arranging	for	a	designated	driver,	handing	over	the	car	keys,	or	the	 like.	 Whether	 these	 precautions	 are	 sufficient	 to	 obviate	 the	 culpability	 for	becoming	intoxicated	to	the	point	of	incapacity	is	not	clear	to	me.	However,	it	is	true	that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 an	 agent	 to	 become	 intoxicated	 to	 the	 point	 of	 incapacity	without	 thereby	 raising	 the	 sorts	 of	 risks	 that	 ordinarily	 render	 such	 behavior	culpable.	For	such	cautious	agents,	 their	 incapacity	would	not	be	culpable,	and	we	should	not	blame	them,	regardless	of	whether	any	harm	results.	
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And	we	could,	 like	many,	accept	 that	 the	 results	of	an	agent’s	behavior	can	affect	the	degree	of	appropriate	blame.	The	results	need	not	reflect	any	difference	in	the	 quality	 of	 the	 agent’s	will	 nor	 any	 difference	 in	 the	 agent’s	 regard	 for	 others.	However,	 the	results	of	wrongdoing--risks	 imposed	and	harms	suffered--can	affect	the	interests	of	others.	The	culpable-incapacity	cases	often	result	in	serious	harms.	Think	 of	 Hinckley,	 shot	 and	 killed	 by	 Arsenault,	 or	 think	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 drunk	drivers.	 Their	 deaths	 are	 serious	 harms,	 and	 many	 accept	 that	 causing	 serious	harms	 can	 render	 a	 blameworthy	 agent	 significantly	 more	 blameworthy.	 And,	 as	King	suggests,	even	culpably	incapacitated	agents	whose	further	wrongdoing	results	in	 no	 additional	 harm--such	 as	 a	 drunk	 driver	 who	 fortuitously	 makes	 it	 home	without	 incident--might	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 the	 additional	 risk	 they	 have	imposed,	for	the	close	call	they	created.	If	these	harms	and	dangers	can	increase	the	degree	of	an	agent’s	blameworthiness,	then	the	tracing	skeptic	can	explain	why	we	might	hold	the	unlucky	culpably	incapacitated	agent	far	more	blameworthy	than	we	hold	the	lucky	culpably	incapacitated	agent.	We	can	also	explain	why	it	might	be	appropriate	to	blame	the	drunk	driver	but	not	 the	agent	who	drinks	 to	 intoxication	but	 luckily	does	not	drive.	We	might	conclude	 that,	 while	 both	 are	 blameworthy,	 it	 is	 only	 all-things-considered	appropriate	 to	 blame	 the	 drunk	 driver.	We	 see	 something	 like	 this	 in	 cases	 of	 de	minimis	blameworthiness.122	Section	2.12(2)	of	the	Model	Penal	Code,	for	instance,	
																																																								122	What	counts	as	de	minimis	wrongdoing	and	whether	we	should	withhold	blame	in	 those	 cases	 are	 questions	 I	 do	 not	 fully	 address	 here.	 For	 more	 substantive	treatments,	see	Husak	(2010)	and	Stanislaw	Pomorski	(1997).	
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excuses	 behavior	 “too	 trivial	 to	warrant	 the	 condemnation	 of	 conviction.”	 The	 de	minimis	defense	is	an	element	of	our	criminal	practices	and	almost	certainly	also	of	our	moral	practices.	Why	might	this	be?	Blaming	and	punishment	are	not	costless.	It	takes	effort	to	identify	blameworthy	agents,	and	we	risk	blaming	and	punishing	the	innocent.	 Blaming	 and	 punishment	 impose	 costs--psychological,	 financial,	interpersonal	and	otherwise--on	the	blamer,	on	the	punisher,	and	on	third	parties.	These	costs	might	be	particularly	unpalatable	if	the	wrongdoing	is	fairly	minor.	And	so	 we	 might	 let	 some	 wrongdoings	 slide,	 though	 the	 agents	 involved	 are	blameworthy.	This	means	 that	we	might	 blame	drunk	drivers	 even	 though	we	do	not	blame	drunks,	despite	both	being	blameworthy.	The	costs	of	blaming	might	be	worth	paying	in	the	case	of	drunk	drivers,	while	the	costs	might	be	too	high	in	the	case	of	merely	drunks.	I	 do	 not	 here	 resolve	 which	 response	 the	 tracing	 skeptic	 should	 offer	 to	address	the	comparative	patterns	in	our	punishing	and	blaming	practices.	However,	plenty	of	philosophical	resources	can	be	brought	to	bear,	from	criticizing	our	extant	practices	to	explaining	them,	none	of	which	need	tracing.	Since	we	can	comfortably	address	 those	 comparative	 patterns	 without	 appealing	 to	 tracing,	 they	 do	 not	pressure	us	to	accept	tracing.	Finally,	 rejecting	 tracing	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 incapacitated	 wrongdoings	are	just	ordinary	harmful	consequences.	But	surely	this	is	wrong.	Both	we	and	the	agent	should	see	the	incapacitated	wrongdoing	as	more	than	merely	some	untoward	event	 in	 which	 the	 agent	 played	 some	 causal	 role.	 If	 ordinary	 responsibility	
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commands	us	to	take	this	impoverished	view	of	the	relationship	between	the	agent	and	the	incapacitated	wrongdoing,	so	much	the	worse	for	ordinary	responsibility.123	But	 this	 objection	 to	 tracing	 skepticism	arises	 only	 if	we	 are	not	 careful	 to	distinguish	 between	 the	 many	 different	 sorts	 of	 responsibility	 that	 might	 be	 at	issue.124 	As	 I	 have	 argued,	 the	 incapacitated	 agent	 is	 not	 responsible	 for	 the	incapacitated	 action	 in	 a	 way	 that	 could	 ground	 blameworthiness.	 However,	 the	agent	 can	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 incapacitated	 action	 in	 other	 ways.	 We	 might	ascribe	responsibility	to	him	in	a	way	that	permits	us	to	make	judgments	about	his	character.	 For	 instance,	 we	 might	 think	 that	 the	 pill	 taken	 by	 Parfit’s	 parent	unleashed	some	improper	impulse	she	otherwise	would	have	restrained.	She	is	not	responsible	 for	 the	 incapacitated	wrongdoing	 in	 the	 accountability	 sense,	 but	 we	might	 make	 some	 judgment	 of	 her	 character	 because	 she	 harbored	 such	 an	improper	impulse	at	all.	She	is	responsible	for	the	wrongdoing	in	that	sense,	even	if	that	 is	 not	 the	 accountability	 sort	 of	 responsibility	 that	 could	 make	 her	blameworthy.	Likewise,	 the	 culpably	 incapacitated	 agent	might	 be	 responsible	 in	 a	 sense	that	makes	it	appropriate	for	the	agent	to	feel	regret	and	to	make	efforts	at	repair.	
																																																								123	I	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	raising	this	objection	forcefully.	This	objection	invites	 tracing’s	 advocates	 to	 say	more	about	 the	boundaries	of	 the	 reactions	 that	accountability	licenses,	a	rich	area	for	further	discussion.		124	There	is	a	significant	literature	on	the	many	kinds	of	responsibility	that	might	be	at	stake,	from	Watson’s	seminal	“Two	Faces	of	Responsibility”	(1996)	(which	yields	talk	 of	 attributability	 and	 accountability)	 to	 Fischer	 and	 Tognazzini’s	 recent	 “The	Physiognomy	of	Responsibility”	(2011a)	(where	they	identify	a	number	of	different	attributability	 questions,	 a	 number	 of	 different	 accountability	 questions,	 and	matters	of	responsibility	that	lie	between	the	two).	
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Think	of	the	lorry	driver	in	Bernard	Williams’s	Moral	Luck	(1982).	The	lorry	driver	faultlessly	runs	over	a	child,	striking	the	child	despite	driving	with	due	care.	Though	the	lorry	driver,	by	hypothesis,	has	done	nothing	wrong,	we	expect	the	lorry	driver	to	feel	a	special	sort	of	regret,	and	we	may	also	think	it	appropriate	for	the	driver	to	compensate	 for	 the	harm	caused.	 In	 the	culpable-incapacity	cases,	 the	grounds	 for	regret	and	compensation	should	be	at	least	as	strong.	Williams’s	lorry	driver	bears	only	causal	responsibility	for	striking	the	child.	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	drunk	driver	also	bears	causal	responsibility	for	the	harm	caused;	however,	unlike	Williams’	lorry	driver,	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	drunk	driver	is	not	faultless.	And	so	just	as	it	would	be	inapt	 for	 the	 lorry	driver	 to	 think	no	more	of	 the	harm	he	caused	than	that	 it	was	something	that	happened	merely	in	or	through	him,	it	would	surely	be	inapt	for	the	drunk	driver	to	have	such	thoughts.	Non-blame	 reactions	 like	 regret	 deserve	 greater	 philosophical	 attention.	However,	 we	 should	 distinguish	 them	 from	 the	 guilt	 and	 indignation	 that	 the	reasons-responsiveness	 theorists	 and	 the	 tracing	 advocates	 take	 to	 mark	accountability	and	blameworthiness.	If	we	are	not	careful	to	distinguish	the	ways	in	which	agents	can	be	responsible,	we	might	think	culpably	incapacitated	agents	are	responsible	simpliciter	for	the	incapacitated	wrongdoing.	That	could	make	us	think	we	need	tracing	to	account	for	culpably	incapacitated	agents’	responsibility,	and	this	would	return	us	to	worries	about	non-culpably	incapacitated	agents’	responsibility--the	 Odysseus	 case	 objection.	 If	we	 are	 careful	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 various	sorts	of	responsibility	at	issue,	however,	we	can	see	that	tracing	is	not	needed.	
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4.4	 Conclusions	Tracing’s	 advocates	 contend	 that	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 of	moral	responsibility	needs	to	be	augmented	to	account	for	the	blameworthiness	of	culpably	 incapacitated	 agents.	 However,	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account	 can	give	us	 the	right	explanation	 in	 those	cases:	The	culpably	 incapacitated	agents	are	blameworthy	for	culpably	incapacitating	themselves.	As	other	tracing	skeptics	have	suggested,	 this	 defuses	 one	 motivation	 for	 adding	 tracing,	 that	 ordinary	responsibility	initially	appeared	to	be	explanatorily	inadequate.	Defusing	 that	 motive,	 however,	 does	 not	 tell	 us	 that	 tracing	 gets	 things	wrong.	 To	 show	 that	 tracing	 is	 wrong,	 I	 have	 offered	 a	 new	 argument	 against	tracing.	The	addition	of	tracing	is	typically	motivated	by	looking	at	cases	of	culpable	incapacity,	 but	 I	 have	 challenged	 tracing	 by	 pointing	 to	 cases	 of	 non-culpable	incapacity,	 the	 Odysseus	 cases.	 Tracing	 gets	 those	 cases	 wrong,	 and	 ordinary	responsibility	gets	them	right.	This	gives	us	reason	to	reject	the	addition	of	tracing	to	 the	 ordinary-responsibility	 account.	 And	 I	 have	 supplemented	 that	 argument	against	tracing	by	offering	explanations	for	tracing’s	continued	popularity,	showing	how	we	might	have	been	misled	into	thinking	tracing	attractive.	Rejecting	 tracing	 is	 no	 small	 matter.	 Tracing	 bifurcated	 the	 conditions	 of	action	 responsibility,	 rendering	 an	 agent	 responsible	 if	 either	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 conditions	 were	 met	 immediately	 or	 the	 tracing	 conditions	 were	met	 historically.	 Rejecting	 tracing	 permits	 us	 to	 maintain	 a	 univocal	 condition	 of	action	responsibility.	And,	by	rejecting	tracing,	we	eliminate	one	historical	element	
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of	 the	 analysis	 of	 responsibility.	 Without	 tracing,	 contemporaneous	 reasons-responsiveness	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 of	 responsibility.	 This	 is	 one	 step	 toward	ascertaining	 just	 how	 and	 when	 an	 agent’s	 history	 can	 be	 relevant	 to	 their	responsibility	for	some	particular	bit	of	action.		Rejecting	tracing	also	allows	us	to	treat	a	central	sort	of	criminal	wrongdoing	more	honestly.	 It	might	 have	 seemed	 that	 tracing	was	 only	 an	 exceptional	 sort	 of	responsibility.	 However,	 intoxication	 is	 involved	 in	 a	 tremendous	 proportion	 of	violent	 crimes.	 If	 so	 many	 of	 our	 most	 serious	 crimes	 involve	 some	 degree	 of	culpable	 incapacitation,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 we	 get	 the	 analysis	 of	 culpability	 in	those	 cases	 correct.	 So	 without	 tracing,	 what	 should	 we	 say	 about	 intoxicated	wrongdoers	 like	Max	 and	 Arsenault?	 In	 answering	 that	 question,	we	will	 have	 to	wrestle	 with	 difficult	 questions	 about	 partial	 responsibility,	 about	 foreseeability,	and	 about	 just	 how	 risky	 and	 improper	 self-incapacitation	 is.	 Not	 all	 self-incapacitation,	 not	 even	 all	 intoxication,	 is	 alike.	 Perhaps	 there	 is	 a	 significant	difference	between	the	sort	of	drinking	that	agents	such	as	Arsenault	have	engaged	in--drinking	 far	 to	 excess,	 and	 in	 dangerous	 conditions--and	 the	 sort	 of	 social	drinking	that	is	widespread	in	our	society.	Does	that	difference	lead	to	a	difference	in	 culpability?	 What	 are	 we	 to	 say	 about	 social	 drinking	 that	 unluckily	 leads	 to	incapacitated	wrongdoing?	Given	 the	prevalence	of	 the	behavior	and	 the	stakes	of	the	harm	involved,	these	pressing	questions	need	philosophical	investigation.	
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Chapter	 4	 has	 been	 adapted	 from	 Craig	 Agule,	 “Resisting	 Tracing’s	 Siren	Song,”	 Journal	 of	 Ethics	 &	 Social	 Philosophy	 10(1):1-24	 (2016).	 The	 dissertation	author	was	the	sole	investigator	and	author	of	this	paper.		
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Chapter	5	 Explaining	the	bad-history	cases	
Robert	Alton	Harris	brutally	murdered	two	teenagers	in	1978.	He	shot	them	in	cold	blood,	laughed	about	their	killings,	and	then	used	their	car	to	commit	a	bank	robbery.	Harris’s	crimes	were	reprehensible,	and	I	readily	respond	to	wrongdoings	like	 his	 with	 disgust	 and	 resentment.	 Harris	 seems	 a	 fit	 candidate	 for	 blame.	However,	Harris’s	upbringing	was	horrific.	He	was	neglected	and	abused,	assaulted	and	 institutionalized.	 This	 background	 deserves	 sympathy,	 and	 my	 sympathy	tempers	 my	 initial	 resentment	 and	 disgust.	 Because	 of	 the	 close	 tie	 between	appropriate	 resentment	 and	 responsibility,	 it	 might	 thus	 seem	 that	 Harris’s	responsibility	 for	having	done	wrong	 is	undermined	by	his	bad	history,	even	 if	he	appears	 to	 be	 reasons-responsive.	 So	 our	 responses	 to	 bad-history	 cases	 pose	explanatory-adequacy	 problems	 for	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 theory	 of	 moral	responsibility.	In	this	chapter,	I	address	that	challenge.	Some	 argue	 that	 the	 bad-history	 cases	 show	 that	 we	 should	 abandon	reasons-responsiveness	and	perhaps	even	compatibilism	more	broadly	altogether.	Pereboom	 (2001,	 2014),	 for	 instance,	 offers	 a	 source	 argument	 to	 support	 his	responsibility	 skepticism.	We	might	 imagine	 that	Harris’s	bad	history,	 rather	 than	Harris,	 was	 the	 ultimate	 source	 of	 his	 behavior,	 because	 the	 bad	 history	was	 the	source	of	his	character.	We	can	imagine	a	similar	argument	about	control:	Harris’s	crimes	 were	 the	 upshot	 of	 his	 character,	 Harris’s	 character	 was	 not	 under	 his	control,	and	so	his	crimes	were	not	under	his	control.	We	might	then	accept	that	the	best	 explanation	 for	 our	 intuitions	 in	 these	 cases	 is	 that	 Harris	 is	 not	 fully	
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responsible	 because	 of	 source	 or	 control	 concerns.	 But	 incompatibilists	 like	Pereboom	 then	 urge	 us	 to	 note	 that	 such	 explanations	 generalize.	What	 is	 easily	noticed	in	the	bad-history	cases	is	in	fact	true	for	all	of	us:	 	our	character	and	thus	our	 behavior	 is	 in	 large	 part	 the	 product	 of	 outside	 forces,	 forces	 beyond	 our	control.	On	 this	 argument,	 there	 is	 no	 relevant	 difference	between	Harris	 and	 the	rest	 of	 us.	 That	 should	 lead	 us	 to	 reject	 reasons-responsiveness	 and	 even	compatibilism	more	broadly.	Others	urge	a	more	moderate	response,	allowing	that	we	could	maintain	the	core	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	account	if	we	augment	the	theory	with	a	history-sensitive	 element.	 For	 example,	 in	 response	 to	worries	 about	manipulated	agents,	Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 (1998)	 add	 the	 taking-ownership	 condition	 of	 moral	responsibility.125	Recall	 that	 an	 agent	 takes	 ownership	 in	 the	 relevant	 sense	 by	coming	to	see	herself	as	agentially	efficacious	and	as	an	appropriate	target	of	moral	assessments.	Fischer	and	Ravizza	claim	that	this	process	is	the	result	of	an	ordinary	moral	 education.	 An	 agent	 is	 then	 morally	 responsible	 if	 and	 only	 if	 both	 she	 is	reasons-responsive	and	she	has	 taken	ownership	 for	 the	relevant	bit	of	her	moral	psychology.	 The	 taking-ownership	 requirement	 arguably	 allows	 us	 to	 identify	 a	difference	between	Harris	and	the	rest	of	us:		unlike	most	of	us,	Harris	was	denied	an	 ordinary	 moral	 education.	 He	 was	 abused	 and	 neglected,	 rather	 than	 being	nurtured	and	 taught.	Accordingly,	on	Fischer	and	Ravizza’s	account,	Harris	cannot	be	held	responsible	for	his	behavior.	But	what	is	true	of	Harris	is	not	true	of	most	of																																																									125	I’ve	 already	 argued	 that	 we	 can	 accept	 much	 of	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza’s	 taking-responsibility	account	without	taking	on	any	core	historical	elements.	
145	
	
the	rest	of	us,	because	most	of	the	rest	of	us	were	given	adequate	moral	educations.	And	 so	 Fischer	 and	 Ravizza	 have	 a	 history-sensitive,	 compatibilist,	 reasons-responsive	account	of	moral	responsibility.	Both	 the	 skeptics	 and	 the	 historicists	 assume	 that	 the	 ahistorical	 reasons-responsiveness	advocate	has	no	good	explanation	for	the	bad-history	cases.	If	that’s	so,	then	these	critics	are	right:		the	theory	must	be	modified	or	abandoned.	But	we	should	 not	 so	 hastily	 agree	 with	 these	 critics,	 as	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	advocate	 has	 much	 to	 say	 about	 these	 cases.	 The	 bad-history	 cases	 merit	 two	complementary	 responses:	 	 bad	 history	 casts	 a	 shadow	 upon	 contemporary	normative	capacities,	and	bad	history	merits	a	sympathetic	response	which	conflicts	with	blame	but	not	with	blameworthiness	or	responsibility.	Those	responses	enable	the	reasons-responsiveness	advocate	to	explain	our	intuitive	responses	to	the	bad-history	 cases	 without	 modifying	 the	 account	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 to	 include	 a	historical	element.	
5.1	 Robert	Alton	Harris’s	bad	history	In	 the	 early	 summer	 of	 1978,	 teenagers	 Michael	 Baker	 and	 John	 Mayeski	planned	 a	 day	 of	 fishing,	 and	 they	 headed	 to	 a	 fast	 food	 restaurant	 to	 get	 lunch	before	leaving.126	At	the	same	time,	Harris	and	his	brother	planned	a	bank	robbery.	
																																																								126	My	account	of	Harris’s	 crime	and	his	upbringing	 is	 taken	 from	Watson	 (1987),	the	 Los	 Angeles	 Times,	 and	 several	 of	 the	 court	 opinions	 addressing	 his	 case,	including	People	v.	Harris,	28	Cal.3d	935	(Ca.	1981)	and	Harris	v.	Pulley,	885	F.2d	1354	 (9th	 Cir.	 1989).	 And,	 of	 course,	 Harris’s	 story	 is	 dramatic	 but	 not	 unique.	Nelkin	 (2011)	 discusses	 the	 case	 of	 Jeremy	 Gross,	 who	 brutally	 shot	 and	 killed	 a	store	 clerk	during	a	 robbery.	A	 jury	 sentenced	him	 to	 life	 in	prison	 instead	of	 the	death	penalty	after	hearing	extensive	testimony	about	his	rotten	social	background.	
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Needing	a	car,	the	Harris	brothers	spotted	Baker	and	Mayeski	and	kidnapped	them,	planning	 to	 use	 the	 teenagers’	 car	 for	 their	 robbery.	 The	Harris	 brothers	 ordered	Baker	 and	Mayeski	 at	 gunpoint	 to	 drive	 to	 a	 secluded	 canyon	 in	 rural	 San	 Diego	County.	There,	Harris	promised	the	teenagers	that	they	would	go	unhurt.	Baker	and	Mayeski	were	instructed	to	walk	off,	wait	some	time,	and	then	report	the	car	stolen,	giving	a	misleading	description	of	the	thieves.	But	then	Harris	shot	Mayeski,	first	in	the	back,	and	then	in	the	head.	He	chased	Baker	down,	confronting	the	teenager	as	he	 cowered	 in	 a	 bush	 and	 telling	 him	 to	 “quit	 crying,	 and	 die	 like	 a	man”	 before	shooting	 him	 four	 times.	 Harris	 shot	 Mayeski	 again,	 point	 blank,	 with	 his	 pistol,	before	 taking	 a	 rifle	 dropped	by	his	 brother	 and	 shooting	Mayeski	 one	 final	 time.	Harris	later	laughed	at	having	shot	Baker’s	arm	off,	he	laughed	at	the	idea	that	the	brothers	might	pose	as	police	officers	and	inform	the	teenagers’	parents	that	their	sons	had	been	killed,	and	he	 laughed	as	he	flicked	bits	of	Mayeski’s	 flesh	off	of	his	pistol.	Harris	coolly	ate	a	carryout	hamburger	the	teenagers	had	left	behind,	scoffing	at	his	brother	for	failing	to	join	him.	Harris	and	his	brother	would	go	on	to	commit	the	 bank	 robbery	 before	 being	 captured	 by	 police.127	Assuming	 that	 Harris	 was	responsible	 for	 his	 actions,	 then	 Harris	 was	 tremendously	 blameworthy	 and	 we	have	great	reason	to	blame	him.	
																																																																																																																																																																					For	a	moving	account	of	the	emotional	difficulty	of	serving	as	a	juror	in	such	a	case,	see	Alex	Kotlowitz’s	 “In	 the	Face	of	Death,”	The	New	York	Times	Magazine	 (July	6,	2003).	127	Horribly,	 one	 of	 the	 police	 officers	 who	 arrested	 Harris	 later	 that	 day	 was	Detective	Steven	Baker,	Michael	Baker’s	 father.	At	 the	 time,	Baker	had	no	 idea	his	son	had	been	killed.	
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But	Harris’s	blameworthiness	is	not	all	of	the	story.	Thinking	of	a	suggestion	from	Strawson,	Watson	asks	what	we	are	to	make	of	Harris’s	“‘being	unfortunate	in	formative	circumstances’”	(1987,	pp.	271–272	quoting	Strawson).	Harris’s	father,	a	decorated	World	War	II	veteran,	suffered	from	shell	shock,	and	his	mother	grew	up	in	 severe	 poverty.	 Both	 abused	 alcohol.	 Harris’s	 father	 viciously	 mistreated	 his	entire	family,	physically	abusing	all	of	them	and	sexually	assaulting	Harris’s	sisters.	Harris	was	born	months	premature	after	his	father,	intoxicated	and	questioning	his	wife’s	 (Harris’s	mother’s)	 fidelity,	 attacked	her,	 sending	her	 into	 labor.	 She	would	later	say	that	bringing	Harris	home	from	the	hospital	was	 like	“taking	a	stranger’s	baby	home.”	Harris’s	 father	never	 accepted	Harris.	He	beat	Harris	with	 a	bamboo	cane,	and	he	 threatened	 to	shoot	Harris,	 loading	his	gun	and	 telling	Harris	 to	 run.	Harris’s	 mother	 came	 to	 resent	 Harris,	 perhaps	 because	 of	 the	 abuse	 she	 herself	suffered	and	the	poverty	under	which	the	family	labored.	When	Harris’s	father	was	eventually	 jailed	 for	 sexual	 abuse,	 Harris’s	mother	 took	 Harris’s	 siblings	 and	 left,	abandoning	Harris	at	14.	Harris’s	mistreatment	by	his	family	was	exacerbated	by	his	experiences	 at	 school.	 He	 suffered	 from	 a	 learning	 disability	 and	 from	 a	 speech	problem,	 which	 led	 to	 teasing	 and	 self-doubt.	 However,	 there	 was	 no	 money	 for	treatment.	Instead,	Harris	spent	most	of	his	formative	teenage	years	incarcerated	in	youth	 facilities	 and	 prisons,	 learning	 to	 fight,	 becoming	 meaner.	 While	 confined,	Harris	was	raped	several	times,	and	he	twice	attempted	suicide	by	slashing	his	own	wrists.	
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These	 two	aspects	of	Harris’s	 story	 commonly	 lead	 to	 conflicting	 reactions.	When	 I	 focus	 on	 Harris’s	 crimes	 and	 the	 suffering	 he	 caused,	 I	 see	 him	 as	blameworthy.	 But	 when	 I	 learn	 of	 Harris’s	 childhood,	 when	 I	 imagine	 those	conditions,	I	feel	sympathy	toward	him.	Even	as	then-Governor	Pete	Wilson	denied	Harris	clemency,	he	noted	his	great	compassion	 for	 “Robert	Harris	 the	child.”	And	my	sympathy	tempers	my	resentment.	This	is	how	McKenna	sees	Harris’s	case:	“The	modification	of	 our	 antipathy	 can	be	understood	as	 a	psychologically	unavoidable	effect	 of	 learning	 of	 Harris’s	 past”	 (1998,	 p.	 138).	 This	 is	 the	 phenomenon	 to	 be	explained.	
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5.2	 Harris’s	history-compromised	reasons-responsiveness	The	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 excuses	 agents	 whose	 reasons-responsiveness	capacities	are	compromised,	and	the	various	component	capacities	of	 reasons-responsiveness	 mark	 various	 excuses	 the	 account	 can	 comfortably	explain.	 Reasons-responsiveness	 and	 its	 components	 are	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	normative	psychology,	and	of	course,	an	agent’s	normative	psychology	has	a	causal	history.	 Accordingly,	 an	 agent’s	 history,	 be	 it	 good	 or	 bad,	 can	 ground	 an	 excuse	when	 the	 history	 “casts	 a	 shadow”	 on	 the	 present	 by	 resulting	 in	 compromised	reasons-responsiveness.	This	much	should	be	uncontroversial,	but	attending	to	the	force	 of	 the	 threat	 bad	 history	 poses	 to	 reasons-responsiveness	 makes	 clear	 just	how	powerful	an	explanation	shadow-casting	is	for	the	bad-history	cases.		5.2.1	 The	shadow	cast	by	bad	history		Although	 the	 study	of	 the	 long-term	 impact	 of	 juvenile	 trauma	 is	 relatively	new,	 and	 although	 I	 should	 be	 cautious	 translating	 from	 the	 lessons	 of	 the	sociologists	 and	 criminologists	 to	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 philosopher,	 the	 empirical	literature	offers	support	for	the	intuition	that	childhood	trauma	might	compromise	reasons-responsiveness. 128 	Empirical	 work	 confirms	 that	 children	 exposed	 to	trauma	 later	 display	 a	 range	 of	 disorders,	 anxieties,	 and	 phobias.	 As	 psychiatrist	Bruce	 Perry	 writes,	 “Traumatic	 experiences	 in	 childhood	 increase	 the	 risk	 of	developing	a	variety	of	neuropsychiatric	symptoms	in	adolescence	and	adulthood”	
																																																								128	See,	e.g.,	Bruce	Perry	et	al.	 (1995),	Robert	Pynoos	et	al.	 (1999),	Christine	Heim	and	Charles	B.	Nemeroff	(2001),	Virginia	Ann	De	Sanctis	et	al.	(2012),	and	James	A.	Reavis	et	al.	(2013).		
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(1995,	p.	273)	And	social	scientists	have	adduced	evidence	that	early	trauma	can,	at	least	in	part,	explain	later	aggressive	behavior	and	criminality.		There	 are	 a	number	of	plausible	 accounts	of	how	early	 trauma	might	 yield	later	 problems.	 Christine	 Heim	 and	 Charles	 B.	 Nemeroff	 describe	 the	 effect	 of	childhood	 trauma	 on	 the	 nervous	 system’s	 use	 of	 corticotropin-releasing	 factor	(CRF).	As	they	explain,	CRF	“is	generally	acknowledged	to	be	the	major	coordinator	of	 the	 behavioral,	 autonomic,	 immune,	 and	 endocrine	 components	 of	 the	mammalian	stress	response”	(2001,	p.	1024).	Corticotropin	 is	often	produced	as	a	response	 to	 stress,	 and	 one	 of	 its	 primary	 functions	 is	 to	 spark	 production	 and	release	 of	 cortisol.	 Problems	 with	 CRF	 distribution	 are	 associated	 with	 major	depression	and	with	anxiety	disorders,	such	as	post-traumatic	stress	disorder.	But	trauma	 during	 development	 seems	 to	 mar	 the	 construction	 of	 healthy	 CRF	mechanisms.	 For	 instance,	 even	 a	 day	 of	 separation	 from	 their	 mothers	 saw	 a	tremendous	reduction	in	pituitary	CRF-receptors	in	young	rats,	likely	a	response	to	CRF-overstimulation.	 Likewise,	 overexposure	 to	 stress	 may	 lead	 to	 reduced	hippocampal	volume	and	 to	alterations	 in	 the	prefrontal	cortex	and	 the	amygdala.	These	 regions	 of	 the	 brain	 are	 believed	 to	 be	 particularly	 important	 for	 decision-making,	 reward-assessment,	 and	 dealing	 with	 anxiety.	 Thus,	 the	 impact	 of	 stress	and	 trauma	on	 the	developing	brain	 is	both	wide	and	deep,	 spanning	much	of	 the	brain	and	causing	serious	changes.	Or	 consider	 the	 evidence	 that	 Perry	 (1995)	 offers	 of	 the	manner	 in	which	early	 trauma	 affects	 the	 development	 of	 neural	 pathways.	 Neurons	 adapt	 to	 the	
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signals	 they	 receive;	 the	 more	 frequently	 a	 neural	 activation	 occurs,	 the	 more	permanent	a	mark	is	made.	Relatedly,	a	regular	pattern	of	activation	can	result	in	an	increase	 in	sensitivity.	And	 in	 the	developing	brain,	repeated	exposure	can	change	the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 later	 adult	 brain.	 The	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 experiences	during	immaturity	or	significant	mistreatment	can	lead	to	“major	abnormalities	or	deficits	 in	neurodevelopment--some	of	which	may	not	be	 reversible”	 (Perry	et	 al.,	1995,	p.	276).	Perry	points	to	significant	examples	of	developing	treatment-resistant	attachment	 problems,	 including,	 “often,	 the	 remorseless,	 violent	 child”	 (1995,	 p.	277).	 All	 of	 this	 evidence	 can	explain	how	 the	very	young	 respond	 to	 trauma.	As	Perry	 explains,	 each	 time	 a	 child	 is	 exposed	 to	 trauma,	 the	 child’s	 developing	response	mechanisms	are	activated.	With	repeated	activation,	the	mechanisms	can	become	 hyper-	 or	 hypoactive;	 this	 is	 the	 upshot	 of	 the	 neural	 learning	 just	described.	 The	 child	 can	 become	more	 sensitive	 to	 trauma,	 leading	 to	 even	more	activation.	This	process	is	exacerbated	if	the	child’s	ordinary	tools	for	dealing	with	trauma	 are	 themselves	 dysfunctional.	 For	 instance,	 unable	 to	 defend	 themselves,	infants	 and	 young	 children	 appeal	 to	 their	 protectors	 (usually	 their	 parents)	 in	times	of	trauma.	A	successful	appeal	both	abates	the	trauma	and	binds	the	child	to	the	 parent.	 If	 the	 appeal	 is	 unsuccessful,	 however,	 the	 originating	 trauma	 is	compounded	by	the	alienation	from	the	parent	and	the	sense	that	the	child	can	do	nothing	to	abate	the	trauma.		
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This	evidence	of	brain	mechanism	and	traumatic	response	provides	support	for	 the	 intuitive	 claim	 that	 developmental	 stress	 mars	 psychological	 health	 and	function.	 Childhood	 stress	 is	 associated	 with	 post-traumatic	 stress,	 attention	deficit/hyperactivity	 disorder,	 depression,	 and	 mood	 and	 anxiety	 disorders.	 As	Perry	 explains,	 repeated	 trauma	 during	 childhood	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 long	 list	 of	 ills:		“motor	hyperactivity,	 anxiety,	 behavioral	 impulsivity,	 sleep	problems,	 tachycardia,	hypertension,	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 neuroendocrine	 abnormalities”	 (1995,	 p.	 278).	 The	brain	 regions	 affected	 by	 stress	 are	 important	 for	 regulating	 arousal	 and	 affect.	Because	 of	 this,	 a	 repeatedly	 traumatized	 child	 may	 struggle	 to	 differentiate	 and	understand	his	emotions,	and	he	may	 fail	 to	develop	normal	control	of	aggression	and	 assertiveness.	 Trauma-response	 emotions	 like	 courage	 and	 fear	 may	 be	suppressed	 or	 heightened.	 These	 emotional	 effects	 may	 interact	 with	 cognitive	disruptions,	as	traumatic	experiences	can	mar	the	capacities	to	properly	assess	risk	and	 danger.	 Then	 there	 are	 psychological	 effects	 which	 develop	 as	 a	 defensive	response	to	trauma.	For	example,	a	child	who	regularly	witnesses	others	subjected	to	 trauma	 may	 develop	 an	 empathy	 deficit	 as	 a	 protective	 defense	 mechanism.	There’s	good	reason	to	believe	that	these	dysfunctional	and	defensive	effects	may	be	additive,	 such	 that	 a	 child	 who	 is	 repeatedly	 exposed	 to	 trauma	 will	 experience	cumulative	harms.	It	isn’t	clear	that	the	philosophers	and	the	scientists	are	deploying	the	same	terminology	and	concepts,	hampering	the	easy	translation	of	the	empirical	research	into	 philosophical	 implications.	 However,	 it	 does	 seem	 that	 early	 trauma	 can	
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undermine	the	reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	Begin	with	the	cognitive	capacity.	Even	in	this	brief	survey,	there	are	a	number	of	ways	that	a	bad	history	may	cause	problems	 for	 the	 agent’s	 later	 capacity	 to	 recognize	 the	 reasons	 there	 are	 and	understand	how	they	fit	together.	Recognizing	reasons	requires	attending	to	them,	and	 so	 attention	 deficits	 compromise	 the	 cognitive	 capacity.	 And	 risk-assessment	problems	 are	 also	 cognitive	 problems.	 In	 almost	 all	 cases,	 the	 propriety	 of	 some	action	 depends	 upon	 the	 risks	 attending	 to	 the	 choice.	 How	 likely	 are	 benefits	 to	accrue?	How	 likely	 are	harms	 to	 result?	 If	 the	 agent	 has	difficulty	 assessing	 risks,	then	the	agent	will	struggle	to	correctly	evaluate	the	choices	she	faces.	For	example,	an	agent	who	has	become	desensitized	to	risk	may	be	unable	to	correctly	assess	the	risks	 to	 others	 her	 choices	would	 create,	 and	 this	may	 lead	 her	 to	 impose	 undue	risks	on	others.		Childhood	 trauma	 also	 undermines	 the	 development	 of	 the	 volitional	capacity.	Many	of	the	emotional	effects	associated	with	a	traumatic	upbringing	bear	directly	 on	 the	 capacities	 needed	 to	 properly	 convert	 practical	 judgments	 into	actions.	 Hyperactivity,	 impulsivity,	 and	 inadequate	 control	 of	 aggression	 and	assertiveness	 all	 compromise	 that	 functioning.	 Of	 course,	 the	 possibility	 that	 an	agent	might	act	occasionally	on	impulse	does	not	render	the	agent	irresponsible.	But	in	 the	 bad-history	 cases,	 where	 impulse	 control	 is	 pathological,	 we	 should	 more	readily	believe	the	agent’s	volitional	capacity	has	been	compromised.	
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5.2.2	 The	mixed	evidence	Harris	presented	to	the	courts	We	can	now	revisit	Harris’s	case	to	see	how	a	closer	look	at	a	particular	bad-history	 case	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 yield	 evidence	 of	 compromised	 reasons-responsiveness.	 Although	 Harris	 plainly	 did	 not	 escape	 his	 upbringing	 with	 a	healthy	 normative	 psychology,	 we	 have	 only	 limited	 information	 about	 his	 exact	mental	 condition.	 What	 we	 know	 about	 his	 condition	 is	 limited	 to	 what	 was	revealed	in	the	course	of	the	courts’	complicated	adjudication	of	Harris’s	crimes	and	punishment.	 At	 trial,	 Harris’s	 counsel	 did	 not	 present	 evidence	 regarding	Harris’s	mental	 health,	 instead	 blaming	 the	 killings	 on	 Harris’s	 brother.	 Harris’s	 counsel	thought	 that	 a	mental-health	 defense	would	 be	 seen	 as	 inconsistent	with	 this	 on-the-elements	defense.	However,	Harris’s	mental	 condition	was	 at	 issue	during	 the	sentencing	phase	of	his	trial.	In	order	to	undermine	Harris’s	belated	claim	to	regret	the	killings,	the	prosecutor	introduced	evidence	that	Harris	suffered	from	antisocial	personality	disorder.	A	prosecution	psychiatrist	testified	that,	while	those	suffering	from	 antisocial	 personality	 disorder	 were	 likely	 to	 regret	 being	 caught	 and	punished,	they	were	unlikely	to	experience	remorse	for	their	wrongs.	The	argument	was	that,	if	Harris	lacked	the	capacity	for	remorse,	his	testimony	at	sentencing	that	he	 regretted	 the	 crimes	 should	 be	 dismissed	 or	 even	 held	 against	 him	 as	dissembling.	 The	 psychiatrist	 also	 testified	 that	 people	who	 suffer	 from	 antisocial	personality	 disorder	 “are	 immature,	 emotionally	 unstable,	 they’re	 callous,	 rather	rigid	 at	 times,	 they’re	 irresponsible,	 impulsive,	 egotistical,	 somewhat	 passively	aggressive	at	times,	they	seem	to	have	an	inability	to	profit	from	past	experience	or	
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punishment.”	 The	 psychiatrist	 explained	 that	 Harris’s	 antisocial	 personality	disorder	likely	arose	because	of	Harris’s	mistreatment	as	a	child.		Harris’s	 mental	 condition	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 crimes	 was	 brought	 up	 again	during	his	appellate	and	post-appellate	litigation,	especially	in	the	litigation	over	the	effectiveness	 of	 his	 trial	 counsel.	 In	 addition	 to	 affirming	 the	 prosecution	psychiatrist’s	 diagnosis,	 Harris’s	 later	 doctors	 also	 found	 evidence	 of	 a	 range	 of	other	 problems,	 including	 fetal	 alcohol	 syndrome,	 post-traumatic	 stress	 disorder,	childhood	head	trauma,	and	organic	brain	damage.	Like	the	prosecution’s	doctor	at	sentencing,	these	later	doctors	traced	Harris’s	conditions	to	his	mistreatment	early	in	life.129		This	 further	 psychiatric	 evidence,	 however,	 proved	 no	 aid	 to	 Harris.	 The	appellate	 courts	 that	 visited	 the	 issue	 considered	 the	 evidence	 procedurally	suspect.130 	But	 even	 setting	 aside	 those	 procedural	 concerns,	 the	 courts	 were	skeptical	 that	Harris’s	psychiatric	evidence	should	excuse.	 In	one	ruling,	 the	Ninth	Circuit	 Court	 of	Appeals	 commented	 that	Harris’s	 conditions	were	distinguishable	from	 “incurable	 and	 dangerous”	 conditions	 like	 paranoid	 schizophrenia	 and	
																																																								129	Tellingly,	 one	 doctor	 explained	 that	 Harris’s	 mental	 health	 seemed	 to	 have	improved	 on	 death	 row,	 crediting	 Harris	 with	 using	 “the	 opportunity	 of	 a	 highly	structured	and	relatively	low	stress	environment	of	death	row	to	weed	out	much	of	his	PTSD	symptomology	and	related	behavior.”	130	For	 instance,	 one	 appellate	 court	 ruled	 that	 Harris	 had	 forfeited	 the	 right	 to	present	 additional	 psychiatric	 evidence	 because	 nine	 years	 had	 passed	 before	 he	presented	 his	 evidence.	 The	 court	 explained	 that	 the	 years-long	 delay	 had	prejudiced	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 respond,	 noting	 that	 one	 of	 Harris’s	 examining	physicians	had	passed	away	during	that	time.	
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hallucinations.131	The	 court	 worried	 about	 treating	 more	 leniently	 someone	 who	rejected	society’s	social	norms	(perhaps	as	an	element	of	a	mental	condition)	than	someone	who	accepted	them	generally	but	flaunted	them	on	a	particular	occasion,	and	the	court	worried	that	there	might	be	some	diagnosable	condition	involved	in	every	 crime	 as	 vicious	 as	 Harris’s.	 Most	 relevantly,	 the	 court	 pointed	 out	 that	Harris’s	conditions	did	not	leave	him	unable	to	understand	the	consequences	of	his	actions	 and	 that	 Harris’s	 condition	 did	 not	 leave	 him	 unable	 to	 refrain	 from	performing	the	particular	crimes.		But	we	should	not	defer	to	the	decisions	of	the	courts,	which	face	evidentiary	and	procedural	hurdles	not	binding	on	philosophical	investigations,	and	we	should	distinguish	 Harris	 the	 defendant	 from	 Harris	 the	 intuition	 pump.	 While	 the	psychological	 capacities	 of	 Harris	 the	 defendant	 are	 a	 matter	 of	 fact	 we	 might	investigate	 by	 turning	 to	 the	 extensive	 record	 generated	 during	 his	 trial	 and	subsequent	 litigation,	 the	 philosophical	 problem	 arises	 because	 of	 our	 conflicting	responses	to	Harris’s	case	as	a	limited	vignette.	Accordingly,	we	may	fairly	confine	ourselves	to	that	vignette.	What	can	the	reasons-responsiveness	advocate	say	about	Harris	the	intuition	pump?		5.2.3	 Harris’s	compromised	risk	sensitivity	Harris’s	 crimes	 were	 multiple,	 complex,	 and	 connected,	 and	 most	 of	 the	wrongdoing	was	planned	in	advance.	He	and	his	brother	spent	a	great	deal	of	time																																																									131	The	 court’s	 concern	with	 the	potential	 for	 cure	 is	misplaced.	That	Harris	 could	have	 cured	 his	 condition	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 cure	 the	 condition	renders	 the	 condition	 normatively	 irrelevant,	 especially	 as	 we	 should	 reject	 the	tracing	doctrine.	The	concern	with	dangerousness,	however,	is	more	important.	
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plotting	their	bank	robbery,	considering	the	risks,	and	preparing	for	the	crime.	But	at	the	core	of	his	culpability	is	the	murder	of	the	two	teens.	Unlike	the	bank	robbery	and	the	theft	of	the	car,	the	murders	seem	to	have	been	spontaneous	and	unplanned.	Harris’s	brother	testified	(albeit	self-servingly)	that	he	was	surprised	by	the	killings.	I	 suspect	 that	 Harris	 killed	 the	 two	 teenagers	 as	 a	 last-second	 decision	 when	 he	feared	that	they	would	turn	the	brothers	in	to	the	police.	While	imprisoned,	Harris	told	another	 inmate:	 “I	couldn't	have	no	punks	running	around	that	could	 identify	me,	 so	 I	 wasted	 them.”	 Thus	 we	 can	 understand	 the	 murders	 as	 an	 immediate	response	to	a	perceived	threat.		But	 Harris’s	 rotten	 social	 background	 almost	 surely	 marred	 his	 ability	 to	assess	 and	 respond	 to	 threats.	 The	 healthy	 exposure	 to	 and	 defusing	 of	 apparent	risks	 during	 childhood	 is	 an	 important	 element	 of	 developing	 a	 healthy	 cognitive	faculty	for	assessing	risk	during	adulthood.	Because	Harris	was	repeatedly	exposed	to	traumatic	risks,	and	because	he	was	almost	never	appropriately	protected	from	those	risks,	we	can	be	confident	that	Harris’s	cognition	of	risks	was	compromised.	In	particular,	we	should	expect	that	Harris	was	hypersensitive	to	risks.	As	Perry	writes,	for	those	subjected	to	serious	developmental	trauma,	“full-blown	response	patterns	…	can	be	elicited	by	apparently	minor	stressors”	(1995,	p.	275).	Children	who	have	undergone	 serious	 trauma	 “are	 hyperreactive	 and	 overly	 sensitive	 …	 very	 easily	moved	from	being	mildly	anxious	to	feeling	threatened	to	being	terrorized”	(1995,	p.	278).	We	can	connect	these	effects	to	the	two	reasons-responsiveness	capacities.	We	 should	 expect	 that	 an	 agent	 in	 the	 throes	of	 oversensitivity	 to	 risk	will	 find	 it	
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difficult	 to	 notice	 countervailing	 matters,	 and	 that	 cognitive	 effect	 will	 likely	 be	paired	 with	 volitional	 impairment.	 The	 repeated	 exposure	 to	 trauma	 likely	undermined	Harris’s	restraint	and	his	control	of	his	aggression,	and	it	likely	left	him	more	exposed	to	impulsive	behaviors.	These	 issues	 should	 not	 affect	 Harris’s	 responsibility	 for	 the	 bank	 robbery	and	the	car	theft.	While	Harris	may	not	have	been	in	possession	of	an	unblemished	faculty	of	risk	perception,	much	of	that	compromise	was	likely	compensated	for	by	Harris’s	advanced	planning,	which	left	him	able	to	coolly	consider	the	consequences	of	his	behaviors	and	able	 to	plan	 in	 light	of	perceived	 risks.	The	 car	 theft	 and	 the	bank	robbery	were	not	wrongs	of	impulse.	But	we	can	understand	Harris’s	killing	of	the	teenagers	differently.	Of	course,	the	risk	that	the	teenagers	would	turn	him	in	to	the	police	would	not	itself	ground	any	justification	or	excuse,	partial	or	otherwise.	The	risk	of	being	reported	is	not	the	sort	of	factor	that	could	support	a	killing	(at	least	in	ordinary	cases).	Nor	would	the	mere	misjudgment	of	that	risk	excuse.	If	a	higher	risk	of	getting	reported	would	not	justify	 the	 killing,	 then	 mistakenly	 judging	 there	 to	 be	 a	 higher	 risk	 of	 getting	reported	would	not	excuse	either.	However,	as	the	murders	seem	to	have	been	rash	and	 unplanned,	 Harris’s	 compromised	 ability	 to	 assess	 risk	 and	 his	 compromised	impulse	control	 surely	played	a	role	 in	 the	killings.	 It	 is	plausible	both	 that	Harris	overestimated	 the	 marginal	 effect	 on	 his	 risk	 of	 being	 caught	 and	 that	 Harris	overweighed	 the	 pragmatic	 downside	 of	 being	 identified.	 These	 misperceptions,	combined	 with	 his	 likely	 compromised	 volitional	 capacity,	 likely	 made	 it	
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correspondingly	more	difficult	to	control	the	impulse	to	kill	the	teenagers.	If	that’s	so,	we	might	reasonably	conclude	that	Harris	was	not	fully	reasons-responsive	with	respect	to	the	murders.132	That	Harris’s	impulsivity	might	have	limited	his	reasons-responsiveness	with	respect	 to	 the	 murders	 is	 an	 important	 conclusion.	 Though	 Harris	 committed	 a	number	of	crimes	during	his	spree--the	car	theft	and	the	bank	robbery	among	them--the	two	murders	are	clearly	the	worst	of	the	lot.	Our	reactions	to	Harris	are	largely	our	reactions	to	the	two	murders.	So	even	if	he	was	fully	responsible	for	every	other	element	 of	 his	 spree,	 we	 should	 expect	 his	 compromised	 responsibility	 for	 the	murders	 to	 significantly	 affect	 his	 overall	 level	 of	 culpability.	 Because	 of	 this,	 an	intuition	that	Harris	is	not	fully	culpable	can	be	explained	as	tracking	his	expected	compromised	responsibility	for	the	two	murders.	His	bad	history	indirectly	explains	why	he	is	not	fully	responsible	for	the	murders.	So	here	we	have	one	explanation	for	our	experienced	response	to	Harris’s	case	that	gives	his	history	an	indirect	role.	5.2.4	 Harris’s	compromised	empathy	My	second	argument	is	that	Harris’s	traumatic	upbringing	compromised	his	capacity	for	empathy	and	that	this	compromised	empathy	limited	Harris’s	capacity	to	 discern,	 make	 sense	 of,	 and	 respond	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 teenagers	 and	 the	
																																																								132	Of	course,	that	Harris’s	impulse	control	was	compromised	does	not	mean	that	it	was	so	compromised	that	he	might	be	entitled	to	an	excuse.	Perfect	impulse	control	is	not	required	for	responsibility,	only	substantial	impulse	control,	and	it	is	not	clear	that	 Harris	 lacked	 substantial	 impulse	 control.	 This	 is	 a	 place	 where	 further	investigation	 into	 Harris’s	 particulars	 might	 help	 inform	 the	 debate.	 As	 I	 explain	shortly,	however,	even	the	mere	suspicion	might	help	explain	our	discomfort	with	Harris’s	case.	
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reasons	not	 to	 kidnap	 and	 then	kill	 them.	As	 I	 explained	previously,	 empathy	 can	play	 a	 number	 of	 roles	 in	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 scheme.	 In	 development,	empathy	can	help	habituate	us	to	respond	to	moral	reasons,	and	at	the	time	of	our	behavior,	it	can	help	to	draw	our	attention	to	certain	moral	reasons	and	it	can	help	motivate	 appropriate	behavior.	Moreover,	 if	 a	 thick	understanding	of	 the	 relevant	moral	reasons	is	required,	empathy	might	even	be	necessary	for	cognition	of	at	least	certain	 reasons.	 These	 roles	 for	 empathy	 are	 not	 wholly	 uncontroversial.	 The	constitutive	 role	 for	 empathy	 (the	 last	 role	 described)	 in	 particular	 requires	 a	controversial	 account	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 knowledge	 required	 for	moral	 responsibility,	and	 the	 other	 roles	 for	 empathy	 (where	 empathy	 serves	 as	 an	 aid	 to	 the	responsibility	capacities)	may	be	helpful	but	not	necessary	for	moral	responsibility.		While	the	philosophical	role	for	empathy	might	be	controversial,	it	is	almost	certain	 that	 Harris’s	 capacity	 to	 empathize	 was	 drastically	 compromised.	 The	reports	 from	 Harris’s	 family,	 from	 those	 around	 him	 in	 prison	 after	 his	incarceration,	 and	 from	 the	 physicians	 who	 testified	 throughout	 his	 legal	proceedings	 make	 it	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 he	 had	 severe	 empathy	 problems.	Harris’s	mother	explained	that	“The	only	way	he	could	vent	his	feelings	was	to	break	or	kill	something.	...	He	had	no	feeling	for	life,	no	sense	of	remorse.”	And	one	of	his	jailmates	 commented	 of	 Harris	 that,	 “He	 doesn’t	 care	 about	 life,	 he	 doesn’t	 care	about	others,	he	doesn’t	care	about	himself.”	Harris	is	like	many	bad-history	agents	in	that	his	bad	history	apparently	compromised	his	capacity	for	empathy.	
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Assuming	that	Harris	was	burdened	with	an	empathetic	deficit,	it	would	have	been	 marginally	 more	 difficult	 for	 him	 to	 see	 that	 the	 killings	 would	 have	 been	wrong,	 and	 it	 would	 have	 been	 marginally	 more	 difficult	 for	 him	 to	 resist	 the	pragmatic	 urge	 to	 kill	 the	 teenagers.	 We	 should	 expect	 that	 his	 cognitive	 and	volitional	capacities	were	less	sensitive,	and	we	should	expect	that	they	functioned	without	 the	 ordinary	 aid	 of	 empathy.	 And	 Harris	 might	 have	 been	 denied	 the	possibility	 of	 seeing	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 wrongness	 of	 the	 killings	 altogether.	 The	depth	 of	 his	 empathy	 deficit	 combined	 with	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 roles	 plausibly	played	by	empathy	should	make	us	reticent	 to	conclude	 that	Harris	possessed	 the	requisite	 reasons-responsiveness	 capacities.	 And	 that	 reticence	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	explaining	the	felt	discomfort	with	judging	Harris	fully	blameworthy.		These	are	thus	two	ways	we	might	suspect	Harris’s	rotten	background	might	ground	excuse.	Neither	explanation,	however,	requires	that	Harris’s	history	be	given	a	direct	role	in	the	determination	of	his	moral	responsibility.	Instead,	in	both	cases,	Harris’s	history	has	an	indirect	impact	on	his	responsibility.	Moreover,	it	is	plausible	that	neither	of	 these	potential	excuses	will	be	availing.	Harris	did	have	substantial	control	 over	 his	 behavior,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 empathy	 in	 moral	 responsibility	 is	controversial.	However,	explanations	like	these	might	accord	with	the	thought	that	Harris’s	background	was	so	unlike	ours	that	surely	it	is	likely	that	he	did	not	escape	his	 childhood	 relevantly	 unscathed.	 That	 is,	 these	 potential	 explanations	 can	highlight	a	background	suspicion	we	should	have	about	Harris.	These	explanations	and	 that	 background	 suspicion	 can	 explain	why	our	 intuitive	 response	 to	Harris’s	
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case	 is	 sensitive	 to	 Harris’s	 history	 without	 giving	 history	 a	 direct	 role	 in	 the	determination	of	responsibility.	
5.3	 Being	sympathetic	to	bad-history	agents	In	many	bad-history	cases,	we	should	expect	that	the	agent’s	bad-history	has	“cast	 a	 shadow,”	 leaving	 the	 agent	 without	 the	 full	 reasons-responsiveness	capacities	 required	 for	 moral	 responsibility.	 But	 we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 look	 to	compromised	responsibility	to	explain	why	we	should	refrain	from	fully	blaming	the	bad-history	agents.	 It	 is	because	we	should	also	 feel	 sympathy	 for	 the	bad-history	agents	that	we	should	not	fully	blame	them.	The	bad-history	agents	are	both	blame-	and	 sympathy-worthy,	 and	 so	 we	 have	 pro	 tanto	 reason	 to	 blame	 and	 pro	 tanto	reason	to	sympathize.	However,	in	many	cases,	we	cannot	fully	make	good	on	both	of	 those	 warranted	 responses--we	 cannot	 both	 fully	 blame	 and	 fully	 sympathize.	Thus	 the	grounds	 for	sympathy	(and	not	merely	what	 those	grounds	might	 tell	us	about	the	agent’s	reasons-responsiveness)	tell	against	fully	blaming	the	bad-history	agents.	This	insight	is	of	tremendous	importance.	Many	of	the	most	serious	cases	of	wrongdoing	involve	bad	history,	and	so	we	need	to	make	sense	of	the	relationship	between	 blame	 and	 sympathy	 to	 get	 our	 responses	 right	 in	 those	 cases.	 And	 this	insight	 is	 also	 important	 in	 addressing	 historicism	 about	 responsibility,	 given	 the	centrality	of	the	bad-history	cases	for	many	historicists’	arguments.	The	historicists	think	 that	 a	 history-sensitive	 component	 of	 responsibility	 explains	 our	 intuitions	about	those	cases.	My	argument	here	provides	a	compelling,	alternative	explanation,	
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defusing	 the	 usual	 arguments	 for	 historicism,	 and	 strengthening	 the	 case	 for	 an	ahistoricist,	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	responsibility.133	5.3.1	 The	distinctive	conflicts	in	overlap	cases	To	tell	that	story,	I	begin	by	looking	at	a	class	of	cases	I	call	“overlap	cases.”	In	overlap	cases,	the	grounds	which	make	two	(or	more)	distinct	responses	fitting	are	co-present.	Consider	the	charming	colleague	case	offered	by	Wallace	(1994,	pp.	76–77).134	This	colleague	is	especially	charming;	perhaps	this	colleague	is	attentive	and	witty,	 or	 perhaps	 he	 is	 an	 engaging	 and	 sympathetic	 listener,	 a	 confident	 but	 not	dominating	 interlocutor.	However,	 the	 colleague	has	 also	 cheated	 and	 lied	 to	 you.	Blame	 is	 a	 fitting	 response	 to	 the	 colleague’s	wrongdoing,	 but	 being	 charmed	 is	 a	fitting	 responsive	 to	 the	 colleague’s	 charm.	 In	 some	 overlap	 cases,	 like	Wallace’s	charming	 colleague	 case,	 the	 two	 (or	more)	 fitting	 responses	 are	both	directed	 at	the	same	agent.	But	other	overlap	cases	are	more	complex	than	this.	In	Harris’s	case,	for	 instance,	 blame	 is	 fitting	 toward	Harris	 but	 blame	 is	 also	 fitting	 toward	 those	who	neglected	and	mistreated	Harris.	What	is	important	is	there	are	simultaneously	two	 or	more	 responses	 it	would	 be	 fitting	 for	 the	 evaluating	 agent	 to	 experience.	Overlap	cases	of	both	sorts	are	neither	rare	nor	unfamiliar.	They	are	 the	ordinary	cases.	Because	the	world	is	complicated,	overlap	cases	abound.		
																																																								133	McKenna	(2012)	gestures	at	a	similar	argument.	134	Wallace	uses	this	case	to	distinguish	between	judging	someone	blameworthy	and	blaming	them.	We	judge	the	charming	colleague	blameworthy	without	blaming	him.	We	 judge	 the	 colleague	 blameworthy	 because	 we	 judge	 that	 the	 colleague	 was	responsible	 and	 committed	 a	 wrongdoing.	 But	 because	 we	 don’t	 experience	 the	requisite	 affective	 response,	 our	 response	 to	 him	 does	 not	 include	 the	 blaming	reactive	attitudes.	
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Overlap	 cases	 yield	 a	 distinctive	 conflict.	 Consider	 the	 charming	 colleague.	There,	 as	 Wallace	 explains,	 the	 colleague’s	 charming	 nature	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	work	up	full	resentment.	It	is	difficult,	and	perhaps	even	impossible,	both	to	be	fully	charmed	 by	 the	 colleague	 and	 to	 fully	 blame	 the	 colleague.	 This	 conflict	 is	 an	ordinary	phenomenon.	We	should	expect	conflicts	like	this	because	the	responses	require	resources,	psychological	resources	in	particular,	and	we	are	finite	agents,	with	finite	resources.	For	 instance,	 our	 reactive	 attitudes	 both	 require	 and	 command	 attention.	 It	 is	familiar	that	noticing,	focusing,	and	dwelling	on	a	wrong	naturally	lead	to	blame	and	resentment,	and	it	is	familiar	that	the	stronger	the	attention,	the	stronger	the	blame	experienced.	 Correspondingly,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 surprising	 that	 we	 might	 fail	 to	muster	up	full	resentment	unless	we	sufficiently	attend	to	the	wrongdoing	at	issue.	So	 our	 responses	 seem	 to	 require	 attention.	 And	 our	 responses	 can	 capture	 our	attention.	 This	 is	 one	 important	 consequence	 of	 the	 seeing-as	 dimension	 of	 the	reactive	attitudes.	When	we	resent	someone,	our	resentment	focuses	our	attention	on	the	wrongdoing	at	 issue,	we	see	the	wrongdoer	in	 light	of	the	wrongdoing,	and	we	more	readily	notice	matters	consistent	with	seeing	the	wrongdoer’s	behavior	as	expressing	ill	will	and	more	readily	overlook	matters	inconsistent	with	seeing	things	that	way.	This	explains	why	it	is	a	familiar	experience	that	it	is	difficult	when	angry	to	attend	to	other	affairs.	When	we	are	angry,	we	are	highly	aware	of	the	nature	of	the	wrong	at	issue,	and	we	often	think	and	examine	the	wrong	mentally,	considering	its	 causes,	 its	 effects,	 and	 the	 blameworthiness	 of	 the	 wrongdoer.	 This	 effect	
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occludes	our	attending	to	other	matters,	including	the	grounds	for	other	responses.	Because	our	attention	is	limited,	our	responses	are	limited.	We	can	only	attend	to	so	much,	and	so	we	can	only	respond	to	so	much.	Likewise,	 many	 of	 our	 responses	 are	 associated	 with	 distinctive	phenomenologies.	 Anger	 has	 a	 feel,	 and	 being	 charmed	 has	 a	 feel.	 Perhaps	 those	phenomenologies	are	constitutive	of	the	various	responses,	perhaps	they	are	causal	upshots	of	the	responses,	or	perhaps	there	is	some	other	relationship.	In	any	event,	the	phenomenologies	are	central	to	the	responses.	So	to	be	angry	seems	to	require	the	distinctive	phenomenology	of	anger,	and	likewise	for	the	other	responses.	Here	too	we	see	reason	to	anticipate	conflict	in	the	overlap	cases.	We	can	experience	only	so	 much	 at	 a	 time,	 and	 in	 fact	 we	 can	 experience	 only	 very	 little	 at	 a	 time.	 For	instance,	it	would	be	difficult	to	feel	both	resentment	and	gratefulness	at	the	same	time.	Because	our	experiences	are	limited,	our	responses	are	limited.	These	conflicts	are	complicated	when	we	recall	that	reactive	attitudes	might	be	experienced	in	either	episodes	or	stances.	It	seems	plain	to	me	that	the	episodes	of	 different	 responses	might	 conflict	with	 each	 other.	 It	 is	 less	 clear	 how	 stances	might	conflict,	or	whether	we	could	make	sense	of	a	conflict	between	a	stance	of	one	reactive	attitude	and	an	episode	of	another.	I	set	those	complications	aside,	thinking	from	here	about	episodes	of	resentment,	sympathy,	being	charmed,	and	the	like.	Return	 to	 the	 charming	 colleague.	When	we	 are	 charmed,	we	 focus	 on	 the	charmer’s	 flattery	 and	wit.	We	 see	 the	 charmer	 in	 light	 of	 his	 charming	 behavior,	interpreting	 the	 charmer’s	 other	 features	 positively	 and	 sympathetically,	 and	
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discounting	 features	 inconsistent	with	 being	 charming.	 This	 framing	 is	 in	 tension	with	 attending	 to	 the	 charmer’s	 wrongdoing.	 While	 we	 might	 in	 some	 sense	 be	simultaneously	aware	that	the	charming	colleague	is	witty	and	a	wrongdoer,	we	can	only	attend	to	so	much	at	a	time,	and	so	we	cannot	simultaneously	be	fully	charmed	and	fully	resentful.	And	being	charmed	requires	a	certain	warmth,	notably	distinct	from	 the	 heat	 of	 anger.	 We	 cannot	 simultaneously	 experience	 both.	 In	 both	dimensions,	blame	conflicts	with	being	charmed.	These	conflicts	have	 important	normative	upshots.	We	might,	as	a	standing	assumption,	take	it	that	we	have	some	reason	to	experience	fitting	responses.135	In	the	overlap	cases,	this	means	that	we	have	some	reason	to	experience	at	least	two	different	 responses.	 By	 the	 instrumental	 principle,	 we	 also	 have	 some	 reason	 to	engage	 in	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 of	 those	 responses.	 However,	 because	 of	 the	conflicts	 between	 the	 responses,	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 of	 any	 one	 of	 the	responses	will	 include	 foregoing	 or	 at	 least	 curtailing	 the	 other	 responses.	 But	 of	course,	this	means	that	we	have	reason	to	engage	in	explicitly	conflicting	behaviors.	In	 order	 to	 figure	 out	 what	 responses	 we	 should	 have,	 then,	 we	 would	 need	 to	reflect	on	the	values	of	the	responses	and	the	practical	limits	of	our	behavior.		Consider	 two	ways	of	developing	Wallace’s	 charming-colleague	case.	 In	 the	first	variant,	the	wrongdoing	committed	by	the	colleague	is	slight.	 In	that	case,	the	lesser	nature	of	 the	wrongdoing	reduces	 the	 importance	of	blaming	 the	colleague.	
																																																								135	As	 I	noted	before,	 this	 assumption	 is	widely	assumed	and	 sometimes	explicitly	stated.	McKenna	 (2012,	 p.	 36),	 for	 instance,	 claims	 that	 blameworthiness	 yields	 a	pro	tanto	reason	to	blame.	But	it	is	rarely	defended.	
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The	grounds	for	blaming	being	therefore	weaker,	dwelling	on	it	in	order	to	avoid	the	eclipsing	 effect	 of	 the	 colleague’s	 charm	 might	 be	 inappropriate	 or	 at	 least	 not	required.	 In	 the	 case	 where	 the	 wrongdoing	 is	 slight,	 therefore,	 there	 might	 be	nothing	inappropriate	about	failing	to	blame,	even	though	the	charming	colleague	is	blameworthy.	 In	 the	 second	 variant,	 by	 contrast,	 imagine	 that	 the	 wrongdoing	committed	 by	 the	 colleague	 is	 a	 significant	 wrongdoing	 to	 some	 innocent	 and	seriously	 harmed	 third	 party.	 This	 might	 make	 the	 case	 for	 blame	 especially	pressing.	 It	 is	 still	of	 course	 true	 that	 fully	blaming	 the	agent	 requires	avoiding	or	overcoming	 the	 urge	 to	 be	 charmed,	 though	 perhaps	 the	 attention-grabbing	viciousness	of	the	wrongdoing	will	make	this	easier.	But	the	costs	required	to	avoid	being	charmed	seem	worth	paying.	Of	course,	we	might	avoid	these	conflicts	if	our	psychologies	were	such	as	to	express	both	or	all	responses	comfortably.	It	might	sometimes	be	open	to	an	agent	to	 change	 her	 moral	 psychology	 and	 to	 thereby	 lessen	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 her	responses	come	into	conflict.	Even	if	this	is	not	true	immediately,	it	might	be	true	in	the	 longer	 run.	 But	 this	 too	 has	 significant	 costs.	 It	 is	 not	 free	 to	 change	 one’s	psychology.	It	might	require	a	prolonged	and	difficult	effort.	And	there’s	no	reason	to	think	that	healthy,	virtuous,	duly	responsive	human	agents	won’t	be	marked	by	something	 like	 our	 ordinary	 psychological	 conflicts.	 Perhaps	 more	 sophisticated	agents,	 non-human	 agents,	might	 escape	 these	 conflicts.	 But	 for	 us,	 there	 is	 good	reason	 to	 think	 that	 we	 should	 have	 some	 conflicts.	 We	 need	 not	 think	 that	 the	conflicts	which	we	happen	to	have	now	are	exactly	those	which	it	would	be	best	to	
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have.	 But	 it	 is	 probably	 true	 that	 there	 are	 some	 conflicts	which	we	 should	 have,	given	 that	we	 are	 finite	 beings,	 and	 hopefully	 our	 actual	 conflicts	 are	 not	 too	 far	from	 those.	 If	 that’s	 so,	 then	 the	 right	 arrangement	 of	 our	 limited	 faculties	 is	 one	which	would	in	fact	constrain	the	responses	we	can	have	at	the	same	time.		I	 should	 be	 careful	 about	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 reasons	 to	 blame	 being	outweighed.	First,	 that	 the	 reasons	 to	blame	are	outweighed	can	sometimes	mean	that	 it	 is	 inappropriate	 to	 blame.	 If	 those	 outweighing	 reasons	 are	 important	enough,	 failing	 to	heed	 them	would	be	wrong,	 and	blaming	would	psychologically	entail	failing	to	heed	those	reasons.	Thus,	if	the	outweighing	reasons	are	important	enough,	 blaming	 could	 be	 inappropriate.	 But	 that	 the	 reasons	 to	 blame	 are	outweighed	need	not	mean	that	it	is	inappropriate	to	blame;	it	might	merely	mean	that	it	is	not	inappropriate	not	to	blame.	Whether	it	is	inappropriate	to	blame	or	just	not	 inappropriate	 not	 to	 blame	 might	 depend,	 for	 instance,	 upon	 the	 degree	 to	which	 the	costs	of	blaming	would	be	borne	by	 the	would-be	blamer.	For	 instance,	because	blaming	can	commandeer	attention,	one	cost	of	blaming	is	the	disruption	it	can	cause	to	one’s	other	projects,	and	this	is	a	cost	ordinarily	borne	by	the	blamer.	When	the	costs	of	blaming	would	largely	be	borne	by	the	would-be	blamer,	it	might	be	thought	that	whether	to	give	effect	to	the	normative	weight	of	those	costs	is	up	to	the	would-be	 blamer.	 If	 that’s	 so,	 blaming	might	 be	 permissible,	 but	 not	 blaming	might	also	be	permissible.	Second,	that	it	might	be	inappropriate	to	blame	an	agent	does	not	entail	that	the	agent	blamed	has	grounds	to	object	to	being	blamed.	Not	everyone	has	the	same	
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right	to	object	to	a	given	wrong,	and	for	some	wrongs,	some	people	might	have	no	right	or	a	de	minimis	right	 to	object.	Whether	an	agent	has	grounds	 to	object	 to	a	particular	 wrong	 depends	 upon	 whether	 their	 interests	 are	 at	 stake	 in	 the	wrongdoing.	 Sometimes	 the	 blameworthy	 agent	 has	 important	 interests	 in	 the	conflicting	reactions	in	the	overlap	cases,	but	not	always.	Think	again	of	charm.	We	have	an	important	interest	in	being	perceived	as	charming--it	is	easy	to	imagine	my	life	 being	 better	 in	 important	ways	 if	 others	 (correctly!)	 take	me	 to	 be	 charming.	However,	there	are	also	significant	reasons	to	respond	to	charm	which	lie	in	other	agents.	 It	 is	pleasant	to	be	one	who	is	charmed.	Where	the	reasons	supporting	the	attitude	which	conflicts	with	blame	are	significantly	 tied	 to	 the	 interests	of	agents	other	than	the	agent	who	would	be	blamed,	that	agent	has	correspondingly	weaker	reason	to	object	to	being	blamed.136	Third,	 the	 outweighing	 effect	 need	 not	 always	 be	 binary.	 Sometimes	 the	outweighing	costs	might	render	it	inappropriate	to	blame	altogether,	but	sometimes	they	 might	 merely	 render	 it	 inappropriate	 to	 fully	 blame.	 Whether	 that	 is	 so	depends	upon	whether	mixed	responses	are	possible.	Plausibly,	we	can	experience	some	degree	of	blame	and	some	degree	of	some	other	response.	If	that’s	so,	then	the	outweighing	 costs	 could	 make	 some	 mixed	 response	 a	 permissible	 or	 even	preferred	response.																																																									136	This	 is	 perhaps	 easier	 to	 see	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 reasons	 against	 blaming	 a	blameworthy	agent	are	more	ordinary	consequences.	For	 instance,	 imagine	a	case	where	the	reasons	to	blame	some	agent	are	outweighed	by	the	harms	that	blaming	the	 agent	 would	 impose	 on	 innocent	 third	 parties.	 This	 might	 be	 a	 case	 where	blaming	a	parent	harms	their	child.	In	that	case,	even	if	it	is	inappropriate	to	blame	the	parent,	the	right	to	object	lies	in	the	child,	not	in	the	parent.	
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Finally,	 even	 if	 blameworthiness	 is	 outweighed,	 that	 does	 not	 entail	 that	blameworthiness	 becomes	 insignificant.	 Blameworthiness	 can	 serve	 a	 number	 of	roles.	 One	 role	 is	 to	 ground	 a	 pro	 tanto	 reason	 to	 blame,	 and	my	 argument	 here	suggests	that	when	blameworthiness	is	outweighed	that	pro	tanto	reason	does	not	yield	 an	 all-things-considered	 reason.	 But	 blameworthiness	might	 still	 have	 other	roles.	Blameworthiness	might,	for	instance,	make	it	appropriate	for	us	to	adjust	our	interpersonal	 relationships,	 or	 blameworthiness	 might	 be	 seen	 as	 grounds	 for	making	certain	sorts	of	inferences	about	an	agent’s	character.	Just	as	I	mean	to	focus	on	the	sort	of	responsibility	associated	with	the	appropriateness	of	blame,	and	not	other	sorts	of	responsibility,	I	mean	to	focus	here	on	the	role	of	blameworthiness	in	rendering	 blame	 appropriate,	 and	 not	 any	 other	 roles	 for	 blameworthiness.	 I	 set	considering	those	roles	aside	for	some	other	time.	My	 discussion	 of	 the	 normative	 features	 of	 the	 overlap	 cases	 takes	 me	outside	 the	 core	 fittingness	 concerns	of	 a	 theory	of	moral	 responsibility.	Why	not	think	 that,	 in	 such	cases,	our	 theory	of	blame	might	 rightly	 say	only	 that	blame	 is	appropriate	as	far	as	it	is	fitting	and	leave	it	to	our	comprehensive	moral	theory	to	say	 that	 blame	 is	 inappropriate	 all-things-considered?	 Forcing	 a	 theory	 of	appropriate	 blame	 to	 address	 every	 fact	 which	 might	 bear	 on	 the	 all-things-considered	 appropriateness	 of	 blame	 seems	 to	 preclude	 having	 a	 theory	distinctively	about	blame.	In	that	case,	there	would	just	be	the	larger	theory	of	the	reasons	that	make	behaviors	appropriate	or	inappropriate,	applied	to	the	particular	
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case	of	blame.137	So	 it	might	 seem	that	we	should	cabin	our	 theory	of	appropriate	blame	to	internal	matters,	matters	like	quality	of	will	and	reasons-responsiveness.	Although	I	have	sympathy	with	this	concern,	 it	 is	not	 fatal	 to	my	argument.	Suppose	that	we	accept	that	our	moral	responsibility	theorizing	should	be	limited	to	the	internal	norms	of	blame.	Still,	a	theorist	concerned	only	with	that	more	limited	project	 should	 take	 heed	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 outweighing	 reasons	 in	 the	 overlap	cases.	 So	 long	 as	 we	 appeal	 to	 our	 intuitions	 about	 cases	 where	 blame’s	appropriateness	 is	 at	 issue	 in	 order	 to	 pick	 out	 the	 content	 of	 a	 theory	 of	blameworthiness,	we	need	to	be	aware	that	there	could	be	factors	rendering	blame	inappropriate	beyond	the	lack	of	blameworthiness.	We	need	to	avoid	the	moralistic	fallacy.	And	so	a	theorist	who	fails	to	consider	those	latter	situations	might	produce	a	 theory	 which	 errs,	 attributing	 some	 externally	 driven	 phenomenon	 to	 internal	features	for	want	of	broader	consideration.	And	the	overlap	cases	aren’t	just	any	old	phenomenon	which	an	overarching	moral	 theory	 should	 account	 for.	 In	 discussing	 the	 relationship	 between	blameworthiness	 and	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 blame,	 McKenna	 offers	 an	 example	where	 blaming	 would	 result	 in	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 planet.	 While	 that	consequence	surely	has	normative	significance,	it	is	only	contingently	and	remotely	related	to	blame.	There’s	nothing	particular	about	blame	that	makes	it	the	case	that	
																																																								137 	Vargas	 argues	 that	 “a	 theory	 of	 responsibility	 must	 be	 silent	 on	 those	considerations	whose	origin	or	normative	force	places	them	external	to	the	norms	of	 responsibility”	 (2013,	 p.	 184).	 Once	 we	 go	 beyond	 matters	 internal	 to	 the	propriety	 of	 blame,	 “the	 question	 becomes	 uninteresting	 for	 a	 theory	 of	responsibility”	(ibid.).	
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one	 instance	of	blame	threatens	the	planet.	By	contrast,	 the	concerns	posed	 in	the	overlap	 cases	 are	 intimately	 concerned	with	 the	 nature	 of	 reactive	 attitudes.	 The	countervailing	reasons	of	the	overlap	cases	arise	because	of	the	phenomenological	experiences	 and	 the	 framing	 effects	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes.	 These	 overlap	 cases	arise	because	of	distinctive	features	of	the	reactive	attitudes,	and	surely	a	theory	of	the	conditions	of	the	appropriateness	of	the	reactive	attitudes	should	attend	to	their	distinctive	features.	Finally,	my	concern	is	not	solely	with	a	theory	of	responsibility	or	a	theory	of	blameworthiness.	My	interests	are	decidedly	practical.	I	am	concerned	about	getting	blame	right.	A	theory	of	the	norms	internal	to	blaming	is	important	to	that	practical	project.	 But	 I	 also	 want	 to	 understand	 how	 blame	 ordinarily	 operates	 and	 what	import	blame	has	for	blamers	like	us	and	wrongdoings	like	ours.	So	while	a	theory	of	 the	 internal	 norms	 of	 blame	 might	 well	 omit	 any	 reference	 to	 countervailing	reasons,	 an	 account	 of	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 blame	 should	 not.	 A	 theory	 of	 the	appropriateness	of	blame	should	have	something	to	say	about	the	sorts	of	agents	we	might	expect	to	see	blaming	and	the	sorts	of	agents	we	might	expect	to	see	blamed,	and	 it	 should	 have	 something	 to	 say	 about	 the	 sorts	 of	 circumstances	 where	 we	might	expect	blaming	to	take	place.	Consider	McKenna’s	case	again.	It’s	true	that	the	continued	existence	of	the	planet	is	important.	However,	this	is	not	a	concern	which	regularly	 arises	 (or	 has	 ever	 arisen)	 with	 regard	 to	 any	 particular	 instance	 of	blaming.	However,	things	are	different	with	regard	to	the	conflicts	between	blaming	and	our	other	potential	 responses,	 conflicts	which	are	ubiquitous	 in	practice.	This	
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means	that	a	theory	of	blaming	should	have	something	to	say	about	the	matters	that	could	 tell	 against	 blaming.	 The	 theory	 need	 not	 account	 in	 particular	 for	 all	 such	matters,	but	 it	should	account	for	those	which	arise	with	sufficient	regularity	such	that	an	ordinary	agent	should	possess	a	ready	sensitivity	to	those	sorts	of	facts.	5.3.2	 Harris	as	an	overlap	case	We	can	now	return	to	Harris’s	case,	looking	at	it	as	an	overlap	case.	With	the	historicists,	I	assume	for	purposes	of	argument	that	Harris	is	reasons-responsive.138	In	contrast	with	the	historicists,	however,	I	take	it	that	his	reasons-responsiveness	is	sufficient	 for	 his	 responsibility.	 And	 his	 crimes	 are	 horrific,	 malicious,	 and	devastating.	 Therefore,	 I	 assume	 for	 purposes	 of	 argument	 that	 Harris	 is	blameworthy	 for	 those	 crimes	and	 that	we	as	outside	 agents	who	have	played	no	particular	role	in	bringing	about	his	wrongdoing	have	significant	pro	tanto	reason	to	blame	and	resent	Harris.		As	 I’ve	argued,	however,	blame	 is	not	 the	only	response	we	have	reason	 to	experience.	As	Watson	and	McKenna	note	and	as	 former	California	Governor	Pete	Wilson	noted,	we	should	feel	sympathy	toward	Harris.	His	upbringing	was	horrific,	and	 so	 we	 should	 feel	 for	 him	 both	 for	 the	 suffering	 that	 his	 upbringing	 surely	caused	and	for	the	lost	opportunity	to	develop	a	healthy	moral	psychology.	And	we	should	 resent	 those	who	mistreated	Harris,	 both	 those	 in	 his	 family	 and	 those	 in	
																																																								138 	Although	 they	 are	 not	 committed	 to	 Harris	 in	 particular	 being	 reasons-responsive,	 they	need	 the	bad-history	agents	 to	be	reasons-responsive	 in	order	 to	do	 the	needed	dialectical	work.	 In	 fact,	 I	presume	 that	Harris	was	 in	 fact	not	 fully	reasons-responsive.	 I	 assume	 that	 his	 horrific	 bad-history	 compromised	 the	development	of	his	normative	psychology,	as	I	have	explained	previously.	
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institutional	positions	to	help	him.	And,	importantly,	we	should	also	feel	sympathy	toward	 Harris’s	 victims--Baker,	 Mayeski,	 and	 their	 families.	 The	 innocent	 victims	suffered	terribly	and	without	reason.	So	we	should	see	Harris’s	case	as	not	just	one	where	resenting	Harris	is	at	issue	but	also	one	where	these	responses	(and	probably	many	others	besides)	are	at	issue	as	well.	The	 resentment	 we	 might	 feel	 toward	 Harris	 is	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 other	potential	 responses.	Resentment	conflicts	phenomenologically	with	sympathy,	and	so	it	will	be	difficult	to	feel	the	full	force	of	both	the	resentment	due	Harris	for	his	culpable	wrongdoings	and	the	sympathy	due	him	for	the	way	he	was	treated	in	the	past.	And,	perhaps	surprisingly,	it	might	be	difficult	to	feel	both	the	full	force	of	the	resentment	 due	Harris	 and	 the	 full	 force	 of	 the	 sympathy	 due	 his	 victims	 for	 the	suffering	 he	 caused.139	Resenting	 Harris	 also	 requires	 that	 we	 see	 Harris	 as	 a	wrongdoer,	 that	we	 see	him	 in	 the	 light	 of	 his	wrongdoing.	 This	 requires	 that	we	attend	to	his	wrongs,	and	that	constrains	the	attention	we	can	direct	toward	the	way	he	was	treated	in	his	past	and	might	even	to	some	degree	constrain	the	attention	we	can	 direct	 toward	 the	 ways	 his	 victims	 have	 suffered.	 For	 instance,	 someone	concentrating	 on	 the	 suffering	 of	 Harris’s	 victims	 might	 be	 fully	 engaged	 in	sympathetic	 imagining	 and	 in	 identifying	 reparative	 possibilities--which	 might	
																																																								139	As	Dana	Nelkin	has	noted,	I	have	left	it	open	that	the	reactive	attitudes	might	not	include	 any	 particularly	 distinctive	 phenomenology.	 Accordingly,	 there	 might	 be	cases	 where	 there	 is	 no	 phenomenological	 conflict.	 However,	 because	 I	 take	 the	seeing-as	element	to	be	central	and	necessary	to	the	reactive	attitudes,	there	will	be	conflicts	there.	
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make	the	work	of	paying	attention	to	the	wrongdoer	more	difficult	(though	I	expect	some	readers	will	find	this	exercise	easier	than	others).	Because	 of	 this	 conflict,	 we	 can	 fully	 blame	 Harris	 only	 if	 we	 forego	 or	constrain	 those	other	 responses	or	 change	ourselves	 so	 as	 to	 remove	 the	 conflict.	With	 dutiful	 attention	 to	 the	 grounds	 of	 blameworthiness--the	 target	 agent’s	responsibility	for	a	wrongdoing--the	agent	may	experience	the	full	degree	of	blame.	But	fully	experiencing	blame	in	the	face	of	these	psychological	conflicts	will	usually	require	 foregoing	 the	 full	 experience	 of	 the	 other,	 also-grounded	 response.	 In	Harris’s	case,	these	opportunity	costs	are	quite	significant.	There	is	good	reason	to	resent	 those	 who	 mistreated	 Harris,	 to	 feel	 sympathy	 for	 Harris,	 and	 to	 feel	sympathy	for	his	victims.	These	are	very	important	responses,	and	so	to	fail	to	fully	experience	those	responses	is	a	significant	loss.	Moreover,	we	should	be	susceptible	to	both	resentment	and	sympathy	in	just	the	way	that	leads	to	this	conflict.	Resentment	is	a	way	of	acknowledging	the	moral	significance	of	wrongdoing	and	of	acknowledging	the	moral	importance	of	victims	of	wrongdoing.	This	 is	a	 reaction	not	 just	 to	 the	harm	suffered,	but	a	 reaction	 to	 the	wrong	and	how	it	impacts	our	relationships	as	moral	agents.	Those	of	us	within	the	Strawsonian	 tradition	 take	 seriously	 the	 role	 of	 resentment	 in	marking	our	moral	sociality.	 Sympathy,	 too,	 is	 critically	 important.	 Intuitively,	 sympathy	 is	 a	 way	 of	acknowledging	 the	 importance	 of	 someone	 who	 has	 suffered,	 and	 it	 plays	 an	important	role	in	bonding	and	in	motivating	moral	behavior.		
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Accordingly,	 it	 is	 inappropriate	 for	 us	 to	 feel	 full	 resentment	 toward	Harris.140	It	may	be	appropriate	for	us	to	feel	some	resentment	toward	Harris,	as	he	did	commit	a	significant	wrong.	But	it	is	also	important	to	experience	the	competing	responses	at	least	in	part,	and	that	importance	makes	it	wrong	for	us	to	fully	resent	Harris.	 So	 long	 as	 some	 mixed	 response	 is	 possible,	 it	 seems	 right	 to	 respond	partially	to	all	of	the	various	grounds	at	play,	the	exact	balancing	a	further	question.		This	assessment	of	Harris’s	case	 fits	well	with	our	experienced	response	 to	hearing	 about	 the	 case.	 In	 fact,	 it	 provides	 two	 explanatory	 payoffs.	 First,	 we	experience	 a	 mixed	 response	 to	 Harris,	 one	 of	 both	 blame	 and	 something	 like	exculpation,	and	the	overlap	argument	explains	this	phenomenon,	as	I’ve	explained.	Second,	 the	 overlap	 argument	 also	 explains	 why	 we	 find	 the	 bad-history	 cases	distinctively	uncomfortable,	why	we	find,	in	Watson’s	word,	our	response	to	Harris	to	 be	 one	 of	 “ambivalence”	 (1987,	 p.	 275).	 Harris	 is	 fully	 blameworthy,	 but	 we	should	not	fully	blame	him.	And	Harris	is	fully	sympathy-worthy,	but	we	should	not	feel	 fully	 developed	 sympathy	 for	 him.	 The	 resulting	mixed	 response	 is	 a	 second-best	response,	limited	by	our	finite	psychologies.	The	right	response	for	us	might	be	the	best	that	we	can	do,	but	it	leaves	something	important	out.	Our	ambivalence	can	be	seen	as	reflecting	our	sense	that	we	are	in	some	way	falling	short,	even	if	we	are	doing	exactly	as	we	should.	
																																																								140 	Alternatively,	 and	 more	 conservatively,	 it	 is	 not	 inappropriate	 not	 to	 feel	resentment	toward	Harris.	However,	since	the	competing	responses	are	responses	due	agents	other	than	the	blaming	agent,	I	do	not	think	those	competing	responses	are	supererogatory	or	merely	permitted	in	the	way	that	being	charmed	might	be.	
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Thus	there	are	two	powerful	explanations	a	reasons-responsiveness	theorist	might	 offer	 to	 the	 bad-history	 cases:	 bad	 history	 might	 have	 compromised	 the	agent’s	reasons-responsiveness,	 thereby	 indirectly	undermining	her	responsibility,	and	 bad	 history	 might	 ground	 competing	 responses	 like	 sympathy,	 thereby	undermining	 blame	 but	 not	 blameworthiness.	 And	 the	 more	 significant	 the	 bad-history,	the	more	compelling	these	explanations	will	be.	That	means	that	the	cases	which	might	have	seemed	the	most	promising	grist	for	the	historicists--cases	where	the	agents’	bad	histories	make	blame	seem	most	 inappropriate--are	also	 the	cases	where	these	explanations	are	the	most	compelling.	At	least	in	the	sorts	of	real-world	bad-history	 cases	 we	 actually	 confront,	 the	 ordinary	 reasons-responsiveness	account	 of	moral	 responsibility	 faces	 no	 explanatory	 deficit	 requiring	 us	 to	 adopt	historicism.	
5.4	 The	artificial	bad-history	agents	My	 assessment	 of	 the	 bad-history	 cases	 turns	 on	 the	 complications	 those	cases	all	 involve.	Just	as	the	bad	history	leaves	me	reticent	to	fully	blame	Harris,	 it	also	gives	me	substantial	reason	to	be	skeptical	that	he	has	developed	the	necessary	reasons-responsiveness	 capacities	 as	well	 as	 substantial	 reason	 to	be	 sympathetic	toward	him.	Thus,	while	Harris’s	case	is	an	importantly	representative	case,	it	might	not	 be	 a	 particularly	 fit	 test	 case.	 Philosophers	 have	 thus	 designed	 artificial	vignettes	 precisely	 to	 avoid	 just	 the	 sorts	 of	 explanations	 I’ve	 offered.	 If	 they	succeed	 in	 that,	 and	 if	 they	 also	 succeed	 in	 eliciting	 compelling	 intuitions	 about	compromised	responsibility,	then	we	will	be	pushed	to	add	a	historicist	element	to	
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the	 theory	 of	 moral	 responsibility.	 Here,	 I	 offer	 my	 skepticism	 that	 the	 fictional	accounts	can	simultaneously	achieve	both	of	those	goals.	Many	 of	 the	 fictional	 bad-history	 vignettes	 function	 by	 depicting	 an	 agent	whose	 behavior	 (often,	 but	 not	 always,	wrongdoing)	 is	 arguably	 the	 product	 of	 a	drastic	change	in	their	personality	brought	about	by	outside	intervention.	Not	all	of	the	 fictional	 bad-history	 vignettes	 have	 these	 features,	 but	 many	 do,	 as	 these	features	are	a	good	way	to	prompt	the	audience	to	see	that	the	behavior	was	in	an	important	 sense	 not	 the	 agent’s	 own.	 Consider	 Pereboom’s	 (2001,	 pp.	 112–126,	2014,	pp.	74–82)	Professor	Plum,	the	most	famous	such	case:	Professor	 Plum	 decides	 to	 murder	 White	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 some	personal	advantage,	and	succeeds	in	doing	so.	…	[T]he	action	satisfies	the	reasons-responsiveness	condition	advocated	by	John	Fischer	and	Mark	Ravizza	(1998):	Plum’s	desires	can	be	modified	by,	and	some	of	them	 arise	 form,	 rational	 consideration	 of	 his	 reasons,	 and	 if	 he	believed	that	the	bad	consequences	for	himself	that	would	result	from	his	killing	White	would	be	more	severe	than	he	actually	expects	them	to	be,	he	would	not	have	decided	to	kill	her.	…	Plum	has	the	general	ability	 to	 grasp,	 apply,	 and	 regulate	 his	 actions	 by	 moral	 reasons.	(2014,	p.	75)		However,	Plum’s	killing	of	White	can	be	traced	to	outsiders’	intervention:	A	team	of	neuroscientists	has	the	ability	to	manipulate	Plum’s	neural	states	 at	 any	 time	 by	 radio-like	 technology.	 In	 this	 particular	 case,	they	do	so	by	pressing	a	button	just	before	he	begins	to	reason	about	his	situation,	which	they	know	will	produce	in	him	a	neural	state	that	realizes	 a	 strongly	 egoistic	 reasoning	 process,	 which	 the	neuroscientists	 know	will	 deterministically	 result	 in	 his	 decision	 to	kill	White.	(2014,	p.	76)		Pereboom	claims	that	we	do	not	see	Plum	as	responsible	for	killing	White	and	that	this	response	shows	that	we	should	accept	historicism	about	responsibility--indeed	that	we	should	accept	incompatibilism.		
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Or	 consider	 Al	Mele’s	 contrast	 between	 Brainwashed	 Beth	 and	 Evil	 Chuck.	Evil	 Chuck	 is	 a	 deeply	 vicious	 agent	 who	 enjoys	 killing	 people,	 and	 his	 terrible	character	 is	 his	 own	 craftsmanship.	 When	 he	 was	 younger,	 Chuck	 would	 torture	animals	despite	his	distaste	for	the	act	just	to	ensure	that	he	could	do	as	he	pleased	without	regard	for	conventional	morality.	Mele	then	has	us	consider	Beth:		When	Beth	crawled	into	bed	last	night	she	was	an	exceptionally	sweet	person,	 as	 she	 always	 had	 been.	 Beth’s	 character	 was	 such	 that	intentionally	doing	anyone	serious	bodily	harm	definitely	was	not	an	option	 for	 her:	 her	 character—or	 collection	 of	 values—left	 no	 place	for	a	desire	to	do	such	a	thing	to	take	root.	Moreover,	she	was	morally	responsible,	 at	 least	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	 for	 having	 the	 character	she	had.	But	Beth	 awakes	with	 a	desire	 to	 stalk	 and	kill	 a	 neighbor,	George.	Although	she	had	always	found	George	unpleasant,	she	is	very	surprised	 by	 this	 desire.	What	 happened	 is	 that,	while	 Beth	 slept,	 a	team	of	 psychologists	 that	 had	discovered	 the	 system	of	 values	 that	make	 Chuck	 tick	 implanted	 those	 values	 in	 Beth	 after	 erasing	 hers.	(2013,	p.	169)		Beth	proceeds	to	act	on	the	implanted	Chuck-like	values,	killing	George.	Mele	thinks	that	Beth	is	not	autonomous	but	that	Chuck	is,	and	he	thinks	that	these	cases	show	that	the	conditions	of	autonomy	must	include	a	historical	element.141	For	both	Beth	and	Plum,	we	are	to	see	the	agent’s	wrongdoing	as	the	product	of	some	outside	factor,	and	the	outside	factor’s	role	is	to	prompt	us	to	intuit	that	the	agents	are	not	blameworthy.	Pereboom	and	Mele	thus	think	that	these	cases	show	that	those	agents’	bad	histories	must	be	accounted	for	in	assessing	the	agents.	What	can	the	ahistoricist,	 reasons-responsiveness	 theorist	say	about	 these	cases?	Here	 I	offer	 three	 responses:	 	 in	 fact,	we	 should	 see	 these	 agents	 as	blameworthy;	 but	 if	
																																																								141	I	set	aside	the	difference	between	the	sort	of	autonomy	which	interests	Mele	and	the	sort	of	responsibility	which	interests	me.	
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they	are	not	blameworthy,	the	ordinary,	ahistoricist	explanations	will	suffice;	and,	in	any	case,	we	should	not	trust	our	intuitions	in	these	bizarre	fabrications.	5.4.1	 The	blameworthiness	of	the	artificial	agents	Although	Pereboom	and	Mele	see	the	artificial	bad-history	agents	as	plainly	not	blameworthy,	it	is	open	to	the	theorist	to	say	that	both	agents	are	deserving	of	blame.142	Both	 cases	 are	 constructed	 so	 as	 to	 make	 clear	 that	 the	 killings	 are	manifestations	of	the	agents’	malicious	characters,	and	we	are	told	that	both	agents	have	the	properties	sufficient	for	the	ahistoricist,	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	 responsibility.	 If	 I	 dwell	 on	 Plum’s	 reasons-responsiveness,	 think	 about	 his	likely	awareness	that	the	killing	was	wrong,	and	think	about	his	insensitivity	to	the	suffering	and	harm	he	caused,	I	am	inclined	to	think	that,	whatever	his	history,	Plum	has	 become	 vicious,	 that	 his	 behavior	 was	 vicious,	 and	 that	 he	 is	 an	 appropriate	target	 of	 blame.	 As	 Fischer	 writes,	 “Although	 Plum	 is	 manipulated	 by	 others	(without	his	knowledge	or	consent),	he	is	not	forced	or	compelled	to	act	as	he	does;	thus,	 he	 is	 not	 a	 robot--he	 has	 a	 certain	 minimal	 measure	 of	 control,	 and	 moral	responsibility	 is	 associated	with	 control	 (of	 precisely	 this	 sort)”	 (2004,	p.	 157).143	Likewise,	if	I	focus	on	Beth’s	behavior,	if	I	keep	in	the	fore	of	my	mind	that,	whatever	the	 source	 of	 her	 ill	 character,	 Beth	 had	 the	 requisite	 reasons-responsiveness	
																																																								142	McKenna	(2008b)	calls	this	the	“hard-line	reply.”	The	hard-line	reply	denies	that	the	manipulated	agent	is	not	responsible.	This	is	the	line	Frankfurt	(not	a	reasons-responsiveness	 theorist)	 takes.	 As	 I	 quoted	 Frankfurt	 before:	 	 “The	 fact	 that	someone	is	a	pig	warrants	treating	him	like	a	pig”	(2002,	p.	28).	143 	Fischer	 then	 proceeds	 to	 distinguish	 responsibility	 for	 wrongdoing	 from	blameworthiness,	 in	 large	part	by	appealing	 to	his	 taking-responsibility	 account.	 I	reject	that	distinction	and	the	historicism	of	that	account,	as	explained	previously.	
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capacities	at	the	time,	and	if	I	make	myself	imagine	someone	who	feels	the	urge	to	kill,	who	has	all	the	rich	capacities	needed	to	control	her	urge,	and	yet	indulges	that	urge,	 I	 am	 inclined	 to	 think	 that	 Beth’s	 behavior	 is	 vicious,	 and	 that	 she	 is	 the	appropriate	 target	 of	 blame.	 The	 science-fiction	 elements	 of	 the	 stories	 are	distracting,	but	perhaps	not	impossibly	so.	When	I	focus	on	the	agents’	indulging	in	their	inclinations	to	wrongdoing	despite	being	in	the	possession	of	rich	capacities	to	resist,	 I	 am	 inclined	 to	 blame	 both	 fictional	 agents.	 If	 this	 method	 of	 focusing	produces	 similar	 results	widely,	 then	 the	 fictional	 cases	 are	 grist	 for	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	theory,	not	a	challenge	to	it.	5.4.2	 Explaining	the	artificial	bad-history	intuitions	Nonetheless,	many	people	respond	to	Plum,	Beth,	and	similar	artificial	cases	by	reporting	that	they	find	blame	inappropriate.	In	many	of	the	artificial	cases,	this	is	exactly	the	verdict	the	reasons-responsiveness	theory	should	lead	us	to	expect.	As	was	 true	 for	 the	 real-world	 bad-history	 agents,	 blame	 might	 be	 inappropriate	because	 the	 agent	 is	 not	 blameworthy,	 and	 blame	might	 inappropriate	 even	 for	 a	blameworthy	wrongdoer	because	of	further,	countervailing	factors.	First,	despite	the	professed	aims	of	the	vignettes’	constructors,	we	should	be	skeptical	that	the	artificial	cases	can	be	constructed	such	that	we	are	in	a	position	to	comfortably	conclude	that	 the	 fictional	agents	are	reasons-responsive.	 If	Plum	and	Beth	 are	 not	 reasons-responsive,	 then	 the	 theory	 can	 readily	 accommodate	 the	urged	intuition	that	they	are	not	appropriately	to	blame.	Pereboom	and	Mele	claim	that	the	outside	 intervention	 leaves	 intact	 the	 features	picked	out	by	compatibilist	
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accounts	 of	 responsibility,	 e.g.,	 the	 agent’s	 reasons-responsiveness.	We	 should	 be	skeptical	 that	 the	 intervention	 can	 be	 so	 precise.	 This	 is	 true	with	 respect	 to	 the	capacities	at	issue,	and	it	is	particularly	true	with	respect	to	the	implanted	desires.	In	many	of	 the	 fictional	 cases,	 the	desires	 at	 issue	 are	particularly	 strong	desires;	they	 must	 be	 strong	 to	 guarantee	 the	 resulting	 unwarranted	 wrongs.	 But	 the	presence	of	particularly	strong	desires	raises	the	possibility	that	the	desires	are	so	strong	as	to	compromise	the	agent’s	responsibility.144	Consider	Plum’s	desire	to	kill	White.	 Did	 that	 strong	 desire	 interfere	with	 his	 taking	 seriously	 the	 possibility	 of	restraint,	 from	recognizing	the	moral	reasons	which	opposed	the	killing?	Or,	 if	 the	desire	did	not	keep	Plum	from	recognizing	that	he	should	not	kill	White,	was	 it	so	strong	he	could	not	resist	the	desire?	We	might	imagine	Plum	acting	like	an	addict,	driven	by	an	urge	against	his	own	better	judgment.	The	more	I	dwell	on	the	strength	of	 the	desire,	 the	more	plausible	these	possibilities	seem.	It	 is	not	clear	to	me	that	there	is	room	to	conclude	both	that	Plum,	Beth,	and	the	rest	were	not	saddled	with	desires	of	this	sort	and	that	we	nonetheless	have	imagined	the	relevant	desire	in	the	right	sort	of	 richness	required	 to	generate	a	reliable	 intuition	about	 the	case.	This	
																																																								144	Fischer	(2014,	pp.	204–205)	suggests	a	dilemma:		either	the	desire	is	not	strong	enough	 to	 guarantee	 the	 wrongdoing,	 or	 it	 is	 strong	 enough	 to	 constitute	 a	responsibility-compromising	irresistible	urge.	I	think	the	problem	for	the	historicist	can	 be	 made	 even	 more	 pressing:	 	 to	 prompt	 the	 right	 intuitions,	 the	 audience	should	 be	 convinced	 that,	 but	 for	 the	 implanted	 desire,	 the	 agent	 would	 have	resisted	 the	 vicious	wrong.	 The	 greater	 the	wrong,	 the	 greater	 the	motivation	we	should	 have	 expected	 the	 agent	 to	 experience	 to	 resist	 performing	 the	 wrong.	Therefore,	the	greater	the	wrong,	the	stronger	the	urge	must	be.	If	the	urge	is	not	at	least	 as	 strong	 as	 the	 wrongdoing	 is	 wrong,	 then	 we	 might	 expect	 the	 outside	intervention	to	do	little	more	than	to	reveal	the	agent’s	prior	bad	character.	There	would	then	be	no	problem	holding	the	agent	responsible	and	blameworthy.	
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suspicion	is	heightened	when	I	recall	that,	while	almost	everyone	accepts	that	there	might	be	desires	so	strong	as	to	excuse,	our	understanding	of	such	desires	remains	relatively	undeveloped.	Second,	 even	 if	 Pereboom	 and	Mele	 have	 successfully	 constructed	 cases	 of	blameworthy	 artificial	 agents,	 we	 should	 suspect	 that	 these	 are	 nonetheless	 not	agents	who	are	properly	to	blame.	We	can	explain	this	by	appealing	to	the	overlap	assessment	without	 needing	 to	 appeal	 to	 compromised	 responsibility.	 Both	 Plum	and	Beth	are	overlap	cases.	We	have	reason	to	resent	them	because	of	their	culpable	wrongdoing,	but	we	also	have	reason	to	resent	those	who	have	manipulated	them	and	 reason	 to	 sympathize	 with	 them	 for	 having	 been	 manipulated.	145	Both	 have	been	manipulated	in	surreptitious	fashion,	leading	both	to	commit	vicious	murders.	We	have	good	pro	tanto	reason	to	feel	sympathy	for	them	on	these	grounds.	As	with	Harris,	 the	various	responses	should	compete,	and	so	we	cannot	 fully	resent	Plum	and	 Beth	 without	 foregoing	 these	 other	 important	 responses.	 Because	 these	responses	conflict,	 the	right	response	to	both	Plum	and	Beth	is	a	mixed,	conflicted	response.	 Here,	 too,	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 theorist	 can	 explain	 why	 the	artificial	bad-history	agents	are	not	properly	to	blame	without	any	need	to	modify	the	underlying	account	of	moral	responsibility.	5.4.3	 Rejecting	the	artificial	bad-history	intuitions	The	bad-history	cases	are	designed	to	generate	intuitions	which	avoid	these	explanations.	 If	 they	 are	 successful	 in	 doing	 so,	 then	 these	 explanations,	 and	with																																																									145	Michael	Bratman	(2000),	Nomy	Arpaly	(2002),	McKenna	(2012),	and	others	have	made	this	point	about	the	manipulation	cases.	
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them	my	case	for	ahistoricism,	fail.	But	we	should	be	skeptical	that	the	bad-history	cases	can	be	expected	to	generate	the	right	sort	of	intuition.146	The	matters	are	too	controverted,	 abstract,	 and	 bizarre	 for	 the	 resulting	 intuitions	 to	 be	 of	 significant	probative	force.	This	means	that	seeing	them	as	noise	or	error	is	not	a	particularly	high	price.147	The	 first	 problem	 with	 the	 intuitive	 data	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 what	 the	intuitions	are	supposed	to	be	intuitions	about.	There	is	disagreement	in	the	way	that	the	 intuitions	are	described.	For	Haji	 and	Pereboom,	 the	 intuition	 is	 to	 regard	 the	agent’s	responsibility.	For	Mele,	the	intuition	is	sometimes	about	responsibility	but	sometimes	about	free	or	autonomous	action.	For	McKenna,	the	intuition	is	about	the	appropriateness	 of	 blame.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 these	 philosophers	 are	 having	intuitive	judgments	about	different	topics	(and	thus	often	talking	past	each	other)	or	whether	some	or	all	of	them	are	mistaken	as	to	the	nature	of	their	own	intuitions.	This	 complexity	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 continuing	 disagreements	 about	 the	concepts	at	issue.	Is	there	one	central	sort	of	responsibility	at	issue,	two,	or	many?	Is	the	sort	of	responsibility	at	issue	the	realist	sort	or	the	response-dependence	sort?	What	exactly	is	the	relationship	between	responsibility	and	blameworthiness?	If	it	is																																																									146	Not	 everyone	 is	 so	 skeptical.	 Some	 think	 that	 the	 science-fiction	 cases	 are	particularly	suited	to	the	task,	since	they	allow	us	to	isolate	and	even	highlight	the	factors	 we	 are	 curious	 to	 investigation.	 See,	 for	 example,	 Pereboom	 (2014,	 p.	 95	quoting	 Nelkin	 from	 conference	 comments	 approvingly)	 and	 Carolina	 Sartorio	(2016,	p.	165).	147 	Because	 there	 are	 ostensibly	 conflicting	 intuitions--ordinary	 intuitions	 of	responsibility	 about	 ordinary	 agents	 and	 fantastic	 intuitions	 of	 non-responsibility	about	artificial	agents--many	philosophers	will	categorize	one	or	the	other	class	of	intuitions	as	in	error.	Thus	we	see	Pereboom	(2014,	p.	88)	offering	an	argument	that	we	should	expect	our	intuitions	about	ordinary	cases	to	be	in	error.	
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not	settled	among	philosophers	what	exactly	“responsibility”	is	to	pick	out,	it	is	not	clear	 how	 I	 could	 be	 confident	 that	 my	 intuition	 regards	 that	 phenomenon,	whatever	it	is	supposed	to	be.		The	second	problem	is	that	we	cannot	expect	reliable	data	from	the	artificial	cases.	 Assume	 that	 there	 is	 some	 agreed	 sense	 of	 realist,	 accountability	responsibility	tied	to	blameworthiness	(to	pick	one	sense	of	responsibility	at	issue),	distinct	 from	 attributability	 responsibility,	 and	 distinct	 from	 blame’s	 being	 all-things-considered	appropriate.	We	would	need	 to	be	 confident	 that	 our	 intuitions	are	properly	responding	to	that	phenomenon	in	particular.	 Ishtiyaque	Haji	(2013),	for	example,	 acknowledges	 that	 the	historicist	must	 take	care	 to	elicit	 an	 intuitive	response	which	avoids	competing	explanations.	He	insists	that	we	are	able	to	keep	these	competing	features	at	bay,	to	focus	our	moral	imaginations	on	the	cases	in	an	intentional	way,	and	to	thereby	generate	an	intuition	which	we	can	be	confident	is	not	 responding	 to	 those	 competing	 features.	 But	 I	 cannot	 focus	my	 intuitions	 like	that.	When	I	attempt	to	introspectively	examine	my	response	to	a	case	and	thereby	focus	 on	 blameworthiness	 in	 particular,	 I	 lose	 my	 grasp	 upon	 the	 case	 and	 my	response.	 Of	 course,	 that	 could	 be	merely	 my	 own	 shortcoming.	 But	 I	 have	 little	beyond	 Haji’s	 own	 assertion	 that	 his	 intuitions	 are	 significantly	 more	 sensitive,	nuanced,	and	controllable	than	my	own.	That	 our	 intuitions	 in	 these	 cases	 might	 not	 be	 reliable	 should	 not	 be	surprising.	The	cases	are	strange,	and	strange	cases	might	be	expected	to	produce	strange	 data.	 We	 see	 this	 worry	 from	 King:	 	 “the	 intuition	 here	 regards	 a	
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significantly	 fringe	 case	 of	 action,	 involving	 a	 mechanism	 that	 is,	 at	 present,	technologically	 impossible.	One	might	 reasonably	 think	 that	our	 intuitions	 in	 such	cases	are	defeasible”	(2013,	p.	69).	We	see	a	similar	worry	from	McKenna:	Our	 intuitions	 have	 evolved	 along	 with	 our	 ordinary	 practices.	 It	 is	only	to	be	expected	that	when	those	intuitions	are	tested	in	extremely	different	contexts,	contexts	which	differ	radically	from	the	ones	out	of	which	 they	 evolved,	 they	 will	 be	 indecisive.	 …	 [W]hen	 we	 test	 our	intuitions	 against	 wildly	 divergent	 contexts,	 we	 are	 certainly	 not	licensed	to	draw	decisive	conclusions.	We	are	not	sure	what	to	make	of	them.	(2008a,	p.	157)		Granting	that	intuition-pumping	is	in	general	a	reliable	method	for	getting	valuable	data	 about	 normative	 facts,	 we	 might	 nonetheless	 have	 particular	 reason	 to	 be	suspicious	of	the	method	in	such	bizarre	cases.	Although	I	do	not	here	offer	a	full	defense	of	this	suspicion,	I	can	offer	several	reasons	in	support	of	my	skepticism.	First,	the	bizarre	features	will	be	particularly	attention-getting,	and	so	they	might	distort	our	verdicts	by	distracting	us	from	more	quotidian	 but	 morally	 relevant	 features.	 A	 science-fiction	 manipulation	 might	capture	our	attention	just	by	being	so	different	from	ordinary	experience,	and	this	might	distract	us	from	the	preserved	elements	of	the	agent’s	psychology.	I	focus	on	Plum’s	manipulation,	rather	than	focusing	on	the	state	of	his	capacities,	the	nature	of	his	control	over	his	behavior,	or	even	his	wrongdoing.	Second,	even	if	we	do	keep	all	of	 the	elements	of	 the	vignette	duly	 in	mind,	why	assume	 that	we	 can	 readily	 and	accurately	 imagine	whatever	 is	presented	 in	the	text	of	the	vignette?	I	know	that	I	am	to	imagine	that	Plum	has	been	manipulated	in	a	way	that	is	both	preserving	of	the	ahistoricist	conditions	and	efficacious--but	I	
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don’t	know	what	it	is	to	imagine	that.	Chandra	Sripada	registers	a	similar	complaint:		“The	philosophers	who	have	advanced	manipulation	cases	actually	provide	precious	little	 information	 to	 help…,	 and	 instead	 make	 only	 broad	 references	 to	 ‘rigorous	practices	of	conditioning’,	vaguely	Skinnerian	kinds	of	behavioral	engineering,	and	‘scripting’	major	life	events”	(2012,	p.	569	citations	omitted).	This	is	not	the	sort	of	language	 that	 aids	 the	 imaginative	 process	 you	might	 expect	 to	 prompt	 a	 reliable	intuition.	The	abstractions	do	little	to	help	illuminate	the	fringe	which	worried	King.	Third,	 we	 should	 expect	 our	 ordinary	 experiences	 to	 infect	 our	 intuitions	about	 extraordinary	experiences.148	Consider	 the	 ‘ordinary’	manipulations	 familiar	to	us,	such	as	hypnosis	or	drugs,	things	which	render	the	agent	readily	suggestible.	These	leave	us	open	to	manipulation,	but	they	seem	to	do	so	in	ways	which	would	provide	good	explanations	of	 the	manipulation	 intuition	 for	 the	compatibilist.	 It	 is	more	than	plausible	that	drugs	and	hypnosis	compromise	reasons-responsiveness.	And	 so	 our	 experiences	 with	 such	 cases	 (real	 or	 imagined)	 might	 make	 us	susceptible	 to	 judging	 other	manipulated	 agents	 non-responsible,	 even	 if	 there	 is	not	specific	evidence	of	compromised	reasons-responsiveness.	This	skepticism	about	the	probative	value	of	the	intuitions	prompted	by	the	artificial	cases	is	supported	by	the	empirical	data.	Dylan	Murray	and	Eddy	Nahmias	(2014)	report	 that	 the	explanation	of	an	agent’s	moral	 responsibility	and	 free	will	judgments	appears	sensitive	to	the	perception	(vignette-induced	or	otherwise)	of	an	agent’s	practical	reasoning	mechanisms	being	bypassed--not	determinism.	This	was																																																									148	Pereboom	raises	a	similar	worry	about	ordinary	experience	 in	 trying	 to	defuse	the	ordinary	intuitions	of	responsibility.	
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the	case	even	though	the	involved	vignettes	were	not	designed	to	prompt	bypassing	judgments.	 That	means	 that	 at	 least	 some	 participants	were	 (perhaps	 against	 the	vignettes)	 inferring	 that	 causal	 determinism	 worked	 by	 bypassing	 the	 relevant	agential	structures,	robbing	the	intuition	data	of	its	probative	effects	with	respect	to	the	direct	relevance	of	history	to	moral	responsibility.	Sripada	 (2012)	 gives	 a	 similar	 indictment	 of	 the	 probative	 value	 of	 the	artificial	 cases.	He	 notes	 that	 people	may	 imagine	 cases	 differently,	 and	 they	may	respond	to	different	features	of	the	cases	(such	that	we	cannot	be	sure	that	all	of	the	elements	 of	 the	 vignette	 are	 playing	 their	 intended	 role).	 There	 was	 a	 high	correlation	 in	 the	 data	 he	 examined	 between	participants	 assessing	 that	 an	 agent	lacked	 free	 will	 and	 participants	 judging	 there	 to	 be	 corruption	 in	 either	 the	information	 available	 to	 the	 agent	 or	 the	 agent’s	 moral	 psychology.	 Importantly,	“reading	 the	 Manipulation	 vignette	 …	 had	 no	 significant	 effect	 at	 all	 on	 free	 will	ratings	 over	 and	 above	 the	 effect	 it	 had	 on	 producing	 judgments	 that	 the	 agent	suffered	 from	certain	kinds	of	psychological	damage”	 (Sripada,	2012,	p.	582).	The	shadows	cast	by	manipulation	upon	the	vignette	agent’s	contemporary	psychology	fully	 explained	 the	 free-will	 judgments.	 As	 Sripada	 concludes,	 “the	 results	 of	 the	studies	 reported	 in	 this	 paper	 suggest	 that	 these	 extra	 historical	 conditions	 are	actually	 unnecessary”	 (2012,	 p.	 567	 n.2).	 These	 reports	 suggest	 that	 it	 will	 be	difficult	 to	 craft	 a	 vignette	which	 prompts	 the	 needed	 intuition	 and	 also	 that	 the	actual	data	supports	the	ahistoricist	against	the	historicist.	
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Given	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 concepts	 at	 issue,	 the	 vagueness	 of	 the	manipulation	 at	 issue,	 and	 the	 empirical	 data,	 I	 am	 skeptical	 that	 the	 bad-history	cases	will	readily	provide	the	particular	 intuition	which	the	historicists	need.	 I	am	also	pessimistic	that	the	historicists	will	be	able	to	design	a	case	which	might	more	clearly	elicit	an	intuition	about	blameworthiness	without	suggesting	the	competing	explanation	from	the	overlap	cases.	Any	appeal	to	a	bad	history	will,	by	the	very	fact	of	 the	 badness	 of	 the	 history,	 invite	 the	 explanation	 from	 the	 overlap	 cases.	 And	even	if	some	delicately	constructed	case	could	be	identified,	the	case	would	have	to	be	imagined	precisely,	and	the	intuition	would	have	to	regard	the	precise	normative	facts.	But	the	complications	of	the	case	should	undermine	our	confidence	that	we’ve	imagined	 the	 case	 correctly,	 holding	 the	 right	 features	 in	 mind	 and	 avoiding	unnoticed	 interference.	 And	 to	 ensure	 that	 we’ve	 imagined	 the	 case	 clearly,	 we	might	need	 to	 simplify	 the	 case,	 but	 then	 it	will	 be	difficult	 to	 be	 certain	 that	 our	intuitive	 responses	are	about	 the	 right	normative	 facts,	 about	blameworthiness	as	opposed	 to	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 blame.	 And	 so	 I	 am	 inclined	 to	 think	 that	 it	 is	more	likely	that	Haji	is	mistaken	about	his	own	intuitions	than	that	he	is	capable	of	generating	the	sort	of	intuitions	needed	to	preserve	the	historicists’	argument.	But	this,	of	course,	remains	open.	Thus	 I	 take	 my	 explanations	 to	 defuse	 the	 most	 popular	 argument	 for	historicism,	 at	 least	 given	 the	 cases	 so	 far	 offered	 to	 support	 the	 argument.	 I	 can	offer	 satisfying	 explanations	 of	 both	 real-life	 cases	 like	 Robert	 Alton	 Harris	 and	artificial	 cases	 like	Professor	Plum.	This	does	not	mean	 that	historicism	 is	 false;	 it	
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means	 only	 that	 the	 most	 popular	 argument	 for	 historicism	 is	 unsound.	 Other	arguments	 for	historicism--e.g.,	 the	consequence	argument	made	popular	by	Peter	van	Inwagen	(1983)--are	left	untouched.	However,	while	my	argument	is	consistent	with	the	truth	of	historicism,	it	can	play	a	key	role	in	the	defense	of	ahistoricism,	by	defusing	one	of	the	central	challenges	ahistoricism	faces.	Chapter	5,	in	part,	is	currently	being	prepared	for	submission	for	publication	as	 Craig	 Agule,	 “Being	 Sympathetic	 to	 Bad-History	Wrongdoers.”	 The	 dissertation	author	was	the	sole	investigator	and	author	of	this	paper.	
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Conclusion	
This	 concludes	 a	 powerful	 case	 for	 an	 ahistorical,	 reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	 responsibility.	On	my	core	account,	 responsibility	has	 to	do	with	the	sort	of	agent	you	are	when	you	act.	You	are	responsible	for	your	behavior	if	and	only	 if	 your	 behavior	manifests	 your	 quality	 of	will,	 and	 your	 behavior	manifests	your	quality	of	will	if	and	only	if	you	act	while	in	the	possession	of	central,	agential	capacities.	Reasons-responsiveness	accounts	of	moral	responsibility	are	widely	popular,	but	 most	 advocates	 augment	 the	 core	 account	 by	 adding	 historical	 elements	 of	various	 sorts.	 The	 historical	 elements	 are	 most	 often	 added	 because	 the	 core	account	 is	seen	as	unable	 to	explain	our	 intuitive	responses	 to	 important	problem	cases.	 Accordingly,	 I	 defend	 the	 ahistorical,	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 by	taking	 on	 those	 important	 problem	 cases,	 by	 showing	 that	 the	 core	 reasons-responsiveness	account	can	provide	satisfying	explanations	for	those	cases	without	requiring	any	historical	commitments.	I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 ahistorical,	 reasons-responsiveness	 account	 can	provide	 satisfying	 explanations	 of	 the	 cases	 often	 thought	 to	 compel	 historicism.	However,	that	those	cases	do	not	give	us	reason	to	accept	historicism	does	not	mean	that	 the	historicist	might	not	 find	support	 for	historicism	elsewhere.	For	example,	historicism	might	yet	be	grounded	in	appeal	to	first	principles	about	fairness	or	in	further	 explorations	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 control.	 Although	 the	 devil	 is	 in	 the	 details,	there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 my	 explanations	 of	 the	 potentially	 troublesome	
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cases	would	be	 inconsistent	with	such	historicist	accounts	of	moral	 responsibility,	and	so	I	have	not	begged	the	question	against	the	historicist.	All	that	said,	while	my	arguments	do	not	provide	a	final	case	against	historicism,	they	do	give	good	reason	to	accept	an	ahistorical	account	of	moral	responsibility.	This	means	that	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that	moral	responsibility	is	an	ahistorical	phenomenon.	Moral	 responsibility	has	 to	do	with	 the	sort	of	agent	you	are,	 not	 with	 what	 has	 happened	 to	 you	 in	 your	 past.	 The	 past	 is	 causally	 and	epistemically	relevant	to	moral	responsibility,	but	moral	responsibility	is	essentially	ahistorical.	 Seeing	 this	 is	 important	 for	 getting	 the	 right	 theory	 of	 moral	responsibility,	 for	 getting	 our	 moral	 responsibility	 verdicts	 correct,	 and	 for	understanding	the	sort	of	control	implicated	in	moral	responsibility.	Although	 my	 argument	 provides	 a	 compelling	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	historicism,	it	also	pushes	us	toward	a	number	of	further	questions.	Some	of	these	questions	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 explanations	 offered	 by	 the	 ahistoricist	 account	 for	 the	tracing	 and	 bad-history	 cases.	 For	 instance,	 once	 we	 recognize	 that	 we	 should	account	for	the	tracing	cases	by	focusing	on	blameworthy	acts	of	self-incapacitation,	we	need	to	consider	whether	those	acts	are	more	widespread	than	we	might	have	originally	 noticed.	 Are	 we	 overlooking	 a	 tremendous	 number	 of	 significant	wrongdoings	 just	 because	 they	 do	 not	 result	 in	 an	 additional,	 compromised	wrongdoing?	 Likewise,	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 bad-history	 cases	 appeals	 to	 the	psychological	 conflict	 between	 resentment	 and	 sympathy	 in	 those	 cases.	Recognizing	that	conflict	can	help	us	explain	our	intuitive	responses	to	those	cases,	
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but	it	should	also	push	us	to	ask	whether	that	conflict	is	fixed	and	to	ask	whether,	in	light	 of	 that	 conflict,	 we	might	 better	 structure	 our	 conflicting	 responses.	 And,	 of	course,	 while	 it	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 an	 agent’s	 history	 is	 causally	 and	epistemically	 relevant	 to	 his	 contemporary	 reasons-responsiveness,	 the	 exact	nature	 of	 this	 relevance,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 the	 causal	development	of	the	capacities,	needs	illuminating.	More	broadly,	my	arguments	point	to	broader	questions	about	the	nature	of	the	 reasons-responsiveness	 account.	 For	 instance,	 the	 argument	 about	 the	 bad-history	 cases	 focuses	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 fittingness	 of	 the	 reactive	attitudes	and	the	reasons	we	might	have	to	experience	them	(or	not)--a	relationship	that	 is	widely	assumed	but	underexplored.	The	reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	 responsibility	 explains	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 reactive	 attitudes	being	 fitting.	Does	 fittingness	 then	 ground	 a	 practical	 reason	 of	 some	 kind	 to	 experience	 the	reactive	attitudes?	What	sort	of	reason	would	this	be?	If	this	reason	derives	from	the	role	that	the	reactive	attitudes	play	in	the	good	life,	what	exactly	is	the	nature	of	that	role,	 and	how	do	 other	 concerns	 interact	with	 that	 role?	 Similarly,	my	 arguments	put	pressure	on	 the	notion	of	 capacity	 at	 the	heart	 of	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	account.	 Both	 the	 general	 notion	 of	 a	 psychological	 capacity	 and	 the	 particular	reasons-responsiveness	capacities	are	 intuitively	attractive,	but	the	working	of	the	capacities	 remains	 underexplored.	 These	 capacities	 will	 not	 admit	 of	 a	 standard	conditional	analysis--for	example,	you	have	the	capacity	if	you	would	perform	if	you	tried	to	perform--as	the	capacity	to	try	is	at	the	heart	of	the	issue.	So	my	arguments	
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push	us	to	identify	the	relevant	notion	of	capacities	that	could	do	the	work	instead.	If	 we	 had	 that	 fully	 developed	 notion	 of	 capacity,	 we	 could	 see	 how	 it	 relates	 to	quality	of	will,	how	it	admits	of	degrees,	and	the	like.	That	 my	 arguments	 for	 ahistoricism	 raise	 these	 further	 questions	 is	 no	particular	 weakness	 of	 the	 account--these	 are	 questions	 which	 all	 reasons-responsiveness	theorists	should	face,	and	my	arguments	merely	help	to	bring	them	into	 focus.	 So	 my	 arguments	 here	 both	 establish	 a	 compelling	 case	 for	 an	ahistoricist,	 reasons-responsiveness	account	of	moral	 responsibility	and	provide	a	framework	for	further	investigations	into	moral	responsibility.		
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